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THESIS ABSTRACT 
The thesis starts by providing a brief overview of South African 
''Coloured" politics from the passing of Ordinance 50 in 1828 to 
the removal of the Cape Coloured people from the common voter's 
roll in 1956. It then goes on to discuss in detail the structures 
instituted by successive Nationalist Governments to serve as an 
alternative to parliamentary representation for the coloured 
people, the role of the various coloured political parties within 
such structures and the latter's gradual adaptation and 
development, culminating in the inauguration of the Tricameral 
Parliament in early 1985. 
The thesis is, on the one hand, a detailed record of coloured 
political activity following the loss of common roll voting 
rights in the Cape, focusing on specifically coloured political 
parties rather than on broader, non-ethnic resistance movements 
in which many coloured people took part during the same period. 
This covers the rise and rapid decline of a conservative grouping 
within the coloured community which sought to foster an 
exclusively coloured nationalism operating within the 
Government's policy of parallel development, and attempted to use 
the Coloured Persons' Representative Council as a means towards 
achieving the economic, social and political upliftrnent of the 
coloured people. It also deals with the important role of the 
Labour ?arty after 1966, showing how a moderate resistance 
movement carne to use the Council as a platform from which to 
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confront the Government's apartheid policies and to render the 
institutions of parallel development unworkable through non-
cooperation and boycotting. 
The second important preoccupation of the thesis concerns the 
ambiguous and often contradictory attitudes towards the "coloured 
question" within the National Party itself. This ambivalence, it 
is argued, not only had much to do with the eventual failure of 
the Coloured Persons' Representative Council to become a viable 
substitute for Parliamentary representation acceptable to the 
majority of coloured people, but was also a primary cause of the 
National Party split in 1982 . It shows too how the collapse of 
Grand Apartheid had its origins in the failure to incorporate the 
coloured population within its framework. 
The thesis is concerned primarily with coloured political 
developments. When relevant, however, the establishment and 
development of representative institutions for the Indian people 
is also dealt with, in so far as this overlaps with issues and 
events concerning the coloured Council. Finally, the five year 
period following the dissolution of the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council in 1980 and the inauguration of the 
Tricameral Parliament in 1985 is briefly dealt with in a 
concluding chapter. This mainly concerns the gradual 
accommodation reached between the Government and the Labour Party 
when the latter eventually agreed , conditionally, to take part in 
the new constitution. 
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CHRONOLOGY The Rise and Entrenchment 
Segregation 1902-1984 
of 
X 
Political 
Pre-1902: Grant of representative Government to Cape (1853) and 
Natal (1856). Franchise colour-blind, based on property 
occupied and income levels. 
1902: 
1903: 
1906-7: 
1908: 
1909: 
1919: 
1926: 
1930: 
1931: 
Granting of voting rights to "natives" (questionably 
extended to coloured people) in the defeated Boer 
republics postponed until after the granting of 
responsible government. 
All people of colour excluded from electing members to 
Johannesburg Town Council by Transvaal municipal 
ordinance. 
Responsible Government granted to Transvaal and Orange 
River Colony, but coloured people and Africans excluded 
from the franchise despite representations to the 
British Parliament. 
National Convention meets, no non-white delegates 
present. 
Draft South Africa Act emerging from the National 
Convention passed by the parliaments of all four South 
African colonies . It disqualifies all people not of 
purely European descent from standing for election to 
the Union Parliament. Sections 35 and 153 entrench but 
do not guarantee the retention of the Cape franchise. 
British Parliament passes Act in toto, despite appeals, 
petitions and deputations. 
Formation of United Afrikaner League (later the African 
National Bond) , the first coloured organisation to be 
enticed into co-operating with the National Party's 
segregatory policies in the hope of political and 
economic advancement. 
Coloured Person ' s Rights Bill proposes the limited 
extension of voting rights to coloureds in the 
Transvaal and 0 . F . S. Bill never comes up for discussion 
in the Union Parliament. 
Women's Enfranchisement Act extends vote to all white 
women but excludes coloured and African women and thus 
effectively halves the value of the non-European vote 
in the Cape. 
Franchise Laws Amendment Act abolishes property and 
educational qualifications required of white males to 
vote, but retains them for coloureds and Africans. 
1931: 
1936: 
1937: 
1943: 
1944: 
1945-8: 
1948: 
1949: 
1950: 
1953: 
1951-6: 
xi 
Electoral Laws Act enables anyone to challenge 
registered voters to prove they had fulfilled the 
franchise qualifications on pain of being struck off 
the roll. 
Representation of Natives Act removes blacks (but not 
coloured people) from the common voters' roll in the 
cape. Native's Representative Council set up as an 
advisory body. 
Wilcocks Commission issues its report on the socio-
economic and legal position of the Cape Coloured 
people. Minority recommendation suggests that separate 
sections in the different departments of state be set 
up to see to the needs of the coloured population. 
Coloured Advisory Council (C.A.C.) established, an 
entirely nominated body with solely advisory powers. 
Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Anti-CAD) and Non-
European Unity Movement (NEUM) emerge in opposition to 
this. 
Moderate Coloured Peoples' National Union (C.P.N.U.) 
set up to oppose radicalism. 
1931 Electoral Laws Act amended three times, giving 
greater opportunities for challenging registered voters 
to prove their franchise qualifications and tightening 
up registration procedures. A significant drop in the 
number of coloured voters results. 
National Party victorious in election and declares its 
intention of removing coloureds from the common voters' 
roll as soon as possible. 
Abolition C.A.C. 
Population Registration Act - coloured people defined 
as anyone who was not white or Bantu and subdivided 
into categories of Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua and 
"Other Coloured". 
Group Areas Act passed, leading to the removal of over 
80 000 coloured families by 1980. 
Section 16 of the amended Immorality Act makes trans-
racial sex illegal. 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. 
Prolonged constitutional and legal wrangling over the 
question of placing coloureds on a separate voters' 
roll. Separate Representation of Voters Act eventually 
passed, in terms of which the establishment of 
1959: 
1964: 
1964-8: 
1968: 
1969: 
1970: 
1971: 
1974: 
1976-7: 
1976: 
1977: 
xii 
Coloured Affairs Department and a coloured advisory 
board are also provided for. 
Coloured Affairs Department created with P.W. Botha as 
its first Minister. Union Council for Coloured Affairs 
also set up as a partially elected and wholly advisory 
body . 
Passing of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council 
Act, providing for the creation of a predominantly 
elected body with advisory, administrative and limited 
legislative powers. 
Emergence of coloured political parties, including the 
Federal Party (1964) a nd the Labour Party (1966). 
Passing of Prohibition of Political Interference, 
Coloured Persons Representative Council Amendment and 
Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Acts. 
First C.P.R.C. elections and the first time non-white 
elections on a nationwide basis had been held. 
White representatives of coloured people removed from 
the Assembly. 
Coloured municipal franchise in the Cape removed and 
management committees set up as a first step towards 
establishing autonomous coloured municipalities. 
Defeat pro-apartheid faction in C.P.R.C., despite aid 
Government nominees. Vorster outlines plans to elevate 
Council's executive to full "cabinet status" and the 
liaison committee of the C.P.R.C. into a consultative 
Cabinet Council. 
Refusal of majority Labour Party to co-operate scuttles 
attempts to get Vorster' s Cabinet Council off the 
ground. 
Theron Commission issues its report on the economic, 
social and constitutional progress of the coloured 
people since 1960. Separate Amenities and Mixed 
Marriages Acts criticised and possible changes to the 
Westminster constitution recommended to accommodate the 
coloured and Indian minorities. 
National Party introduces a set of new constitutional 
proposals which allow for the creation of three ethnic 
parliaments (white, coloured and Indian) and a Council 
of Cabinets. C.P.R.C. and South African Indian Council 
reject the dispensation. 
1978: 
1979: 
1980: 
1982: 
1983: 
1984: 
1985: 
xiii 
South African Black Alliance formed by Inkatha, the 
Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party. 
New proposals gazetted in a draft Bill; split in the 
Freedom Party heralds the virtual demise of right-wing 
coloured political parties . 
C.P.R.C. dissolved and plans for the creation of a 
nominated Coloured Persons' Council dropped by the 
Government; Schlebusch Report recommends the abolition 
of the Senate and the establishment of a multi-racial 
President's Council; Dissident Labourites form the 
People's Congress Party. 
1977 proposals modified by van der Merwe Report, a 
single-chamber Parliament with three houses replacing 
three separate Parliaments; Conservative Party formed 
by dissident Nationalists. 
Labour Party agrees to take part in proposed tricameral 
Parliament; new constitution endorsed by the white 
electorate in a referendum. 
First elections to the coloured House of 
Representatives and Indian House of Delegates held -
Labour Party virtually sweep the board in a low poll. 
First session of the new tricameral Parliament. 
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
One of the main bugbears of any scholar writing on the group of 
South Africans so classified as "coloured" is what term to use 
when referring to them. "Coloured" has deservedly become a term 
of opprobrium, referring as it does to an attempt by previous 
Nationalist Governments to force South Africans of mixed descent 
into a separate racial category (and in so doing, "justify" their 
receiving different - and unequal - treatment from the "white" 
population group). 
The personal interviews I conducted during my research did not 
clarify this question. Dr Willie Bergins spoke of 'Coloureds' and 
'Coloured people' without self-consciousness and Professor R.E. 
van der Ross, in reply to my somewhat uncomfortable reference to 
"so-called Co].oured people" remarked tartly that he made no 
apologies for using the term "coloured", addi ng that he did not 
use it with inverted commas, nor did he prefix it with "so-
called" . Norman Middleton on the other hand spoke of "so-called 
coloured people" throughout the interview and Allan Hendrickse, 
ruefully remarking that his people were the only ones who truly 
bore the stamp "made in South Africa", emphasized that the 
categorisation was an artificial one that had never been accepted 
by his party or the vast majority of people so classified. 
I have sought to resolve this dilemma - not entirely to my 
satisfaction- by using the term "coloured people", spelling it 
with a small "c". The real answer, of course, is that the 
coloured people are Afrikaners, with as much claim to 
Afrikanerdom as their "white" cousins sitting in the House of 
Assembly, religiously, culturally, historically and 
linguistically. Much of the thesis concerns this fact and its 
relation to the events described. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN "COLOURED" POLITICS 
FROM ORDINANCE 50 TO THE REMOVAL FROM 
THE COMMON VOTERS ROLL 
1828-1956 
"The Coloureds are excitable, gregarious and 
noisy. They are fond of loud, rhythmic 
music, bright colours, talking at the top of 
the voice. They usually have none of the 
white instinct of keeping oneself to 
oneself". 1 
"Next session we will take the Hottentots 
off the white man's voter's roll". 2 
"Whatever the sequel, the Coloured people 
have been at the centre of the National 
Party's attempts to entrench apartheid, and 
have not only seen it fail, but have to a 
significant extent contributed to that 
failure". 3 
B K Long MP (Quoted in Lewis, p.210) 
Minister Ben Schoeman, July 1949 
R Evan der Ross, "The Rise and Decline of Apartheid", 
p. 364 
2 
When reviewing the political history of the coloured people from 
the early 19th century to the present day, it is useful to 
distinguish between two broad periods: the 1828-1902 period 
between the passing of Ordinance 50 and the end of the Anglo-Boer 
War, and the 1902-1984 period from the Treaty of Vereeniging to 
the inauguration of the tricameral Parliament. In the first 
period coloured people, at least in the Cape where the majority 
of coloured people lived, shared a common political destiny with 
whites and blacks. With a colour-blind franchise based on income 
and property qualifications, and later literacy levels rather 
than race , coloureds could vote and stand for election as they 
chose. 
With this power came all the rights and privileges flowing from 
political equality - the right to own, acquire and dispose of 
property, to sell their labour freely, the legal upholding of 
their rights and the protection of their dignity and so on. The 
second period saw the gradual erosion of these rights, from the 
failure to extend them to the other South African provinces, to 
their being restricted and finally to their being taken away 
altogether. Together with this stripping away of political rights 
came the vulnerability associated with powerlessness: 
discrimination, exploitation, dispossession - in the job market, 
in education, in property owning, in the legal protection of 
human dignity and standards of civilization. 
Bitterly against their will, coloureds came to be treated as a 
separate element in South African society, as a separate nation 
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whose supposed "difference" was used to justify their being 
treated separately from whites. The opening chapter of this 
thesis will briefly trace this trend towards differentiation in 
the 20th century·, the political and socio-economic suppression of 
the coloured people and the struggles waged by coloured political 
organisations to protect their rights. The remainder of the 
thesis picks up the story from the validation of the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act in 1956 removing coloured people in 
the Cape from the common voters' roll to the relegation of the 
coloured people to a separate house in the Republican Parliament, 
with all the trapping but little of the substance of political 
authority. 
The Political Position of the Coloured People before 1902 
While most legislation passed by white political bodies dealing 
with people of colour in South Africa makes depressing reading, 
Ordinance No. 50 of 1828 is one of the few laws that can be 
looked at with favour. Henceforward the laws of the Cape Colony 
became "colour-blind" in that legislation differentiating between 
one inhabitant and another on the mere ground of colour became 
taboo. 1 Slaves freed between 1834 and 1838, together with 
whites and the old KhoiKhoi (Hottentot) race, the main 
progenitors of the coloured people, were also made free and equal 
before the law. In 1853 the Cape received Parliamentary 
(Representative) Government, and all persons of colour received 
the same franchise rights as those of whites. 
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A man was entitled to register as a voter and stand for election 
to the Lower House - The House of Assembly - if he earned 50 
pounds a year, or if he earned 25 pounds a year and was also 
supplied with board and lodging, or if he occupied a house and 
land with a combined value of 25 pounds. The qualifications for 
membership of the Legislative Council (the Upper House) were 
considerably higher , being the ownership of immovable property 
worth 2000 pounds clear of mortgage or movable and immovable 
property together worth 4000 pounds above all debts. 2 
The great poverty of most coloureds meant that these 
qualifications a cted as a de facto colour bar. However, coloured 
people could and did acquire the franchise in increasing numbers. 
In the constitutions of the two Boer republics, the Orange Free 
State and the South African Republic, coloureds (referred to as 
"bastards") were specifically excluded from standing for office 
or voting for candidates. It became the over-riding fear of 
educated coloureds that this Northern "illiberalism" would 
eventually pose a threat to the liberal tradition of the Cape. 
By the end of the century, coloureds made up some 20 per cent of 
the Cape electorate, though only a handful had acquired the vote 
in Natal. The gradual emerge nce of a coloured elite led to 
organisations being established to advance coloured rights, 
particularly franchise rights. Coloureds had little incentive to 
rally around a unifying coloured identity , lacking as they were 
in homogeneity or any real group loyalty. Indeed, some of the 
most prominent and advanced members of the coloured community 
preferred to "pass for white" and become absorbed into the white 
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community, whose standards of civilization they wished to 
emulate. However, prominent coloureds gradually came to use their 
imposed identity to advance their interests as a group, a 
compromise necessitated by the realities of race politics. 3 
The first non-white political organisation to attempt to 
establish itself on a national basis was the Coloured Peoples' 
Association (C.P.A.). It was formed in Kimberley, 1892, in 
opposition to the Franchise and Ballot Act, a measure that had 
raised the franchise qualifications so as to exclude Africans in 
the recently annexed Transkeian territories. Raising the 
financial requirements and adding a simple education test also 
rendered many coloureds ineligible for the vote. In response, the 
C.P.A. forwarded a petition with a notable 10 341 signatures to 
the Colonial Office in October 1892, no mean achievement for a 
young organisation. 4 
Although the C.P.A. folded soon after its 1894 congress, black 
political awakening was well under-way by the late 1890s. The 
rise of white political parties and the pro-Boer and pro-British 
factions that appeared as a result of the Jameson Raid and the 
Anglo-Boer war, added significant value to the coloured vote. It 
also split it, however . By and large, coloureds supported Britain 
in the war, confident that their reward would be the extension of 
the Cape non-racial fra11chise to the two Boer republics once they 
had been annexed. However, a significant minority were pro-Boer, 
casting their votes for Jan Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond in the 1898 
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election. This was to be the pattern in coloured politics up to 
the late 1970s. From John Tobin's Coloured Men's Protectorate, to 
the African National Bond in the 1920s, to the Federal Party of 
Torn Swartz, there were to be conservative factions, often Pro-
Afrikaans and prepared to co-operate with the authorities to 
advance their rights. 
During the Anglo-Boer War, statements by the British authorities 
lent weight to the assumptions of many coloureds that a British 
victory would mean the extension of their rights to coloured 
people in the north. 5 The British made it clear that they 
distinguished between aboriginals and those of mixed descent. 
However, when peace was made with the republics, Article 8 of the 
Vereeniging Treaty stipulated that the question of granting the 
franchise to ~atives there (emphasis added) would not be decided 
until after the granting of responsible government . The term 
"natives" in the treaty meant, in fact, that in any constitution 
restoring self-government to the ex-republics, the British could 
also grant political rights to the coloured people without a 
breach of faith. 6 But it transpired that as early as 1902, the 
Colonial authorities had resolved, at least tacitly, not to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the two colonies. The pleas 
of the coloured deputations to them in 1907 and 1909 were 
ignored. 
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1902-1910 - The Founding of the A.P.O. and the South Africa Act 
Towards the end of the war and a few months after it, three 
notable coloured political associations emerged. The first of 
these were the Stone Meetings , open air meetings held every 
Sunday in District Six, the predominantly non-white suburb of 
cape Town, and so- named because of the large boulders around 
where they were held. The acknowledged co-ordinator of these was 
John Tobin, a prominent local businessman . A second important 
coloured personality in this period was the immigrant F. Z. S . 
Peregrina, born in the Gold Coast and educated in England. Apart 
from funding a newspaper, the South African Spectator, Peregrina 
formed a number of black political organisations, the most 
important of which was the Coloured Persons' Vigilance Committee, 
in 1901 . The main themes of the Spectator and the C.P.V.C. were 
the rejection of the stigma of "race inferiority", the adoption 
of habits of sobriety and respectability, and the nurturing of a 
sense of "race" pride and identity amongst the coloured people . 7 
Essentially conservative in their aims, Peregrina and his 
supporters advocated a qualified franchise and equal rights for 
all civilized men, there being a need for continued white 
guardianship of those non-whites who had yet to attain 
"civilized" status. 
The most influential coloured organisation to be formed in this 
period was the African Political (later npeoples:r) Organisation 
(A.P.O.). Its first leader was W. Collins, a lay-preacher, Tobin 
being elected vice-president at its founding conference in 
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February 1902. The two main strategies of the A. P.O. were the 
upliftment of the coloured community to "civilised" status and 
the directing of coloured votes to candidates favourable to their 
rights. By 1904, the organisation had over 2000 members in 33 
branches, including some in the Transvaal. 8 Apart from the en 
bloc mobilisation of coloured voters, its activities consisted of 
the sending of deputations and petitions and the forwarding of 
resolutions to the white authorities. Its main concerns in the 
decade leading up to Union were to combat threats of segregatory 
measures (for example, the unsuccessful fight against the School 
Board Act of 1905 which entrenched the principle of preferential 
treatment for white education) and to agitate for the extension 
of coloured voting rights to the northern colonies. It was to 
have little succ ess. The coloured franchise, as the coloured 
elites were to discover to their cost, was an inadequate weapon 
to bring to bear against the white ruling class. A vote without 
power proved to be more demoralising than total 
disenfranchisement. 9 
Prominent coloureds could not have known, though some may have 
suspected, that soliciting the aid of the British Parliament in 
stemming the growing tide of discrimination would prove futile. 
The change in Britain's attitude could already be observed in 
1903 when the municipal franchise was withheld from Transvaal 
coloureds. That year a draft Municipal Ordinance was introduced 
providing for the election of a Town Council for Johannesburg, 
following the principles of the Cape Municipal Ordinance of 1835 
which had based the right to vote on qualification rather than 
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race. A minority of unofficial members on the Council, who 
nevertheless represented the views of the white inhabitants of 
the city, protested strongly at the omission of a colour bar. 
Rather than override the will of the governed, the Council then 
amended the draft so that all non-Europeans, including coloureds, 
were excluded from the franchise despite the wishes of the 
Attorney-General who had introduced the Bill. 10 
Lord Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor 
of the Transvaal, refused to override this decision since, he 
claimed, it would have been autocratic to impose upon the right 
of Europeans to make decisions affecting their lives, and 
ultimately not in the best interests of the coloured people 
either. 11 In this matter, Milner was going back on a promise 
he had made to a coloured deputation in January 1901 in which he 
had rejected the offer that coloureds take up arms against the 
Boers, but undertaken to secured fair treatment for all persons 
of colour in the Transvaal. 12 
This set-back was correctly seen by the coloured elites as a 
harbinger of things to come. Abdullah Abdurahman, a medical 
doctor of considerable standing in the coloured community in Cape 
Town, attacked Milner's defence of the original Bill's defeat in 
his first important. address. Prophetically, he pointed out that 
colour prejudice would come to exert a pernicious influence in 
the Cape. Instances of discrimination against coloured people in 
the North included being compelled to live in locations and 
observe rigid curfew laws. 
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It was beginning to dawn on the coloured elites that, given the 
realities of white racism with its emphases on "race inferiority" 
and the need to segregate blacks from whites, they would have 
their hands full merely holding on to what rights they already 
possessed . For this reason, they found it necessary to establish 
separate political organisations, and in so doing, tacitly 
accepted a separate coloured identity. However, while the A. P.O. 
strengthened this identity by obtaining exemption from 
discriminatory laws for coloureds rather than Africans, and by 
speaking out specifically only for the former, it nevertheless 
remained committed to equal rights for all civilized men. 13 The 
choice between assuming a specific "coloured" identity, even for 
reasons of short-term expediency, and adopting a common 
"blackness " to oppose unjust laws became a highly contentious 
issue. It was to militate strongly against coloureds forming a 
strong united front against segregation and discrimination, even 
the strongest coloured political organisations like the A.P.O. 
and later the Labour Party never being able to claim to represent 
more than 20 per cent of the coloured population . Th~ essential 
marginality of South African coloureds also crippled efforts to 
forge non-white unity. The non-European conferences in the early 
1930s petered out, the Non-European Unity Movement failed to gain 
grass-roots support in the 1950s, and the South African Black 
Alliance, formed in 1978, was all but destroyed by the Labour 
Party's decision to enter the tricameral Parliament in 1983 (see 
Chapter 7, pp. 230-2). The political tragedy of the coloured 
people as a group has been their rejection by the whites and 
their failure to assume either a coloured or a black identity to 
\ 
I 
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fight for their rights with any real conviction or uniformity. 
~Given the lack of homogeneity in the coloured community, factors 
\ like class, education, religion and language, not to mention 
I 
skin-colour, often proved divisive. Thus, internal divisions 
often hamstrung ef~ective political action. On the eve of the 
1904 election, the A.P.O. faced its first major political crisis 
when its leadership was bitterly divided over which political 
party to support. The pro-Afrikaner, anti-Imperialist Tobin 
openly backed the South African Party, whereas Collins called for 
support for the Progressive Party of Dr Jameson. Both were 
expelled from the A.P.O. at its · conference in April 1905 and 
Abdurahman was elected as its new president. An outspoken and 
powerful orator, Abdurahman became the first non-white to win 
election to the Cape Town city council in September 1904. He was 
to be a dominant figure in coloured politics until his death in 
1940. 
The imminent granting of responsible government to the Transvaal 
and the Orange River Colony raised the hopes of the young 
coloured organisations that the terms of the Cape non-racial 
franchise would be incorporated in the new constitutions there. 
When the British Colonial Secretary, Alfred Lyttelton, proposed 
such constitutions however, coloureds as well as Africans were 
excluded. He justified this by telling the British House of 
Commons that the Boers had interpreted Article Eight of the 
Vereeniging Peace Treaty as referring to all people of colour. 14 
Coloured leaders bitterly disputed this, arguing 
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that the term "coloured" and not "native" should have been used 
if the Article had envisaged their being left unenfranchised. 15 
The West Ridgeway Committee, that was appointed to follow up the 
proposals of Lyttelton, nevertheless found that in the opinion of 
most whites, all people of colour were referred to in Article 
Eight . Thus, when responsible government was granted to the ex-
republics in 1906 and 1907, coloureds and Africans remained 
voteless. It was a heavy defeat for the coloured elites who 
rightly feared that the denial of their rights in the North would 
later be used as an excuse to remove their rights in the Cape. 
The significance of the negotiations designed to bring about a 
union of the four colonies in South Africa was not lost on the 
coloured elites, who realised what the 
settlement unfavourable to their interests 
Africa would be. The A.P.O. favoured a 
implications of a 
in a united South 
federal form of 
government, since coloured voting rights in the Cape would be 
endangered by the hostility of the Northern MP's in a unitary 
constitution. The organisation thus decided, at its 1908 
conference, to back Jameson's Progressive Party which advocated 
federalism. Jameson, who saw the coloured franchise question as 
being a major obstacle to union, believed that a federation would 
enable the Cape to maintain its native policy until such time as 
the neighbouring colonies became sufficiently enlightened to 
adopt such policies themselves. The rival South African Party of 
Jchn 11erriman, like the Het Volk party of Jan Smuts in the 
Transvaal, favoured a unitary constitution. When the S.A.P. won 
a comfortable victory over the Progressives in the 1908 Cape 
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elections, the federalists' cause was seriously weakened. It was 
further weakened at the National Convention by the absence of one 
of its most capable exponents, W.P. Schreiner, who at the time 
was defending the Zulu king Dinizulu on charges of treason . 
Natal, the only province to favour a decentralised constitution, 
had neither the bargaining strength nor delegates of sufficient 
skill to counter the well-prepared arguments of the unionists. 16 
The triumph of the latter became a foregone conclusion. 
The draft South Africa Act that emerged from the convention 
confirmed the worst fears of coloured leaders . The franchise for 
non-Europeans was not extended to the Northern colonies, section 
24 instead determining that they be represented by four white 
senators. The Cape franchise was retained under section 35, a 
two-thirds majority of both houses of the new bicameral 
Parliament present in a joint session being needed to change it. 
Section 35 was entrenched under Section 152 . The British Prime 
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, later pointed out in the British 
House of Commons that rather than safeguarding the non-European 
vote, Section 35 provided a means whereby coloured people and 
Africans could be legally disenfranchised . 17 Non-European 
voting rights in Natal received little attention, largely because 
at the time there were only 186 non-Europeans on the voters' roll 
there. It was decided not to make Section 35 refer to the Natal 
as well as the Cape franchise. 18 
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The most damaging provisions in the draft Act were contained in 
Clauses 26(d) and 34, which established a colour-bar in 
Parliament. This meant that people of colour were disqualified 
from standing for e·lection to the House of Assembly or the 
Senate. Only one non-white, Ahmed Effendi in 1894, had previously 
stood for election ~o the Cape Parliament. Moreover, Effendi had 
been heavily defeated when the Cape Town electoral division's 
unique cumulative voting system, which enabled each voter to give 
four votes to one candidate, was prudently abolished to prevent 
his election. 19 
Nevertheless, the fact that non-Europeans were thenceforth to be 
permanently barred from standing for election was a grievous 
blow. Amendments to Clause 26(d) were defeated by 157 votes to 
57. Clauses 70 and 71 did, however, allow non-whites to vote for 
candidates and stand for election to the Cape Provincial Council. 
The A.P.O. and related organisations made concerted efforts to 
have the draft Bill changed, directing "a barrage of protests and 
Act appeals to the colonial and British governments". 20 The 
draft was passed unamended by the Cape Parliament on 16th April 
1909. Nor were any changes made to it at the final session of the 
National Convention, though the delegates from the Transvaal and 
Orange River Colony complained about Section 35 - an ominous 
sign. As a last resort the A.P.O., together with delegates of the 
South African Native Convention, sent a deputation under 
Schreiner to appeal to the British Parliament. 
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Hopes ran high in South Africa after the deputation had left, 
coloured people little knowing that the British Government had 
already decided not to intervene in the affairs of the self-
governing colonies. 21 The insertion of a colour-bar was 
unfortunate, but essentially a domestic matter, and very little 
attention was paid t .o the unofficial delegation beyond windy 
assurances of goodwill. It did obtain an assurance that the 
Imperial Veto would be exercised if Parliament tried to 
disenfranchise the coloured people. Even this tenuous safeguard 
had fallen by the wayside following the 1926 Balfour Declaration 
guaranteeing the Union's legislative sovereignty. The South 
Africa Act, which put the final seal of Britain's approval on the 
betrayal at Vereeniging in 1902, 22 was passed in toto by the 
two Houses and was signed by Edward VII on September 20th , to 
become effective on May 31st 1910. As Wilson and Thompson put it, 
"the price of unity and conciliation was the institutionalisation 
of white supremacy". 23 
Hertzog and the Coloured Right Wing 1918-1933 
After the 1910 elections, comfortably won by Louis Botha's South 
African Party, it became clear that Cape liberal and non-European 
fears that Union would threaten their existing rights had not 
been unjustified. Not only had the value of the coloured vote 
been lessened by the incorporation of white voters from the 
Northern provinces, but the new Government immediately embarked 
on a programme of segregation and discrimination aimed at 
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entrenching white supremacy. It was a trend the coloured elites 
soon found they were powerle ss to halt, let alone reverse. 
The A. P.O. strategies of organising deputations and petitions and 
calling for the support during election time of the comparatively 
liberal Unionist Par't_:y were to be greatly discredited in the 
first two decades of union. The outspoken rhetoric of Abdurahman 
did not disguise the organisation's powerlessness, in fact 
angering the white press and alienating the more conservative 
elements in the A.P.O. 
To counter their lack of influence, the A.P.O. made tentative 
efforts to forge links with other non-white _organisations. To 
this end, it condemned the 1913 Land Act and the white preference 
labour policy on the mines and railways and welcomed the 
establishment of the South African National 
(later African National Congress) in 1912. 24 
Native Congress 
It also set up an 
Indian Passive Resistance Fund to support Ghandi' s 
against discriminatory legislation affecting Indians. 
campaign 
By and 
large, however, non-white solidarity remained on the level of 
rhetoric, and formal links were not forged until the late 1920s 
with the launching of a series of non-European conferences. 
Discriminatory measures favouring whites in industry and 
education had a detrimental effect on the position of coloureds, 
whose situation was shown to be considerably worse than before 
1910 by two commission reports of the Union Government in 1912 
and 1916. In education, which coloured leaders had seen as "the 
key to their social, political and economic advancement", the 
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segregatory trend was particularly marked. 25 The case of Moller 
vs Keimoes School Committee confirmed the principle of segregated 
education. Dismissing an appeal against a school board decision 
not to admit the applicant's coloured children, the court found 
that the 1905 School Board Act not only made special provision 
for European childre~, but also contemplated separate schools for 
them. 26 Coloured education was further hamstrung by critical 
underfunding in relation to white education. 
The merger of the South African and Unionist Parties just before 
the 1921 election was a further blow to the A.P.O. which was now 
forced, in the absence of a liberal alternative, to transfer its 
allegiance to the former, little though the S.A.P. had improved 
the coloured's position. Many coloured intellectuals had become 
disillusioned with the A.P.O.'s methods of protest since they 
yielded no significant gains. Distancing themselves from 
parliamentary politics, they became increasingly involved in non-
white working class movements, in particular the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (I.C.U.) of Clements Kadalie. Towards 
the end of the Great War, it became evident that the A.P.O. was 
shedding support to the right as well. 
Though Abdurahman was for a time pro-Afrikaner and initially 
considered supporting the S.A.P., by 1915 he was a confirmed 
anti-Nationalist. 27 A number of prominent A.P.O. members, 
however, were more favourably disposed towards Hertzog's National 
Party, as were a number of other individuals outside the 
organisation such as Tobin. In the 1915 election, these dissident 
groups notwithstanding, most coloureds on the roll tended to back 
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Unionist or liberal S.A.P. candidates. This cost the Nationalists 
a number of seats, most notably in Paarl where Dr Bruckner de 
Villiers \vas defeated largely through the ballots of the 900 
coloured voters. 28 As a result, the National Party made 
concerted efforts to win the Cape Coloured vote after the 
election . 
Rising dissatisfaction with the A.P.O. 's methods, particularly in 
the light of the coloured people's continued economic decline in 
the post-war recession, made it easier to appeal to dissident 
factions within it. In early 1919, Dr D.F. Malan, then editor of 
Die Burger and Cape leader of the National Party, met with a 
number of prominent and disaffected coloureds, including Tom Le 
Fleur, future leader of the coloured Republican Party (see 
Chapter 2, pp. 56-7). To gain their support, much was made of the 
cultural ties existing between coloureds and Afrikaners, and the 
desire of many of the former to rise above the Africans. 29 
Hertzog himself had distinguished between coloureds and blacks. 
Such people, he believed, had to be classed with Europeans, 
politically, economically and industrially, though he still 
advocated social segregation. In fact, he was strongly inclined 
to extend their political rights to the Northern provinces. 30 
As a result of this meeting, the United Afrikaner League (later 
the African National Bond) was formed with C Dantu, a former 
A.P.O. member, as its first President. The tactics and objects of 
the U.A.L. were largely taken over from the A. P.O. but the call 
for non-white unity was rejected. This foreshadowed the Federal-
Labour split after 1964 as well as bringing to the fore coloured 
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"nationalists" who believed that coloured people had to develop 
along the path to full nationhood apart from whites and Africans. 
These were to be prominent in the pro-separated development 
parties contesting the first C.P.R.C. elections in 1969. 
In 1924, Hertzog's National Party, after making an electoral pact 
with the (white) Labour Party and with the aid of a considerable 
percentage of the coloured vote, defeated Smuts' South African 
Party in the general election. Bruckner de Villiers was elected 
on this occasion, having successfully cultivated coloured 
support. Thereafter Hertzog embarked on a programme protecting 
white workers from African competition in industry through the 
introduction of job colour bars. It had been promised to 
coloureds before the election that they too would benefit from 
this so-called "civilised labour" policy, and indeed the Colour 
Bar Act of 1926 expressly included them with whites while 
excluding Africans. 
Although the Civilised Labour Policy appeared to favour 
coloureds, in practice it did not do so. For example, the number 
of coloured people employed as labourers by the South African 
Railways and Harbours, after rising from 5 628 to just under 
8 000 in 1929, had actually fallen to 4 663 by 1933. The effects 
of the Great Depression had much to do with this drop, but 
Europeans suffered no comparable decline, their numbers employed 
rising from 5 000 in 1924 to almost 19 COO in 1934. 31 The 
African National Bond's hopes that through supporting the Pact 
Government they would be rewarded by material advancement at the 
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expense of Africans were disappointed and the lion's share of the 
civilised labour benefits went to white labourers. It would not 
be the only time a minority within the coloured community would 
co-operate · with the Government of the day in the hope of 
preferential treatment, only to be rewarded with crumbs from the 
white man's table. The failure of Nationalist governments after 
1960 to make more than the most peripheral of concessions to the 
coloured people doomed the policies of parallel development and 
of Tom swartz's Federal Party to failure. 
On the political front Hertzog's Coloured Persons' Rights Bill, 
tabled in Parliament in July 1926, proposed some far-reaching 
changes to ~he political status of coloured people country-wide. 
The Bill, if passed, would repeal Section 35 of the South Africa 
Act entrenching the Cape franchise and provide for the 
registering of all coloureds in the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State eligible to vote, as well as those in the other two 
provinces. Coloured people living in the three Northern provinces 
could then elect, on a separate voters' roll, one white member to 
represent them in Parliament and the Cape franchise could be 
extended to those provinces after seven years if both houses of 
Parliament agraed to it. 
The Bill and its scanty concessions, if they could be called 
concessions at all given their highly segregatory nature, never 
came up for discussion in the Union Parliament. 32 Instead it 
was presented to Parliament in a revised form in 1929. Its 
acceptance was dependent on the Representation of Natives in 
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Parliament Bill aimed at removing Cape Africans from the common 
voters' roll, being passed with a two-thirds majority in 
accordance with Section 35. After the third reading of the Native 
Bill failed to produce the requisite majority, Hertzog announced 
the withdrawal of the Coloured Bill. 
The Coloured Vote Devalued and the Wilcocks Commission 
In 1930 and 1931, three measures were passed that greatly 
weakened the relative strength of the coloured vote in the Cape. 
The Women's Enfranchisement Act No 18 of 1930 extended the vote 
to all white women over the age of 21 years, but excluded 
coloured and black women. This had the effect of halving the 
value of the non-white vote in the Cape, reducing it from 11,45 
per cent of the total in 1929 to 5,6 per cent in 1935. 33 The 
second discriminatory law was the Franchise Laws Amendment Act No 
41 of 1931 which abolished property and educational 
qualifications required on white males if they were to register 
as voters but retaining them for coloureds and Africans. That 
same year, the Electoral Laws Act was passed, enabling anyone to 
challenge a registered voter to prove he had fulfilled the 
franchise qualifications before a magistrate on pain of being 
struck off the roll. This procedure, tightened up by amendments 
between 1945 and 1948, led to a significant decline in the number 
of non-whites on the common roll . 34 Thus, far from the Cape 
franchise being gradually accepted and adopted in the Northern 
provinces as Jameson et al had hoped at the National Convention, 
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Northern 11 illiberalism" had instead seen a steady erosion of 
coloured voting rights as Abdurahman had feared. The passing of 
the Natives Representation Act in 1936, which put blacks on a 
separate voters' roll, was another major step in this direction. 
In the early 1930s, a Coloured-European Council emerged in 
response to the very severe poverty that was afflicting coloured 
people in the wake of the Great Depression and the segregatory 
policies of the Pact Government. These persuaded the Government 
to appoint a commission to enquire into the socio-economic 
conditions of coloureds nationwide in 1934. Known as the Wilcocks 
Commission after Professor R.W. Wilcocks, its chairman, its 
findings were published in 1938 ~nd exposed in stark detail the 
depressed position of the vast majority of coloured people. 
Although the Commission's terms of reference restricted it to 
socio-economic issues, it was decided to ignore these 
instructions. Hence, a substantial section of the Report was 
devoted to political issues and recommendations were made that 
were felt to be urgently required. Detailed proposals for the 
upliftment of the coloured people which dealt mostly with bread 
and butter issues such as health, working conditions, social 
welfare and pensions and education, were made. Members of the 
Commission were divided upon the crucial issue of segregation, a 
number of them, including Wilcocks, being anxious that existing 
segregatory policies be reinforced and extended. It was they who 
made a minority recommendation that special sections in 
Government departments be created to look after the coloured 
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peoples' interests. This was a forerunner of the Coloured Affairs 
Department set up in the late 1950s (see Chapter 2, p. 39). All 
the commissioners recommended that the Cape franchise be extended 
to all coloured people in the Union, however. 
The United Party Government, formed in 1934 when the South 
African and National Parties merged, took no steps to implement 
the Commission's proposals. In retrospect, the appointment of the 
Commission (which was all white apart from Abdurahman), would 
seem to have been no more than a device to pacify coloureds 
dissatisfied with Government policies concerning them. 35 In 
fact, by its very· terms of reference, the appointment reinforced 
the tendency to treat the coloured people as a distinct group 
separate from the whites and for this r e ason may have proved 
positively harmful. It gave de facto recognition to segregation 
and the treatment of coloureds as a separate racial group. 36 
Well-meaning liberal politicians, anxious that the Commission's 
recommendations be implemented, were responsible for the next 
major segregatory step when their suggestions that an advisory 
board be set up to facilitate such implementation led to the 
establishment of the Coloured Advisory Council (C.A.C . ). It was 
a gigantic miscalculation, and the bitter controversy surrounding 
this ill-fated body was to provide a split in coloured political 
life that had been on the cards for a long time. 
The C.A.C. was established in early 1943 and held its inaugural 
meeting on April 28th of that year. Its chairman was Dr L.H. Gow, 
who had replaced Abdurahman in 1940 as leader of the ailing 
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A.P.O. It had 15 members initially and 25 after October, and 
aimed at opposing segregation, interference with the Cape 
franchise and the establishment of a Coloured Affairs Department. 
Despite these good intentions, the C. A. C. members and their 
supporters became the targets of vitriolic abuse from a hard-
line, non-collaborationist fraction that had first begun to 
emerge in the 1930s and now formed the Anti-Coloured Affairs 
Department (Anti-C.A.D.) to oppose what it saw as a "quisling-
ridden body". A new element in coloured politics, that of 
militant non-collaboration, was thus born and voiced. Its 
proponents consisted mainly of left-wing intellectuals like Ben 
Kies and Cissie Gool. 
In 1943 the Non-European Unity Movement was formed, a left-wing 
body that opposed compromise and collaboration and sought to 
submerge the Cape coloured's identity in a broader black united 
front . The N.E.U.M. ' s leadership base consisted mainly of 
dogmatic Trotskyites who insisted on seeing the struggl e in South 
Africa entirely in class terms and advocated the permanent 
revolution of the working class proletariat. The Movement was too 
elitist to have much popular appeal and in the 1950s was riven by 
ideological feuds and differences in strategy, alienating the 
rising African National Congress whom they described as 
"quislings" and 11 collaborators 11 • 37 
The savage and bitter nature of the invective hurled against 
those who accepted nomination to the hated C.A.C. took many, more 
moderate, coloured people by surprise and in response the 
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Coloured Peoples' National Union (C.P.N.U.), a middle-of-the-road 
organisation led by George Golding, was formed in 1944, largely 
to oppose attempts to intimidate those who believed that to 
reject any improvement offered, however small, was to bar the way 
to advancement. 38 The C. A. C. and C. P. N. U. strove, through 
negotiation and consultation, to achieve its main aims, which 
included the extension of the Cape franchise to the Northern 
provinces. Both were hostile to the coloured prejudice of the 
National Party and supported the United Party as the lesser of 
the two evils, The ·c.A.C.-Anti-C.A.D. clashes were a painful 
episode in the history of coloured politics and indicative of the 
growing frustration of coloured people. The rift was to widen as 
the years went by. The Anti-C.A.D. faction and the Non-European 
Unity Movement lost momentum in the 1950s but their philosophies 
continued to have a strong under-current influence. 39 
The Coloured Policy of the Purified National Party 
and the 1948 Election 
In the 1920s, both the South African and National Parties 
accepted that a dividing line be drawn between black and coloured 
people. Between 1924 and 1933, while serving as Minister of the 
Interior under Hertzog, Dr D.F. Malan on a number of occasions 
firmly spoke out against the setting up of colour bars between 
coloureds and whites, notably in the House of Assembly in March 
1928 when he said it was necessary to distinguish between blacks 
and coloureds and that he personally wanted to give the vote to 
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coloured womcn. 40 In 1929, in an election speech delivered at 
Stellenbosch, he said that the National Party wanted to extend 
the coloured franchise to all provinces. In the early 19 3 Os, 
before the Purified National Party broke away from the United 
Party, prominent Nationalists spoke strongly in favour of 
retaining the entrenched clauses of the constitution during the 
debates on the status of the Union within the Empire. 41 
After the 1934 breakaway, however, there was a distinct shift in 
Nationalist Party policy. This clearly emerged for the first time 
during the debates in a joint sitting of both houses of 
Parliament o"'rer the question of removing Cape Africans to a 
separate roll. Now Malan and his party advocated that coloured 
people too should have been included in this separate 
representation scheme, and Malan moved an amendment to this 
effect. 42 In seconding the amendment, Dr N.J. van der Merwe 
argued that political equality would lead to social equality, and 
this in turn would result in the "mixing of blood and the ruin of 
.. -- - -··· -- - - ·-· -
the white race". 43 In its 1938 election manifesto, the 
Purified National Party now called for separate representation 
for coloureds on separate rolls in all legislative bodies. 
Hertzog called the trend a breach of faith with the coloured 
people. 44 
With a view of drafting an apartheid policy with electoral speech 
in the years leading up to the 1948 election, the Nationalists 
appointed a commission under Paul Sauer to determine a general 
policy with regard to the coloured people. The Sauer Commission's 
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findings formed the basis of the coloured policy which the 
Nationalist Party put before the electorate in 1948. 45 
Proposals included a population register, a Department of 
Coloured Affairs, a representative council f or coloureds, 
separate voters' rolls, three white representatives for coloureds 
for as long as blacks also had Parliamentary representation , the 
extension of apartheid to separate residential areas and the 
prohibition of mixed marriages and "bastardization". On the more 
positive side, the Commission also advoc ated better community 
services and housing schemes, the upgrading of social services, 
the improvement of coloured education and so on . 46 Indians were 
regarded as be ing unassimilable since they were an alien element 
whereas blacks would be accommodated in the reserves where 
separate political systems based on traditional forms of 
government would be set up once the reserves had been 
consolidated. The Commission did not rule out the possibility 
that a separate territory for coloureds might be provided. 47 
The National Party's apartheid policy gained sufficient votes in 
the 1948 election for it to assume office. Thereafter it lost 
little time in the implementation of a programme of full social 
and political segregation for the coloured people. A series of 
Acts of Parliament between 1950 and 195 6 revolutionised white-
coloured relations, accelerating and legally entrenching 
segregatory ~nd discriminatory trends that had been in evidence 
since the beginning of the century . 
First of these laws was the prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 
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1949 which banned marriages between whites and coloureds (a law 
banning marriages between whites and blacks had already been 
passed in 1927) . 48 The most revealing feature of the debates 
on this Bill, quite apart from the strong streak of race 
prejudice that emerged time and time again, was the way in which 
both sides of the House were in agreement as to the 
undesirability of mixed unions. United Party objections were 
limited to questioning the practicality of legislation designed 
to prevent them. It was left to the lone Communist member of the 
House, Sam Kahn, to point out that what was inherently evil in 
South Africa were not mixed marriages, but a social system that 
condemned the offspring of such marriages to positions of 
economic and social inferiority. 49 
The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was supplemented the 
following year by the amendment to the Immorality Act (Section 
16) , a measure that was to gain considerable notoriety over the 
years. This measure made extra-marital sex a more serious offence 
if indulged in across inter-racial frontiers. 50 As anticipated 
in the Sauer Report and in the Mixed Marriages debates, the 
division of all South Afr~cans into population groups defined by 
race was achieved by the passing of the Population Registration 
Act. It was a pivotal measure, one that came to be regarded as a 
"foundation stone to the whole apartheid structure". 51 However, 
it failed to provide a precise definition of what a coloured 
person was, saying that coloureds were all those who were not 
defined as "native" or "white", thus including Asians in their 
definition (see the comments of the Theron Commission, 
Chapter 5, p. 154). The sub-groups making up the group usually 
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known as "Coloured" were Cape Coloured (the great majority), 
Malay, Griqua and "other" Coloured. The Act stressed descent, 
rather than appearance and acceptance, as being criteria for 
classification. Thus "passing for white", which had enabled many 
lighter-skinned people of mixed descent to pass into the white 
community, was cut off as an escape route for members of the 
coloured middle class. 
The Group Areas Act was also passed in 1950 and empowered the 
Government to proclaim residential areas for particular race 
groups. Perhaps no other apartheid measure was to cause so much 
hardship. The discriminatory nature of the measure is reflected 
by the fact that by 1982, 80 053 coloured families had been 
removed, often from homes their forefathers had occupied for 
centuries, whereas only 2 262 white families had been 
resettled. 52 In 1953, following segregation on buses and trains 
in the late 1940s, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act was 
passed, separating the different race groups in their use of 
public facilities which, according to the Act, did not have to be 
equal. The equivalent of the Jim Crow laws in some of the 
U.S.A.'s southern states, this Act was to prove one of the most 
hurtful and insulting of the apartheid laws for the coloured 
people, involving daily humiliation. 
It is important to understand some of the reasons why the 
National Party felt so strongly about removing coloured voters in 
the Cape from the common roll. Firstly, many expressed the view 
that common roll enfranchisement was an ineffective weapon and 
resource for coloureds and that the new system would mean more 
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effective representation for them. 53 There was truth in the 
assertion that politicians had used coloured issues to gain votes 
at election time but taken little interest in them once elected. 
Separate representation, it was argued, would prevent coloured 
people from being used as a politica l football. 54 
The presence of coloured voters on the common roll was also a 
threat to the whole separate development system. So long as they 
were allowed to vote on it, other non-white groups would come to 
demand the same privileges. It was also difficult to regroup the 
coloureds residentially without interfering with their voting 
rights which their-property conferred on them in terms of the 
entrenched clauses of the 1909 constitution. 55 The entrenched 
clauses were thus a serious potential obstacle to the 
establishment of separate residential areas for whites and 
coloureds. 
Traditionally, coloured voters had overwhelmingly supported the 
English-speaking parties at election time, a fact which the 
National Party, with its precarious majority after 1948, were 
well aware of. Moreover, there were other factors . The coloured 
community had supported Britain during the Anglo-Boer War and the 
two World Wars, showed strong sentiments of loyalty to English 
symbols such as the Union Jack and were mindful of the fact that 
slavery was abolished in South Africa by order of the British 
Government. 56 Some Nationalists feared a coloured-English 
alliance, claiming that throughout South African history, and 
particularly in the Cape, coloured voters had been "used as a 
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means to thwart the wishes of the white voters in the interests 
of imperial objectives". 57 The claim that coloured voters had 
been misused to keep whites, and particularly Afrikaners, in a 
subordinate position vis-a-vis foreign elements and interests was 
an important emotional justification for their removal from the 
roll. It also enabled Nationalists to argue that the presence of 
coloured voters on the roll soured relations between the two 
white groups in South Africa. 58 
In assessing Nationalist motives, one cannot rule out ingrained 
race prejudice as a factor. Common sentiments 
.... -....,.,..- ~ . 
such as that 
coloureds were lazy, ignorant, given to drunkenness, 
thrif~lessness, illegitimacy and crime, made it distasteful for 
many whites to vote side by side with them. 59 Minister of 
Transport, Ben Schoeman, would not have said in a speech at 
Vrededorp on 3 July 1949 that the "Hotnots" would soon be removed 
from the "white man's roll" had he not known that so offensive a 
statement would strike a sympathetic cord with at least a section 
of his audience. 
The well-known series of events that led to the removal of 
coloureds in the Cape and Natal from the common roll began in 
March 1951, when the Separate Representation of Voters Bill was 
introduced in the Assembly. The Bill aimed at putting coloured 
voters on a separate roll with power to elect four members to the 
Assembly, one to the Senate and two to the Cape Provincial 
Council. It was passed as a bicameral measure, even though, 
according to the constitution, a joint sitting of both Houses 
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voting as a single chamber and with a two-thirds majority was 
required to change Section 35. Soon afterwards, application to 
test the validity of the Act was filed in the Cape Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court in August in the name of four 
coloured voters on the existing roll. The case was lost since in 
terms of a decision of the Appellate Division in 1937, where a 
disenfranchised African failed to have the Representation of 
Natives in Parliament Act overturned (Ndlwana's case), the court 
was precluded from questioning the validity of an Act of 
Parliament. In March 1952, however, the Appellate Division 
overruled the decision as well as overturning the Ndlwana 
judgement, ruling that so far as amending the entrenching clauses 
in the South Africa Act went, Parliament could only be defined as 
a legislative body that functioned unicamerally. 60 It was the 
first major rebuff for the Government and a head-on collision 
between the judiciary and the legislature resulted. 
In April 1952, the High Court of Parliament Bill was introduced 
in the Assembly, a "fantastic measure conceived in the 
curious and contorted brain of the Minister of the Interior, Dr 
Donges" . 61 It provided for the reconstitution of Parliament 
itself as a High Court with power to review all legislation which 
the Appellate Division declared invalid. The Bill was passed and 
the newly-constituted High Court set aside the Appellate 
Division's judgement in August. Soon afterwards the High court 
itself was declared invalid by the Appellate Division and the 
Government had suffered a second set-back. 
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In November 1954, following the retirement of Dr D.F. Malan, J.G. 
Strijdom took over the premiership. His views on the coloured 
people were very much those of a Transvaal Nationalist. Like 
connie Mulder after him, he in no way saw them as being potential 
allies of whites, but as non-whites whose political strength had 
to be curtailed to ensure white supremacy. 62 He was accordingly 
determined to resolve the impasse and break the back of legal 
resistance to separate representation. This was achieved by two 
measures, one which increased the membership of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court to 11 judges in cases dealing with 
constitutional appeals and the other which entailed 
reconstituting the Senate in order to engineer a two-thirds 
majority for the National Party. 
The Senate modification had already been discussed in party 
circles in 1953. Strijdom at the time had felt little enthusiasm 
for the plan, not because he doubted its legality, but because he 
doubted the advisability of putting the matter before the same 
Appellate Division that had thrown out the High Court of 
Parliament Act. 63 His reservations throw light on the 
subsequent enlargement of the A.D. under the Appellate Division 
Quorum Act in which the six new judges appointed were sympathetic 
to the Government's case. Next came the notorious Senate Act 
which proposed the dissolution of the existing Senate and doing 
away with the old system of equal representation for the 
Provinces as well as the proportional system of electing senators 
in reconstituting a new one. Instead the members of the Senate 
(whose numbers were to be increased from 48 to 89) would be 
elected by the party which could muster the majority of votes in 
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the electoral colleges of each province (which included 
Provincial Council members). Since the National Party commanded 
a majority in all the provinces except Natal, it meant that it 
could elect the great majority of senators· and in this way gain 
the requisite two-thirds majority. 64 
In February 1956, the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
became law and Section 35 was repealed, the National Party 
gaining 171 votes against a combined opposition total of 71. In 
October, the Appellate Division dismissed an application to have 
the legislation again declared invalid, only one judge (O . D. 
Schreiner) dissenting . It has been assumed that the court's hands 
were tied and that they had no choice but to declare the Senate 
Act to be valid. Interestingly enough, however, this has come to 
be challenged by recent opinions which favour Schreiner's 
judgement. 65 They argue that a packed Senate had lost its 
original and distinctive features (for example, the system of 
proportional representation in Senate elections enabling the 
minority views in each province to be heard was lost). Whereas 
Centlivres c J, who delivered judgement on behalf of the majority 
in the Appellate Division, was of the opinion that the motive 
with which a measure was enacted was of no consequence to its 
validity, Schreiner believed the two could not be separated. 
' 
Hence, the use of legislation in one field in preparation for 
legislation in another led to the two becoming one, and for this 
reason the creation of an ad hoc Senate was in conflict with the 
provisions of s 152 of the South Africa Act. 66 One wonders how 
the Government would have reacted had the rest of the court 
shared this view! 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNION COUNCIL FOR COLOURED AFFAIRS AND 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE COLOURED PERSONS' 
REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL 
1956-1969 
"What matters for the present . . . is that 
this Kleurling parlementj ie must help to 
dissipate the will and energy of the 
unenfranchised for true democratic rights 
nl 
"Just as the u.c.c.A . was a 
constitutional development, 
Council a phase in your 
development" . 2 
phase in your 
so is this 
constitutional 
"The urbanised Black proletariat will by way 
of miscegenation with the Coloured occupy 
the position of control over the common 
voters' roll throughout South Africa. You 
thereby ensure that the Coloured becomes the 
channel through which the Black proletariat 
gets onto the White man's voters ' roll". 3 
The Education Journal, April-May 1968, p.10 
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C.P.R.C. Debates, Vol 1, 1969, p.14, Opening address 
by Mr J.J. Loots, Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and 
Nama Relations 
P.W. Botha, first Minister of Coloured Affairs 
Senate debates 11 May 1964, Col 3447 
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The Establishment of the U.C . C.A. 
The original draft of the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
also made provision for the setting up of a Board for Coloured 
Affairs (s. 14). This body could advise the Government on the 
interests of the Coloured people and carry out such statutory or 
administrative tasks as might be assigned to it as well as acting 
as a consultative body . In the amended Act of 1956, the name of 
the board was changed to the Union Council for Coloured Affairs 
(U.C.C . A.). In April 1958, the Coloured Affairs Section in the 
then Department of the Interior attained departmental status, 
P.W. Botha, who was to play such a vital role in the political 
life of the Coloured people in later years, becoming the first 
Minister for Coloured Affairs. The establishment of the new 
council was gazetted on 22 May 1959, to come into operation as 
from 1 June . 1 It lasted for just under ten years, being 
abolished early in 19 69 when the Col oured Persons' Representative 
Council came into operation. 
The U.C.C.A. has received little attention from histori ans of 
this period, as it was so obviously a puppet of the Nationalist 
Government as to be called "the most despised, abject and sterile 
coterie on the South African political scene" by its opponents.2 
In fact, this shadowy body was the C.P.R.C. in embryo. It was to 
consist of 27 members, 12 elected and 15 nominated (unlike the 
C. A.C. that had been wholly nominated). Of the nominated members, 
eight were to be from the Cape, four from the Transvaal, two from 
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Natal and one from the Orange Free State. It was the first time 
Coloureds in the two Northern provinces had had any 
representation at all on an official Government body. 
The only Coloured political organisation that might have had any 
orientation towards the U.C.C.A. was the Coloured Peoples' 
National Union of George Golding (see Chapter 1, p. 25). Golding, 
however, decided to oppose the Council , perhaps because he saw it 
as a threat to his C.P.N.U., but also because his whole-hearted 
support of the United Party in the 1948 and 1953 elections may 
have given him good reason to anticipate that he would not be 
chosen as its chairman by the National Party. 3 In this matter 
Golding thought he had the support of his Vice-President, T.R. 
(Tom) Swartz. It came as an unpleasant surprise to him when the 
names of the nominated members of the Council were announced as 
they included Swartz, as Chairman, and C.I.R. (Chris) Fortein, 
another prominent C.P.N.U. member. 
Tom Swartz was to be the acknowledged leader of the conservative, 
pro-Government sector of the Coloured community for the next 15 
years, and while serving on the U.C.C.A. he was clearly being 
groomed by the Government towards becoming the first Coloured 
"Prime Minister". He was already a veteran of Coloured politics 
by 1959, having first served as an A.P.O. delegate in 1923 at the 
age of 19. 
Widespread apathy as well as an active boycott saw all 12 members 
who stood for election elected unopposed, and nearly all were 
41 
virtually unknown in their communities. A number of the 27 
members who made up the first U.C.C.A. were to be prominent 
c.P.R. C. members. These included future Federal Party stalwarts 
like s .s. Cloete, W.J. Louw, P.J. Petersen and H.J. Coverdale and 
a future leader of the Labour Party, M.D. Arendse. Arendse earned 
a certain amount of notoriety for serving on this discredited 
body, but he was also the only member constantly to oppose the 
pro-Government stance of the Swartz faction. (When accused of 
inconsistency by Swartz in the first C.P.R.C. Session, he 
retorted: "I had to keep an eye on your misdemeanours" . ) 4 
Another prominent Councillor was T.L. (Tom) le Fleur, like Swartz 
a seasoned politician, who aimed at achieving autonomy for the 
Griqua community. 
At its meetings in 1960, the new Council made a number of 
recommendations that were passed on to the central Government. 
These included requests that arrangements be made for the 
granting of loans to coloured farmers, for the establishment of 
an agricultural gymnasium for coloureds and for the founding of 
a Coloured Development Corporation to assist coloured 
businessmen. 5 
The broader c'oloured community showed little interest in 
developments on the U. C. C. A. Even the moderate C. P. N. U. had 
boycotted elections to it, and the left-wing S.A. Coloured 
Peoples' Organisation (which was banned two years later) declared 
at its 1960 Congress that it was not prepared to endorse any "new 
deal" for coloured people at the expense of other non-white 
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groups. 6 Significantly, many coloured people were leaving South 
Africa in frustration. 7 Political interest in the coloured 
community at large was ·at an extremely low ebb. The S . A. I.R.R. 
found that 30 per cent of coloureds in Cape Town and 50 per cent 
of those in the rural areas were more concerned with the struggle 
to make ends meet than with politics, and estimated that only 10 
to 15 000 coloured people were actual paid-up members of any 
political organisation in 1961. 8 
An important development in the first half of 1961 to a degree 
served to lift the apathy. This was the meeting of the Coloured 
National Convention on 7 July following a series of preliminary 
meetings between coloured community leaders to discuss ways to 
bring together organisations and individuals opposed to apartheid 
and white domination. 9 The Convention met in Malmesbury as 
meetings in Cape Town were banned at the time under the 
Suppression of Communism Act. This highlights the difficulties 
caused by State harassment which need to be borne in mind when 
assessing the motives of certain organisations when they decided 
to participate in the workings of the C.P.R.C. 
The Coloured Convention pledged to work for a democratic, non-
racial South Africa in which a new constitution, embodying a Bill 
of Rights, would be drawn up by representatives of all races. 10 
R. E. van der Ross, wllo was elected deputy chairman of a 
continuation committee set up to negotiate with other bodies, 
wrote that the convention had insisted that coloureds were "not 
content to be sedated with sundry aids which did not recognise 
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their rights to full citizenship. 11 Several important delegates 
at the convention, including van der Ross himself, Edgar Deans 
and Sonny Leon, were to play an important role in the founding 
and activities of the Labour Party after 1965. 
Party Political Developments and the Coloured Question 
1960-1964 
Although by 1960 the objective of removing coloured voters from 
the common roll had been achieved and the U. C.C.A. seemed to be 
running smoothly, all was not well in the National Party over the 
coloured question. Already there were signs of a deep split 
within its circles, a split that was to involve the cabinet, the 
party caucus, Nationalist newspapers, Afrikaner cultural 
organisations, Afrikaner academics and the party rank and 
file. 12 The controversy that flared up in the early 1960s 
flared up again with greater intensity in the early 1970s (see 
Chapter 5, pp.137-47) and in the early 1980s played an important 
role in splitting the party altogether. Points of friction 
included the question of allowing coloureds to be represented in 
Parliament by their own people, the prospect of perpetual 
coloured subservience under the apartheid structure, the possible 
removal of all coloured representation in the white Parliament 
and the begin;-1ings of the "colo-ured homelc.nd" controversy that 
perhaps most clearly served to divide Afrikanerdom along North-
South lines. It was this opposition between hardliners, of which 
P~ime Minister Verwoerd was one, and moderates like P.W. Botha 
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and B. Schoeman, that led R.E. van der Ross to write in April 
1961 that there had never been a time in the history of the 
country when the position of the coloured · people had been as 
important as it was then . 13 
In essence, the National Party was split between its more 
progressive Cape wing that sought a closer alliance with 
coloureds, in many cases seeing them as "brown Afrikaners" and 
part of the Western community, and the hardliners in the 
Transvaal who denied any such linkage and demanded their complete 
segregation, if possible in their own geographical area. Cape 
Nationalists were able to frustrate this latter scheme, but were 
unable to prevent the further separation of white and coloured 
political and social life. This was attributable to the grip the 
Transvaal National Party had over key ministries of Bantu Affairs 
and Community Development and to conflicts within the Cape 
National Party over coloured social and political identity. 14 
Paul Sauer, a Cape Nationalist who saw himself as a champion of 
the coloured people, believed that increased separation and the 
granting of more autonomy to them was the solution. That 
relations between Afrikaners and coloureds went badly was a 
source of disappointment to him up until his death in 1976. 15 
Although by 1960 there were already serious differences in 
principle over important issues within the National Party, the 
basic tenets of what was to become the policy of parallel 
development for whites and coloureds had also begun to be clearly 
demarcated. There was a strong emphasis on the socio-economic 
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upliftment of the coloured population whose depressed position 
was said to take precedence over their political rights for the 
present. 16 Die Burger (19 April 1961) appealed to moderate 
coloured leaders not to join forces with African extremists but 
be patient while their friends in white circles made the 
necessary adaptations. At the end of August the Deputy Minister 
of the Interior, P.W. Botha, told the National Party Congress of 
the Cape that while the party saw the coloured people as being 
part of the Western group, it nevertheless had to be accepted 
that 60 to 80 per cent of them were economically weak and 
backward. For this reason their socio-economic upliftment was a 
priority. 17 The demand for political rights, Botha and other 
Nationalists claimed, was limited mainly to the intellectual 
elite of the coloured population whereas the vast majority were 
more concerned with bread and butter issues. The Nationalist 
approach, according to C.V. de Villiers, National Party M.P. for 
Vasco, was that the development of the coloured people and the 
improvement of their standard of living had to be seen to, before 
the idea of giving greater political rights to a small group that 
merely formed the top layer of the coloured community could be 
entertained . 18 Botha himself claimed in Parliament that 80 to 
8 5 per cent of coloureds were not bothered by questions of a 
separate voters' roll. This was the concern of the vocal minority 
of coloureds who wanted to "escape from the masses of their own 
people 11 by absorption into the white community . 19 These views 
and attitudes need to be borne in mind when assessing the 
decision of the Labour Party to take part on the C.P.R.C. since 
by doing so it aimed to make the coloured community's 
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dissatisfaction with their situation known to a Government that 
continually made claims to the contrary. 
Between 1956 and 1964, the Government took a number of steps 
aimed at raising the living standards of the coloured community, 
steps which in part were to be compensation for the loss of 
political rights. In 1956, the Western Cape was d1~clared a 
coloured labour preference area, and not uncoincidentally, this 
was the same year the removal of coloureds from the common roll 
was completed. 20 In 1962, the Coloured Development Corporation 
was established to provide financial assistance, advice and 
training for coloured businessmen so that they could take over in 
coloured areas and make them self-sufficient. By June 1972, the 
body had received 1 367 applications for financial assistance, 38 
per cent of which had been granted. 21 During the early 1960s, 
the Coloured Affairs Department busied itself with building up 
rural homes, upgrading rural areas and setting up educational and 
training centres, notably the University of the Western Cape, but 
also a coloured technical high school at Athlone and an 
agricultural gymnasium near Stellenbosch. 22 
Despite putting an emphasis on socio-economic upliftment, the 
National Party was not bypassing the issue of political 
representation completely. Speaking in the Assembly on 2 5 January 
1961, P.W. Botha revealed that the U.C.C.A. was to be reorganised 
and further developed until it could be used as an overall 
organisation covering all the local government areas. It could at 
first advise and later be given administrative powers and could 
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also be so developed that eventually it could be given 
legislative power as well. On this basis of consultation and 
parallel development there would be liaison between the U.C.C.A. 
and the Government of the day at the highest levels. 23 Botha 
emphasized at the same time, however, that socio-economic 
considerations had to precede the extension of political rights . 
Nevertheless, his speech had foreshadowed the key functions and 
characteristics of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council 
as it was constituted eight years later. 
According to Verwoerd, coloured politics would develop along the 
lines of a state within the white state. This did not mean a 
coloured homeland, which was impractical, but by ensuring that 
the white and coloured groups developed side by side while 
maintaining the principle of separation between them in every 
social and political field. 24 A reorganised U.C.C.A. with 
extended powers would be the mechanism by which coloureds could 
be given further rights of self-government over their national 
interests. Should it in fact develop to the stage that it in 
effect took the form of a sovereign Parliament, it could happen 
that coloured representation in the white Parliament could be 
dispensed with. 25 
It was the question of coloured representation in Parliament 
that revealed serious differences within the National Party and 
sparked a sharp controversy. There was a strong move among Cape 
Nationalists for the representation of coloured people in 
Parliament by coloured rather than white M.P.'s . Late in 1960 the 
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South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (S.A.B.R.A.) believed this 
to be possible if not imminent. 26 It came as a shock to some, 
therefore, when Verwoerd ~quashed the idea, saying that 
Nationalist leaders had to stand "like walls of granite" on their 
colour policy because the existence of a nation was at stake. 27 
This led to a minor revolt in the Cape National Party. In a 
strongly-worded article on 7 December, Die Burger said that it 
was not the official, agreed position of the party that coloureds 
would never be represented in Parliament by their own people, and 
to say otherwise was not necessarily liberalistic or treasonable. 
Later that month it argued that the door to direct coloured 
representation had never been closed and to do so would have 
incalculable consequences for the National Party and for 
white/brown relations. 28 Simultaneously, delegates of the 
N.G.K. at an inter-church conference issued a statement saying 
that if complete territorial segregation was impossible, then 
full rights could not be indefinitely be withheld from those 
Africans who lived in white areas. 29 This broadening of the 
debate had ominous implications for the whole apartheid policy 
since it brought into focus the question of citizenship rights 
for all unenfrRnchised South Africans. If a solution could not be 
found to the coloured question, Nationalists were realising, this 
would lead to a breakdown of black-white relations as regulated 
by apartheid throughout the Republic. 
Verwoerd had already ruled out both integration and the homeland 
theory as solutions to this problem. On 12 December 1961, in a 
speech before the Council for Coloured Affairs (as the U.C.C.A. 
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was now called), he outlined a third pathway, one of separate 
parallel development through the creation of a coloured state 
within a white state. 30 Here he laid down guidelines for 
converting the c.c.A., which had been established as an advisory 
body, into a Coloured Persons' Representative Council. This would 
function as a Coloured Parliament with administrative and 
legislative powers and officials to carry out its decisions. 
There would be a five-man executive consisting of a Chairman, who 
would be in charge of finance, and four ordinary members holding 
the portfolios of education, social welfare and pensions, labour 
and local government. The coloured people, Verwoerd asserted, 
would themselves be running all important aspects of their lives 
within ten years. 
Verwoerd's address clearly impressed the members of the C.C.A. 
who gave him a prolonged standing ovation at its conclusion. 31 
Elsewhere, enthusiasm was muted, not least within the ranks of 
the National Party itself where many M.P.'s, particularly in the 
Cape, were disturbed by a system that proposed to keep the 
coloured people indefinitely subservient to whites. The coloured 
people were being asked to raise themselves by their own 
initiative and to render service to their own people. At the same 
time whites were bent on maintaining their dominance of the 
political process, making it impossible for coloureds ever to 
reach the stage where they would fulfil their potential . R. E . van 
der Ross wrote that the coloured person's being was, as the Gre ek 
philosopher wrote, a becoming, whose fate it was to be 
perpetually maturing, never to mature. 32 In February 1962, the 
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Minister of Defence, J.J. Fouche, when outlining the political 
future of the Indian community, said that Indians would not get 
the same degree of freedom as whites, but would be granted 
freedom to the extent that they would not threaten the continued 
existence of the white man in South Africa. 33 In 1965, Verwoerd 
frankly admitted that this was to be the case with coloureds as 
well. It would be much better for the coloureds to be given 
limited powers and opportunities than nothing at all, even if 
this meant that they would be continuously subject to the 
authority of the entire State as controlled by the majority 
group. 34 
-~. 
The C.P . R.C. Act (_ 
~ ' ' \ t 
In September 1964 the C.P.R.C. Act No. 49 was passed in the 
Assembly . It aimed to set up "a representative body for the 
Coloured population" and to determine the powers, functions and 
duties of it. The statute, amended four times, in 1968, 1972, 
1975 and 1977, can be called the cornerstone of the Government's 
policy of parallel development. Section 1 stipulated that the 
Council would consist of 46 members, 30 of whom would be elected 
and the remainder nominated by the State President, no persons 
other than those classified Coloured being eligible for election 
or nomination. Two of the 16 nominees would come from the "race 
group" known as Malays and two from the group known as Griquas. 
The remaining nominees were to be chosen proportionately from the 
four provinces of the Republic, eight coming from the Cape, two 
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from the Transvaal and one each from Natal and the Orange Free 
State. 35 
Sections 3-7 dealt with the registration of voters, every 
coloured person who was a South African citizen and over the age 
of 21 being entitled to vote for a representative in his 
electoral division . It was the first time coloureds in the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State were to be registered as 
voters. It was also the first time coloured women anywhere in the 
Republic were being given the opportunity toe register. 
Section 8 of the Act went into detail over the electoral 
divisions, laying down that 18 would come from the Cape, six from 
the Transvaal and three each from Natal and the Orange Free 
state. Council members would hold office for five years. There 
was no mention of payment in the original Act though it later 
transpired that ordinary Council members would receiveR 150.00 
per month. Later, in an attempt to encourage more capable people 
to stand for election, the Government increased the amount tQ ..... , .... 
R 500. oo per month. Rf-.K)[y::s\ 
'· \ 
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The Chairman of the Council was to be elected by the members, ·thg __ / 
Secretary for Coloured Affairs chairing the Council when the 
election took place. Section 14 determined that such a duly 
elected chairman would have a casting as well as a deliberative 
vote in the event of a deadlock. The Executive Committee would 
consist of five members, four of whom would be elected by council 
members with the Chairman of the Executive being designated by 
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the State President. The Minister of Coloured Affairs justified 
this in the Assembly by saying that since the Executive Chairman 
would also be responsible for handling the finances of · the 
council, it was necessary to ensure that he could be relied upon 
not to fail in his duties or be deemed unfit to remain in office 
as a result of personal action. 36 
The executive committee was to carry out the functions of the 
Council except where the making of laws was concerned, when the 
council was not in session. Apart from the executive chairman, 
who was to hold the finance portfolio, the remaining four 
executive members would be allocated the portfolios of educatio.n, 
local government, rural areas and coloured settlements, and 
social welfare and pensions. Power could be delegated by the 
Minister of Coloured Affairs or an Administrator by notice in the 
Gazette to any executive member responsible for the matter 
pertaining to such powers (s 18). 
The impotent nature of the C.P.R.C. was most clearly shown in 
Sections 20-25 dealing with liaison with the Government and the 
Council's power to make laws. The Council could, on request, 
advise the Government or make recommendations in regard to all 
matters affecting the economic, social, political and educational 
interests of the Coloured population. It was also to serve as a 
means of contact and consultation between the said population and 
the Government, the latter for the most part being represented by 
the Minister of Coloured Affairs. The Council could acquire and 
dispose of property, appoint servants and do anything else 
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necessary for the exercise of its powers, but only with the 
approval of the Minister and after consultation with the Minister 
of Finance (s 20 (5) (a)). 
The Act gave the Council limited legislative powers (the power to 
make laws) , these having to be promulgated by the State President 
through proclamation in the Gazette. No law, however, could be 
introduced in the Council except with the approval of the 
Minister of Coloured Affairs after consultation with the Minister 
of Finance and the Administrators. 
Every Bill passed by the Council, moreover, had to be submitted 
to the Minister. From there it had to be presented to the State 
President for his assent, and this could be given , withheld or 
referred back to the Council for further consideration (s 23{1) 
and {2) (a)). Laws assented to would have the force of law, so 
long as they were not repugnant to any Act of Parliament and only 
affected coloured people. Monies required for the discharge of 
the Council's duties would be made available annually out of the 
monies appropriated by Parliament for that purpose ( ie. the 
Council would have no say in the preparation of the estimates) . 
In the debate in the Assembly, the opposition United and 
Progressive Parties as well as the four representatives for 
coloureds elected on the separate voters' roll, criticised the 
Bill. Speaking on behalf of the United Party, Mr J.M. Connan 
pointed out that the C.P.R.C. had only the trappings of power 
without the reality and that the coloured people as a whole had 
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not been consulted about it. Helen Suzman, the only Progressive 
Party representative, asserted that the new Council could not 
take the place of participation in elections of representatives 
to the Assembly where real power was vested . 37 
Tom Swartz accepted the Act as a sound beginning in the granting 
of increased powers and opportunities to the coloured people. 
Soon after its passing, he and his supporters on the c.c.~. 
formed the Federal Coloured Peoples' Party in the Transvaal, Cape 
Province and orange Free State. The party aimed at promoting the 
interests of the coloured people in the spiritual, social, 
educational, cultural and economic fields and leading them to the 
attainment of full citizenship within the framework of parallel 
development. 38 Hoping to promote a spirit of pride and 
independence in coloured people and of loyalty to South Africa, 
it also saw coloureds as being part of Western civilization, 
capable of achieving full citizenship and the abolition of 
discrimination through contact and dialogue. 39 
The F.C.P.P., by supporting apartheid, Christianity and the 
promotion of a coloured identity , thus hoped to protect and 
advance coloured rights, resembling the earlier, pro-Nationalist 
coloured organisations such as the African National Bond of the 
1920s. 40 Its support-base was drawn largely from the ranks of 
coloured businessmen, government appointees and those who 
benefited directly from coloured labour preference policies or 
the reservation of separate business districts for coloureds 
only . 41 Dr W.J. Bergins, executive member of the party after 
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1970 and its leader after 1975, later stressed that the Federal 
Party wanted to improve the coloured people, especially on the 
socio-economic level, political education being a part of this, 
but not a priority.42 
The F.C.P .P. became the chosen instrument of the Government in 
the implementation of its parallel development policy. This led 
to considerable dissatisfaction within the C.C.A., several of its 
members resentful of the fact that Tom Swartz was so obviously 
being favoured by the authorities while they were being 
disregarded. 43 Later in the · decade, these dissident members 
formed their own political parties with policies similar to those 
of the F.C.P.P., but before this, a new party with a different 
orientation had emerged. 
The founding of the Federal Party led to a number of 
intellectuals, concerned lest it be seen to be representing the 
majority of coloured opinion, founding the Labour Party of South 
Africa in cape Town, 1965. Its first president was Dr R.E. van 
der Ross, an academic and later rector of the University of the 
Western Cape. "The boycottist ethic had a very strong under-
current influence", van der Ross was later to comment, "but we 
believed this to be unproductive. Our only alternative therefore 
was to form another political party and participate in order to 
expose the inadequacy of the C.P.R.C. It would have been a poor 
show if the pro-separate development parties went 
unchallenged". 44 Van der Ross resigned his position as party 
leader in 1967 and was replaced by M.D. Arendse. 
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Labour was the only coloured political party in this period that 
unequivocally opposed apartheid in all its forms and which 
committed itself to working towards the elimination of all 
statutory colour bars. Its ultimate ai~ was the effective 
participation of all South Africans in the government of the 
country, all those qualifying for the vote being eligible for 
membership of Parliament, the Provincial Councils and all other 
instruments of central and local government. 45 
The Labour Party never accepted parallel development as being the 
salvation of the coloured people, nor was the C.P.R.C. regarded 
as a viable instrument whereby full citizenship could be 
achieved. So as not to be accused of legitimising an iniquitous 
system by participation, Labour leaders declared their intention 
of rendering the Council unworkable through gaining control of it 
and then refusing to co-operate. It is hard to see how otherwise 
the party could have captured the anti-apartheid vote, as they 
were in the invidious position of having to oppose the exponents 
of the boycott as well as the pro-separate development opposition 
(by no means a negligible force in 1969). 
Between 1965 and the 1969 election, three more parties were 
formed, all with policies similar to those of the F.C.P . P. The 
first of these was the Republican Coloured Party under the 
leadership of Tom le Fleur which hoped to win the votes of the 
Griqua eleme~t of the coloured people as well as being largely 
reliant on the personal appeal of its leader. The Republican 
Party stated its belief in a separate identity as well as a 
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separate cul ture of the coloured people with their own "ethnic 
values", and disapproved of miscegenation. It undertook to strive 
for a coloured Parliament and "national independence" based on 
communal nationhood, mutual trust and co-operation between white 
and non-white. 46 It stated its belief in the building of a 
coloured farming population and approved of the Group Areas Act, 
offering to advise the Government in applying it . 
A second pro-separate development party to be formed by 
disaffected members of the C.C.A. resenting the favouring of 
Swartz and the Federal Party was the Conservative Party of C.I.R. 
Forte in. It was formed largely as an extension of the old 
Kleurlingvolksbond, a rural-based movement that had been active 
in the 1950s. The party supported separate development but wanted 
a more favourable application of the Group Areas Act, a common 
voters' roll and the representation of coloured people in 
Parliament by six white experts. 47 Other long-term aims were 
the attainment of equal opportunities as those for whites, and 
equal pay. 48 
The National Coloured Peoples' Party was formed in 1966 as a 
breakaway from the Federal Party because of personality 
differences with the party hierarchy in the Transvaa1. 49 Its 
founder and leader, Dr Clifford Smith , was more outspokenly pro-
coloured than any of the Conservative Party leaders. Smith 
regarded the Group Areas Act as being "one of the finest laws 
enacted for the coloured people" since it broke down artificial 
class barriers within the coloured community as well as giving 
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its members greater opportunities than ever before to build and 
buy their own homes on a large scale. 50 He supported the 
removal of coloureds from the common voters' roll and also 
supported the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. The N.C.C.P. 
held strong anti-Muslim and anti-Indian views during the 
election, accusing the Labour Party of being "kaffir-boeties" and 
"koelie-boeties". 51 There were indications that the party would 
poll well, at least in the Transvaal, when it won all five seats 
for the coloured management committee of the Johannesburg City 
Council in 1967. 
It would be incorrect to claim, as A.L.J. Venter did, that the 
five parties formed to contest the 1969 election, represented the 
broad spectrum of coloured opinion nationwide. 52 Ever since the 
launching of Anti-C.A.D. and the Non-European Unity Movement in 
the 1940s and 1950s, a strong tradition of non-collaboration had 
existed amongst the more educated and politically aware 
coloureds, particularly in the Western Cape. These used the 
Educational Journal, the organ of the Teachers' League of South 
Africa (formed in 1913) to launch savage and scathing attacks on 
the proposed new Council and on the Federal and Labour Parties 
for deciding to participate in it . 53 Throughout the painful and 
turbulent history of the C.P.R. C. these academics kept up a 
bitter and sustained stream of invectives against it and all 
those who participated in its workings. Terms like "kleurling 
parlementjie", "white herrenvolk", "quislings", "collaborators" , 
"dummy representation", "carpet-bagging opportunists", "social 
parasites" and "servile, self-effacing unpersons" were used 
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constantly, and people were encouraged to boycott all the 
institutions of parallel development. Compelling as their 
arguments were, they could not disguise the fact that no 
constructive alternatives could be proffered . For the most part, 
all the boycotters could do was involve themselves in cultural 
circles and educational associations, "endlessly elaborating 
their own particular doctrine and damning those who disagreed 
with them as revisionists, collaborators, C.I.A. agents, 
quislings or lackeys". 54 
The Prohibition of Political Interference Act 
The leading coloured political organisations which opposed 
separate voters' rolls and regarded separate representation as 
ineffectual, had decided in 1961 to boycott the election of four 
white M.P.'s to represent coloured voters in the Cape. The 
Progressive and Liberal Parties decided against putting up 
candidates in view of this attitude. In fact, part of the reason 
why 12 United Party M.P.'s broke away in 1959 to form the 
Progressive Party, was the United Party's decision to participate 
in elections on the segregated roll for Cape coloureds. 55 
Later, however, this policy was reversed and candidates were put 
up in the 1965 Cape Provincial Council elections in the South 
Cape and North Cape constituencies which were the two coloured 
seats. This new involvement resulted in an awakened interest in 
politics in the coloured community which was reflected in the 
dramatic rise in the numbers of registered voters on the roll. In 
60 
the south Cape the 4 113 voters on the roll in February 1964 had 
grown by an additional 12 000 by the end of the year and in the 
North cape the numbers grew from 9 389 by 5 000. 56 In the 1965 
elections the Progressives won both seats, in the process 
defeating two United Party candidates and an unofficial 
Nationalist one. 
The Government reacted with considerable concern, not only 
because it did not wish to see the Progressives add to their 
single representative (Helen Suzman) in the Assembly, but because 
coloured voters were now showing renewed interest in white 
politics when the National Party's aim was to direct their 
interests towards their own political affairs. 5 7 One should not 
exaggerate the effect the Progressive role had in removal of the 
four coloured representatives in Parliament. Verwoerd had 
indicated bef.Jre that the system of separate representation would 
become redundant once the coloured people had achieved full 
autonomy through their own Council. 58 Verwoerd had been 
reluctant to remove coloured representation in Parliament because 
certain members of his cabinet, notably Ben Schoeman, were 
opposed to it . ~choeman, in fact, threatened to resign if he did 
so. 59 Verwoerd was aware, however, that the presence of four 
representatives for coloureds in Parliament was obviously 
inequitable, and would in time lead to demands for the numbers to 
be increased in proportion to the relative size of the coloured 
population. An important reason why he opposed direct coloured 
representation was that it would speed up this process . 60 The 
Progressives' entry onto the scene , though unwelcome, 
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nevertheless gave him the opportunity to remove the four coloured 
representatives without splitting his party. 
In September 1965, the National Party published the Prohibition 
of Improper Interference Bill. In terms of this Bill, no one 
could, directly or indirectly, be a member of, take part in or 
give assistance to any political organisation or member of 
another racial group. 61 Representatives of coloured voters were 
to be required to sever all connection with any white political 
party after the Bill became law. 
Both the United and Progressive Parties showed their strong 
opposition to the Bill by fighting its introduction in the 
Assembly. The Bill was eventually passed on its first reading, 
but on 26 September it was announced that it would be referred to 
a Select Committee before the second reading. The committee was 
empowered to convert itself into a commission and did so, 
publishing its report on 16 February 1967. 62 
The majority report recommended that the Prohibition of Improper 
Interference Bill not be proceeded with. It considered, however, 
that legislation preventing the interference of one race group in 
the politics of another was necessary. It was recommended that 
the representation of coloured people by white M.P.'s in 
Parliament should be abolished and that a Coloured Legislative 
Council be created in place of the Council for Coloured Affairs, 
with extended powers. Three important pieces of legislation 
affecting the coloured people were passed as a result of the 
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Commission's findings. The first was the Separate Representation 
of voters Amendment Act No. 50 of 19 68, which provided that 
coloured representation in the Assembly, the Senate and the Cape 
Provincial Council should cease. The second was the Prohibition 
of Political Interference Act No. 51 of 1968, making it illegal 
for individuals or political organisations to be in any way 
active in the political affairs of another race group. As a 
result of this Act, the small, multiracial Liberal Party decided 
to disband. 63 
The third Act, the Coloured Persons' Representative Council 
Amendment Act No. 52, modified the 1964 Act and cleared the decks 
for the first coloureds-only elections the following year. The 
council was now to consist of 60 members, 40 of whom were to be ' 
elected and 20 nominated. All the extra members were to come from 
the Cape Province, including 12 instead of eight nominees and 28 
instead of 18 electoral divisions. 64 As previously, the State 
President would designate the Chairman of the Executive, but now 
could also remove him from office at any time. The power to make 
laws no longer had to be promulgated in the Gazette by the State 
President, but no proposed law could be introduced without the 
approval of the Minister as in the principal Act. Slightly more 
latitude than before was to be given to the Council in the 
preparation of its estimates of expenditure, but these would 
still require the Minister's approval in consultation with the 
Minister of Finance. The Minister would then decide the total 
amount to be submitted to Parliament for appropriation and, once 
the total sum had been voted, submit the estimates to the 
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council. The council would then appropriate the monies for the 
services it controlled, within the limits of the sum voted, by 
resolution. 
one important difference in the amended Act was that registration 
of voters was made compulsory, penalties for failure to register 
being three months' imprisonment or a R 50 fine. The reason for 
this given by the Minister of Coloured Affairs in the Assembly 
was that since the vast majority of coloureds had never been on 
a voters' roll, it would be impractical to allow registration to 
take place voluntarily, steps needing to be taken by the 
Government to ensure that they did indeed register. 65 The 
measure can also be seen as an attempt to preempt a large-scale 
boycott of registration which was anticipated. 
Before 1960, the political fate of the Indian population was 
quite distinct from that of the Cape coloured. Indians had never 
had the vote nor any Parliamentary representation whatever. In 
1946, the Smuts Government made an attempt to accommodate them 
when it passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representative 
Act, a measure which restricted Indian land ownership and 
occupation to particular 11 uncontrolled11 areas of Natal but gave 
them token political representation as a palliative. This would 
have meant three white representatives in the Assembly and two in 
the Senate, plus two provincial councillors who could be 
Indians. 66 The Natal Indian Congress rejected the offer and the 
Act was scrapped by the National Party after 1948. 
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A major shift in the National Party's attitude towards the Indian 
community occurred after 1960 when steady moves towards 
reorganising its political future along the same lines as that of 
the Cape coloured community began to be made. A Department of 
Indian Affairs was created on 1 September 1961 and in May the 
following year the new Minister for Indian Affairs, W.A. Maree, 
admitted that the Government's repatriation scheme had failed and 
that consequently Indians had to be regarded as permanent 
inhabitants of the country. 67 At the same time he indicated 
that the Government intended to set up a consultative council 
which would gradually take over the functions of his department . 
The Government's policy for Indians was thus ·the same as that for 
coloured people, politica l rights for the latter to be limited to 
self-government within their own community. 
The Minister met with over 100 representatives of the Indian 
people in December 1963 to discuss the plans for a National 
Indian Council, which was to be a non-statutory, wholly nominated 
body that would deal with matters of local government, education 
and welfare services. The conference eventually resolved to 
accept the establishment of the Council as an interim measure, 
despite there being considerable opposition to this among many in 
the Indian community who felt that the acceptance of such a body 
would destroy their hopes of ever being granted direct 
representation in Parliament . On 3 February 1964, the names of 21 
prominent members of the Indian community were announced as 
members of the first Indian Council. They represented such 
interests of their community as religion, education, welfare 
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services, sport, business, finance, industry and labour, and were 
drawn from three towns in the Cape, four in the Transvaal and 
nine in Nata1. 68 The Council held its first meeting in March 
1964 at which its name was changed to South African Indian 
Council. 
The South African Indian Council Act of 19 68 turned the S.A.I.C. 
into a statutory body with 25 members to represent the three 
provinces (exc luding, of course, the Free State, in which Indians 
were barred from settling). It remained an advisory, wholly 
nominated body, but a partially elected Council with 
administrative powers was envisaged in the future. It is 
important to note that although these provisions were meagre, 
they did represent a marginal improvement in the political 
position of South African Indians, whereas the C.P.R. C. Act 
downgraded that of the coloured people. Perhaps this was why the 
S.A.I.C., unlike the C.P.R. C., tended to avoid confrontation with 
the Government throughout the 1970s. 
The Firs t C.P.R.C. Elections, Septe mber 1969 
Of the 802 500 people qualified to register, 637 936 had done so 
by election day . 69 The election and the build-up to it led to 
a revival of political interest in the coloured community, the 
emergence of exclusively coloured party politics being an 
entirely new phenomenon in South African history. 
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The Federal Party was the best organised and financed of the 
coloured parties and it alone was able to contest all 40 seats. 
It had used the years prior to the election well to co-ordinate 
its campaigns and make its policies and leader known to the 
people, putting special effort into the rural areas where the 
traditional subservience and conservatism of the electorate would 
give it much greater appeal. 70 Party candidates were fairly 
lavish in their promises to their largely illiterate supporters, 
their appeal being based largely on local interests of voters 
such as the establishing of post offices or police stations in 
their constituencies. The Federal Party also largely had the 
support of the white employers of many voters. Uncertain of the 
secrecy of their votes and afraid of repercussions, many were 
supposedly intimidated into voting Federal for fear of losing 
their jobs. 71 Arendse later claimed that coloured voters had 
been threatened with the deprivation of their jobs and homes in 
the country areas if they did not vote Federal. 72 
It transpired later that the Federal Party's election campaign 
had received extensive support from the Afrikaner Broederbond. It 
was revealed in the Sunday Times that after the death of 
Verwoerd, the Prohibition of Political Interference Bill had been 
postponed as a direct result of Bond pressure on the Cabinet. 
This allowed the organisation to legally assist the F.C.P.P. up 
to 1968, registering coloured voters and advising Federal 
candidates, but even after the passing of the Act it continued to 
play an important role behind the scenes. A donation of R 50 000 
was made to assist in the election campaign and a special 
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circular, dated 14 August 1969, was sent to all members in which 
it was urged that they do all they could to encourage coloureds, 
in their employ or otherwise, to vote and to propagate the views 
of swartz's party and provide transportation to the polls on 
voting day. 73 
Hopes of personal gain also favoured the Federals. It was widely 
believed that favours in the form of shop sites, liquor licenses 
and business loans followed support for the party. The spectre of 
the swart gevaar proved effective, particularly in the Transvaal 
where the idea of a pure coloured nation protected from non-
coloured non-whites gained votes. 74 The Labour Party was also 
hampered by the fact that the election had been called in July to 
take place in September, giving them only three months to prepare 
for it, whereas the Federal Party had been organising for years. 
_/ 
Despite these ~dvantages, Swartz's party suffered a heavy defeat 
in the elections held in September 1969 . Contesting 36 seats, 
Labour won 26 of them and gained 136 845 votes in all. M.D. 
Arendse was the only party leader who was successful, winning the 
Tafelberg seat with a majority of 3 058 in a 26,3 per cent poll. 
Prominent Labour candidates like Norman Middleton (Wentworth, 
Natal) , Sonny Leon (Diamant, Kimberley) , David Curry (Pniel, 
Western Cape), Allan Hendrickse (Bethelsdorp, Eastern Cape), Fred 
Peters (Heideveld, Western Cape) and Edward Rooks (Greenwood 
Park, Natal) all won with substantial majorities. 75 
The Federal Party gained 90 055 votes and 11 seats, three of 
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which (Karee, Free State South, Free State North) were 
uncontested. Four of those elected, H.J. Coverdale (Northern 
Transvaal), P.J. Petersen (Wupperthal, Cape), W.J. Louw (Protea, 
Transvaal) and s.s. Cloete (Steinkopf, Cape) had served on the 
old U.C.C.A. The luckless Swartz, standing in Kasselsvlei 
(Bellville South, Western Cape), suffered the humiliation of 
being beaten by both the Labour and Republican candidates, 
gaining only 1 677 votes out of a total of 9 326 and nearly 
losing his deposit. 76 
Fortein's Conservative Party was virtually eliminated, polling a 
dismal 3 216 votes. The National Coloured Peoples' Party polled 
fairly well only in the Transvaal where it won one seat (W.J. 
Swartz, Witwatersrand) and totalled 23 260 votes in all. Tom le 
Fleur's Republican Party, the only organisation to survive until 
the 1975 election, gained 30 241 votes and one seat (S.M. Brown, 
Haarlem) . Solly Essop (Bokkeveld) was the only successful 
independent candidate out of eight, though he joined the Federal 
Party immediately after the election. 
The fact that the Republican and National Parties each managed to 
attract a fairly large number of votes is worth noting at this 
point, particularly as both parties rapidly lost support after 
1969 and in fact played little further part in coloured politics 
after the election. The N.C.P.P. did especially well in the 
Transvaal where, by a narrow margin, it emerged as the majority 
party (11 301 votes to the 10 962 of Labour and the 10 826 of the 
Federals). The party's success in the Transvaal can be attributed 
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partly to the fact that it was best organised there but also to 
the sympathetic chord its stridently anti-black and anti-Indian 
views struck with many coloured voters. The Transvaal coloured 
community, less well established than that in the Cape, was a 
vulnerable and insecure one. Assimilation with the numerically 
superior blacks was perceived by some as being a constant threat 
to the few privileges, such as exemption from carrying passes, 
that coloured people possessed. There was also a supposedly 
higher degree of African admixture than in the Cape, an 
assumption which led to coloured fears of "racial degeneration" 
if blacks were admitted to their ranks. 77 Anti-Indian fears 
were primarily linked to. economic jealousy and the fear that 
Indians would monopolise all trade concessions in coloured areas 
if the Group Areas Act was allowed to lapse. 
The success of the Republican Party, which was placed third with 
more than 3 0 000 votes, despite contesting only Cape seats, 
indicated a fairly wide response to its appeals for a strong 
coloured ethnic consciousness and autonomy. Most votes were 
gained in the rural constituencies of the central and Eastern 
Cape where there was a strong Griqua presence . Here it is 
important to note the attitude of the Griqua, a people by 
definition and name of mixed stock but who, by the 1960s, were 
intolerant of further race mixture and showed a strong group 
consciousness and race pride. 78 Few in number and scattered 
over a wide area, the Griqua spoke Afrikaans and claimed 
responsibility for its origin, referred to themselves as "Die 
Volk", and continued to yearn for an independent nationhood. (In 
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1981, Eric le Fleur, President of the Griqua National Convention, 
gave evidence before the constitutional committee of the 
President's Council (see Chapter 7, pp.228-9) in which he called 
for the more efficient application of the Population Registration 
Act and for consolidating all Griquas and coloureds who were 
accepted as being part of the Griqua people, in their own 
national territory.) 79 
The Decline of the Smaller Parties after 1969 
The Republican, National and Conservative Parties lost support 
rapidly after 1969, and only the Republicans survived to contest 
the 1975 election. This was a consequence of their being unable 
to formulate distinctive policies to distinguish them from the 
Federal Party. This was particularly true of the Conservative 
Party which made little impact on the electorate in 1969. 80 The 
Republican and National Parties differed only in their relative 
emphasis on certain policies that were already incorporated in 
the Federal Party's platform. In the case of the National Party, 
it was protection from interracial competition, in that of the 
Republican Party, the propagation of a separate coloured 
identity. A second reason for the decline of the other pro-
separate development parties was their lack of support from 
Government sonrces which concentrated on keeping the Federal 
Party on its feet and discouraging the further splitting of the 
conservative coloured vote. 81 A clear sign of this came soon 
after the 1969 election when none of the 20 Government nominees 
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to the C.P.R.C. represented any of the pro-separate development 
parties. An analysis of the 1969 election results shows that the 
participation of the smaller conservative parties cost the 
Federal Party three seats in the Cape (Visrivier, Haarlem and 
Genadendaal) and three more in the Transvaal (Newclare, Rus-Ter-
Vaal and Witwatersrand). Without that participation and including 
Solly Essop's seat , the Federal Party could have had 18 seats in 
the Council as against the Labour Party's 22, a defeat for the 
Government certainly, but by no means the humiliating rejection 
that the 1969 election in fact turned out to be. 
Including the uncontested seats, the overall pe~centage poll of 
those registered was 48,7 per cent, ranging between 66,6 and 81 
per cent in the three Northern provinces and being fairly high in 
the rural constituencies of the Cape where the Federal Party was 
strong. In the seven urban constituencies of the Cape, however, 
it was below 30 per cent, the lowest being the 12, 9 per cent 
recorded in Liesbeek. Low as the overall poll was, it was to drop 
drastically in future elections (37,2 per cent i n 1975, 30,9 per 
c ent in 1984 and barely 20 per cent in 1989). The boycott 
notwithstanding, pro-separate development parties overall managed 
to gain nearly 15 000 votes more than Labour (151 179), this 
indicating that at least a sizeable minority of coloured people 
had hopes that parallel development might be beneficial to 
them. 82 
The 1969 election and the election that followed it in 1975, 
revealed much about the voting patterns and political divisions 
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amongst the coloured people. In essence, the two elections showed 
just how fragmented the coloured electorate was with factors of 
age, socio-economic status, geography, education and language all 
serving to divide it into various groupings and factions. In both 
elections, supporters of the Federal Party and other pro-separate 
development movements tended to be from the rural areas of the 
cape, the Orange Free state and the Transvaal, were usually 
Afrikaans-speaking, and represented people of middle to lower 
socio-economi9 status . 83 Of the 11 seats won by the Federals 
in 1969, five were rural Cape constituencies where the party was 
best organised and the electorate least sophisticated in terms of 
educational standards and degrees of politicisation. The 
remaining six seats were equally distributed between the 
Transvaal and the Free State where the coloured communities, less 
well established than those in the Cape and more vulnerable to 
African competition, tended to support those parties that sought 
to protect th8ir rights as a group. Had the National Coloured 
Peoples' Party not split the pro-apartheid vote in the Transvaal, 
the Federal Party would have won all six seats there in 1969. 
Those who voted for the Labour Party in 1969 and 1975 tended to 
be people of comparatively high socio-economic status, who were 
under 45 years of age and who lived in the urban areas. 84 The 
party gained most of its seats in the urban constituencies of the 
Western Cape, the Eastern Cape and Natal, where the electorat8s 
were relatively politicised and where there was considerable 
opposition to parallel development and a separate coloured 
identity. After 1969, following disillusionment over the 
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c.P.R.C.'s failure to bring about the hoped for improvements in 
the coloureds' status, Labour steadily made inroads in Federal 
areas, but even in 1975 there was still sufficient support for 
parallel development for the Federal Party to gain eight seats, 
three from Cape rural constituencies and the remainder from the 
Transvaal and Free State. 
There was, however, a "third constituency", made up of the 
majority of potential coloured voters who consciously boycotted 
the election. Least inclined to vote were those under 35 years of 
age, those with post-school training and those in the top income 
group. The majority of doctors, nurse s, lecturers and ministers 
of religion did not vote while a majority in other occupational 
categories (especially teachers) did. 85 Although there was a 
tendency in the lower and middle income levels for involvement in 
political activity to increase in proportion to wealth, there was 
a significant tailing-off of political involvement in the highest 
income groups. Coloured people in the northern provinces and in 
the Cape rural areas were much more active politically than those 
in the Cape urban areas, especially in the Cape Town 
constituencies where participation was very low indeed. 
Proportionally, Afrikaans-speaking coloured people took a more 
active part in C.P.R.C. politics than English-speaking. 86 The 
low poll was not entirely due to dissatisfaction with the system 
of representation, however. Factors like illiteracy, ignorance, 
the migration of potential voters and the inability to get to 
polling booths also played their part. 87 
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The C.P.R.C.'s support base was to shrink steadily after 1969. 
Many voters who had supported the Labour Party in the first 
election did not vote in 1975 while a large number of those who 
had voted for the pro-separate development parties transferred 
their allegiance to Labour. In the 1980s, the demise of the 
Federal Party was complete and the Labour Party came to replace 
it as a focus of moderate and conservative coloured opinion. An 
analysis of the Labour Party's support base after 1983 does not 
fall within the ambit of this thesis, but it could well lend 
substance to Norman Middleton's claim in 1989 that the Labour 
Party was essentially the old Federal Party in a different guise 
and should have changed its name (see Chapter 7, p.240). 
The 1969 election was the first of a series of set-backs suffered 
by the Vorster Government in its coloured policy. It was expected 
that at least a handful of the nominated seats would be allocated 
to the victors and it came as a shock when all 2 0 of those 
nominated on 7 October belonged to the Federal Party. Of these, 
13 were candidates who had been defeated in the elections, 
including Swartz who was appointed Chairman of the Council's 
Executive. Only Federal members had been nominated since the 
Government evidently hoped to encourage the development of a two-
party system and to discourage divisions in the pro-apartheid 
sector of the coloured population. J.J. Loots, the Minister of 
Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations (as he was now officially 
called), said bluntly: "I admit the Council was loaded and I 
would do so again if necessary". 88 The Federal Party was thus 
presented with a slight overall majority (32 to a combined 
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opposition total of 28), but any limited credibility the Council 
might have had was further weakened . The Education Journal , hard-
put to disguise its glee, provided the following comment: 
"Surprised and stripped naked by t~e boycott, the collaborators 
are frantically casting about for something, anything, with which 
to cover their (political) pudenda, not from any sense of shame, 
but merely because of the freezing draught. They are nailed to 
the -scaffolding of Uncle Tom's Cabin, and nothing can save 
them. "89 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"UNCLE TOM'S CABINET': 
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COUNCIL 
1969-1972 
"Mr Chairman, politics is the art of the 
possible. You cannot get things which are 
impossible, but you can try to get things 
that are possible." 
Tom Swartz1 
Mnr Swartz en die Federale Party is bereid 
om soos hanger hondjies die krummels van die 
wit manse tafel op te lek." 
George Fortuin2 
C.P.R.C. Debates, Vol 25, 22 August 1973, p.751 
C.P.R.C. Debates, Vol 23, 6 August 1973, p.133 
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Opening of the First Council 
The C.P.R.C. was opened on 6 November 1969, in an official 
ceremony at Proteaville, Belville South in the Cape Flats. The 
Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, and the Minister for Coloured, 
Rehoboth and Nama relations, J.J. Loots, both officiated. The 
Government was embarrassed by the non-attendance of the Labour 
Party who boycotted the occasion in protest at the packing of the 
Council. Labour did attend the first short session of the Council 
on 20 and 21 November, however, a lively meeting that anticipated 
the nature of future sessions. 
The C.P.R.C. had clearly been cast in a mould to make it 
function, look and sound like the House of Assembly . This was 
shown in the terminology used to describe the functions and 
functionaries ( eg. "honourable members", "no-confidence motion", 
"Leader of the Opposition", "Leader of the House", etc., the 
procedures followed by meeting in general assembly and meeting in 
general committee), and the general wording of the provisions in 
the Standing Orders of the principle Act. 1 One important 
difference was that private members motions could be introduced 
quite freely and these motions came to form almost the entire 
substance of the Council's business in view of the lack of real 
legislative authority. Commentators noted that the Government had 
provided nothing but the best in decor and materials for the new 
C.P.R.C. building, going to a great deal of trouble to create a 
good impression, if only for outside consumption. 2 
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M.D. Arendse, who to the annoyance of many in his party referred 
to himself as 'Leader of the Opposition' and was, it was felt, 
generally giving the proceedings a dignity they did not deserve, 
submitted the first No-Confidence motion. In the ensuing debate 
Norman Middleton, who was to distinguish himself as one of the 
most uncompromising of Labour Party hardliners, introduced an 
unwelcome note of realism into the proceedings. "Mr Chairman", he 
said with crushing sarcasm, "may I with humble respect ask you 
not to make this Council a bigger circus than what it is 
already?" 3 This showed how even at this early stage there were 
Council members who had no intention of giving the Coloured 
Parliament even a chance of functioning smoothly. 
After the No-Confidence motion had been defeated, Labour walked 
out en bloc. When they returned, a motion by Arendse that equal 
salaries on the same basis as whites should be paid to all 
professional and medical personnel, teachers, public servants and 
nurses holding the same qualifications was unanimously agreed to. 
It was the only motion passed at the first C.P . R. c. session, 
proceedings being brought to a close soon afterwards. 
The Labour Party, having decided to continue participation in the 
working of the Council despite being prevented from taking it 
over, were careful not to give the institution any unnecessary 
legitimacy. This was r eflected in some of the main principles and 
tactics adopted by it in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was 
decided in November 1969 that no member of the party caucus would 
serve on any committee brought into being by the C.P.R.C. (This 
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was followed up by an undertaking the following year not to serve 
on the liaison committee linking the Council to members of the 
Republican cabinet) . At the same meeting it was decided that the 
National President would refuse to accept the Chairmanship of the 
council Executive if chosen by the Government, nor would any 
caucus member serve on the executive. 4 At the same time 
resolutions were passed not to participate in or attend the non-
white South African games and to boycott the festivities 
commemorating the tenth anniversary of the South African Republic 
in May 1971. 5 
All was not well in the party, however, dissatisfaction over M.D. 
Arendse's leadership having become increasingly apparent after 
the 1969 election. In February 1970, he unilaterally appointed 
himself and another party member to serve on a liaison committee 
between the Council and the Government, despite the recent 
conference resolution forbidding this. That same month, without 
informing his executive, he met with Vorster where, it 
transpired, he was asked to weed out the more radical members of 
the party, including Norman Middleton and Deputy Leader Sonny 
Leon. 6 
It became cle~r that the forthcoming Labour Party congress in 
April would be an explosive one, Arendse declaring his intention 
of possibly expelling from the party caucus those members who 
would not toe the line and Leon threatening to resign if Arendse 
was retained as Party Leader. 7 In his opening speech on the 
first day of the congress, Arendse made an ill-advised speech 
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suggesting that the Western Cape be partitioned off from the rest 
of the country as a fully autonomous state. This was clearly 
orientating coloureds to the Council with its implications of 
separate treatment. In short, Arendse had failed to follow the 
party line at non-collaboration within the collaborationist area, 
and this speech was the last straw. 8 At the final sitting he 
was voted out and replaced by Sonny Leon as Party Leader. The 
Reverend H. J. Hendrickse became National Chairman, Norman 
Middleton National Vice-Chairman, David Curry Deputy Leader, and 
Fred Peters, National Secretary. All five men were to dominate 
party policy for most of the decade. 
The son of a cabinet-maker and a Regimental Sergeant Major 1n 
World War Two, Lionel Samuel (Sonny) Leon was to prove himself to 
be a strong and capable leader, despite his lack of formal 
education. Arendse refused to take his defeat gracefully, 
however, at first threatening to contest Leon's election in court 
on the grounds that the voting had been irregular. This he did 
not do, but in the following years, tensions ran high between the 
two, threatening at times to split the party altogether. 
Coloured people were represented in the Assembly for the last 
time on 27 February 1970. Two of their M.P . 's, Graham Eden and 
Bill Holland, said that they regretted being legislated out of 
office, but nevertheless saw the Council as being a step in the 
right direction . A third member, Abe Bloomberg, was less 
optimistic, saying in the Assembly on 3 February that the 
Government's packing of the Council had disillusioned him, 
despite initial hopes . 9 
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The Second C.P.R.C. Session October-November 1970 
The c.P.R.C. had had a bumpy start, but was still very much an 
unknown quantity when its members gathered at the end of 1970 for 
the first full session. It was opened by Prime Minister Vorster 
on November 6th, an occasion again boycotted by Labour. In his 
opening speech, he appealed to all coloured leaders to work 
together alongside the Government for the advancement of their 
people and promised that great developments were awaiting them. 
Vorster's address was followed by the No-Confidence motion moved 
by Leon and reading: 
"That this Council places on record its no confidence in the 
Chairman of the Executive Committee and the members of the 
Executive Committee of the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council." 
Later No-Confidence motions were to concern the policy of 
Separate Development and the institution of the C.P.R.C .. The 
C.P.R.C. Executive had been elected at the previous short session 
and apart from Swartz con.sisted of S. S. Cloete, W. J. Berg ins, 
W.J. Louw and P.J. Pietersen. Already people had come to refer to 
it as "Uncle Tom's Cabinet". 
In the ensuing debates, L.P. members attacked their opponents for 
being nominated, for co-operating with the authorities and for 
not taking a strong stand on crucial issues in coloured 
politics. 10 Swartz replied by criticizing the ousting of Arendse 
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and reaffirming his party's support for parallel development. "We 
may have helped the white man build up this country", he said, 
"we provided the labour, but with the white man's initiative , the 
white man's know-how, the white man's capital, the white man's 
Christianity, the white man's education, the white man's 
civilization, everything. 1111 The No-Confidence motion was 
defeated 32 to 27. 
Twenty-four motions were agreed to during the session. Four of 
these submitted by the Labour Party were agreed to unanimously, 
including calls for the repeal of the Immorality Act and the 
appointing of an independent commission of experts to enqui re 
into the serious housing backlog. After the equal-pay-for-equal-
work resolution of the previous year had been side-stepped by the 
Government on the grounds that present circumstances prevented 
it, Labour proposed that this be found totally unacceptable. The 
motion was also passed. 
A number of amendments to Federal Party motions were submitted, 
these being controversial requests for the abolition of job 
reservation and the repeal of the Group Areas Act, that the 
Council resolve that all forms of discrimination by one group of 
people against another be found totally unacceptable and that the 
system of management committees be abolished in favour of an 
extended municipal franchise. 12 The job reservation and Group 
Areas amendments, while not being accepted, did lead to the 
original Federal motion, which called for a tightening up of 
these laws in favour of coloureds, lapsing in terms of standing 
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order No. 9 (laying down that a private member's motion could not 
be discussed for more than 2, 5 hours). A third controversial 
motion, by the sole N.C . P . P. representative W. J. Swartz, 
calling for the reclassification and removal of all non-
coloureds, also lapsed after an introduction by Labour of an 
amendment demanding the repeal of the Population Registration 
Act. None of the Labour amendments were accepted because of the 
built-in Federal majority, but the heated opposition of its 
members did prevent the smooth passage of pro-apartheid 
legislation as well as bringing about the gradual conversion of 
many Federals to their cause. 
A fourth motion to lapse was that by a Labour member calling for 
a boycott of the forthcoming Republican celebrations. Unanimously 
agreed to, however, was the Labour motion that the terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act be extended to coloured farm 
labourers. The motions were forwarded to the Minister by the 
Council secretary at the end of the session, but in the end not 
one of them was accepted by the Government. 13 
The Federal Party decision to allocate a large sum toward co-
ordinating the tenth anniversary of the Republican celebrations 
for coloureds caused much resentment, not least within the party 
itself. Coloured people had not voted in the Republican 
referendum in 1960, even those able to vote on the separate roll 
being excluded. "The Federals are organising the Coloured kitchen 
celebrations for their masters", commented the Educational 
Journal bitterly, "and indeed, the C. R.C. voted R 75 800 for the 
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klonkie celebrations. 1114 The Labour Party actively campaigned 
against participation, asking instead for a day of prayer on the 
sunday nearest Republic Day for all people suffering under 
apartheid legislation. Coloured people had not been consulted 
over the Republic, it was argued. 15 At least four Federal 
members of the Council boycotted the celebrations which were a 
massive flop, only about 2 500 people attending the official 
opening of the festivities at the Athlone stadium (70 000 had 
been expected) .16 
Rifts in the Labour Party , 1971 
In January 1971, Leon met informally with Chief Buthelezi, then 
Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority which had 
been established by the Government the previous year. Amongst the 
issues discussed were the future of the coloured people in 
Zululand and the question of granting self-rule to the 
homelands. 17 
toenadering 
This was the first step in a gradual process of 
that characterized Labour-Inkatha relations 
throughout the 1970s, a courtship that culminated, as will be 
shown, in the short-lived South African Black Alliance (see 
Chapter 6, pp.200-5). Many within the Labour Party, particularly 
those influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement (see Chapter 
4, pp.113-5) like Norman Middleton, wanted the party to diffuse 
its coloured identity within a broad black front against 
apartheid. An important achievement for this group came in April 
1973 when Buthelezi was able to address the 7th Annual Conference 
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of the Party. In it, he emphasized that the challenge for 
coloureds was to defeat Government attempts to keep them apart 
from blacks by having them cling to the white power structure in 
the hope of better things to come. 18 
Many in the Labour Party were unhappy about Leon's initiative, 
however, particularly E.G. Rooks , member for the Natal seat of 
Greenwood Paxk and a founder member of the Party. Rooks openly 
criticized Leon, saying that he had had no mandate for meeting 
with Buthelez i. He also made insulting remarks to the Natal 
Mercury about Buthelezi, referring to him as the "so-called Zulu 
King" (22 January 1971). Rooks'. anti-Buthelezi statements angered 
protagonists of Black Consciousness and many were demanding his 
expulsion from the party, not least Middleton, who claimed he was 
"finished with the old bastard" and would "destroy him even in 
his sick bed". 19 
Rooks was nevertheless not without allies of his own, and at a 
stormy regional meeting on 21 February in which he had allegedly 
packed the conference with his branch members and where his 
daughters apparently threatened to beat up the daughter of his 
opponent, he was elected leader of the party for Natal. This was 
seen as a swing to the right for Labour, and moves were quickly 
afoot to purge the leadership of its "moderate" elements. In 
March, Rook's Transvaal ally, Domingo, was ousted at a regional 
congress and replaced by Don Mattera. Moves were then taken at 
the party congress in April to discipline Rooks who responded by 
leaving the party.20 
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At the same congress a new Labour executive was elected. Arendse 
stood against Curry for the position or Deputy Leader and was 
heavily defeated. R.E. van der Ross, the first leader of the 
party, who had left politics in 1968 after being appointed 
Assistant Educational Planner in the Administration of Coloured 
Affairs, was expelled from Labour. The reason given was his 
acceptance of the appointment as chairman of the Coloured 
Committee for Cape Town to co-ordinate the Republican 
celebrations . 
The April cong1.·ess had been a comprehensive victory for the party 
militants. Arendse resigned from Labour in October, declaring his 
intention of forming a new, more moderate party which, he 
claimed, had the support of at least 15 c. P.R. c. members. 21 
Before his resignation, Les du Preez (Newclare) and E. Domingo 
had been expelled for advocating "Brown Power", a philosophy 
which sought to apply the principles of Black Consciousness 
specifically to coloureds and was spear-headed by Lofty Adams 
after he had left the Federal Party. Adams was sympathetic 
towards Black Consciousness and foresaw the possibility of the 
upper structure of black solidarity linking up with the upper 
structure of B~own solidarity, but for the present, the emphasis 
had to be for each group to develop itself independently. 22 The 
Labour executive were quick to reject this movement for its 
exclusively colo~red orientation. 
The Labour Party had lost other members; L. Julies (Gelvandale), 
who had res ig·ned from the C.P.R. C. and J.D. Petersen, who had 
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been expelled from the party caucus at the beginning of the 1970 
session. An amendment to the party constitution did, however, 
allow Jaap Muller to join Labour (as a nominated C.P.R.C. member, 
he would not have been allowed to do so prior to the amendment) . 
When the c.P.R.C. convened for its third session, however, Labour 
was down from 26 members in 1969 to 21, making it well-nigh 
impossible for it to overturn opposition motions , even if several 
Federal members did cross the floor. 
The musical chairs nature of the Council politics, in which both 
main parties were constantly weakened and disrupted by 
defections, usually to the independent benches but sometimes, in 
the Federal Party 1 s case, to the opposition, characterised 
Council proceedings throughout its history. The reasons for this 
difficulty in maintaining internal cohesion was partly due to 
lack of experience, but mostly a result of the little impact, and 
therefore prestige, which the parties could demonstrate. 23 
While the individual member standing as an independent in 
elections was at a disadvantage, he nevertheless had far greater 
scope for the building up of his political personality during 
Council sessions. The significance of the independent members was 
increased by the fact that they could hold the balance between 
the two dominant parties since they could vote as they saw fit 
whereas party stalwarts, who could be relied upon to vote for 
their party at all times, tended to recede into the 
background. 24 Council members who had the highest profile, for 
example Lofty Adams, Solly Essop and Jaap Muller, tended to be 
independents. 
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The Third C.P.R . C. Session, August-September 1971 
The third c.P.R.C. session saw a continuation of Labour's 
spoiling tacti cs and more outspoken opposition to Government 
policies by Swartz and his party . Leon's No- Confidence motion on 
August 6th called for the total abolition of the Council, for the 
40 members elected to it to be included in Parliament and for 
those 40 members to constitute an electoral college for the 
nomination of senators. 25 Swartz was forced to concede that he 
agreed with much of what Leon said, but held that the C.P.R.C. 
had to be accepted as a medium through which the coloured people 
could achieve full citizenship , even if at that stage it did not 
provide adequate machinery for their political aspirations. 26 
The No- Confidence motion was defeated in favour of Swartz's 
amendment supporting parallel development and the granting of 
further powers to the Council, but only by three votes (31 to 
28), the independents and members of the minor parties voting 
with the Labour Party. 
Labour boycotted the budget debate after pr oposing an amendment 
to the Appropriation Resolution that it was u nacceptable since 
the Council had had no say in the preparation of the estimates 
and had no power to change it. The budget of R 76 000 (up from 
just under R 50 000 in 1969) was adopted without discussion. Leon 
later gave his party's reason as being an unwillingness to convey 
to the nation the impression that the C.P.R.C. was handling its 
own finances. 
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Labour during the session were invited to send four of its 
council members to participate in the Government, these dealing 
with such issues as the improvement of liaison machinery between 
the Council and the Cabinet and the possible extending of the 
powers of the former. The invitation was refused in view of 
recent Labour conference decisions not to give unnecessary 
credibility t o the C.P .R. C. by serving on its sub-committees, in 
particular liaison committees (caucus meeting, November 1970). 
Many nominated councillors had begun to chafe over their status, 
particularly as their opponents lost no opportunity of taunting 
them over it. Consequently, .none of the 20 nominees opposed a 
Labour motion asking for legislation to provide for the election 
of all 60 members in the Council. To allow this, representation 
to the Minister would be made to amend the C. P.R . C. Act of 1964 
as well as to allow for the leader of the majority party to be 
automatically appointed Chairman of the Executive . Swartz, 
mindful of the difficulties surrounding the registration of new 
voters and the redelimitation of the country into 60 
constituencies, decided to propose to the Prime Minister that the 
1974 elections be held on the current basis and that the 
following elections (in 1979) . be fully elective. 27 This 
proposal was later included in a memorandum handed to the 
Government in a liaison meeting on 21 February 1972. The Minister 
accepted this in principle in May, but stressed , as Swartz had 
ant icipated, that the decision could only be implemented in 
1979. 28 
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The Council passed its first Act, the Coloured Persons' 
Rehabilitation Centres Law (No. 
session. Although a relatively 
proceedings were taken up with 
1 of 1971), 
part 
during the third 
of the overall large 
the various stages of the 
legislative processes, the significance of the Act was limited. 
An almost identical Act pertaining to the other racial groups, 
covering more or less the same ground but excluding coloured 
people, had already been passed in the central Parl iament. This 
Act had an appendix to the effect that, as Curry put it , if their 
little Council did not pass it, the Minister could the next year 
in Parliament merely by a simple amendment pas s the Bill so that 
it applied to coloured persons also. 29 The first C.P.R.C. 
passed only two more laws after this , a Coloured Farmers' 
Assistance Law (No. 1, 1973) and a Coloured Social Pensions Law 
(No. 1, 1974), both having equally little effect. According to 
the Theron Report (see Chapter 5 , p.159) the laws had little 
effect since they were "largely duplications of existing 
legislation of the white Parliament which applied to the South 
African Parliament at large". 30 
Despite a built-in majority, the Federal Party sustained its 
first defeat when several of its members crossed the floor to 
vote with the opposition. The Labour Party had submitted a motion 
urging the Government to take over the administration of nursery 
schools and places of care from private organisations, and also 
urged that the state build such schools. W. B. Pieterse , a 
nominated member, watered down the motion with an amendment 
urging the Government to increase state subsidies to such 
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institutions. Four Federal members crossed the floor to vote 
against the amendment which was defeated 31 to 26. It was a minor 
set-back, but showed how even a packed Council could not 
guarantee the continued rubber-stamping of pro-separate 
development policies. 
Swartz, who in April had stressed the dangers inherent in 
discrimination on the grounds of colour alone and the possibility 
of a disloyal and dissatisfied fifth column arising because of 
it, was further outspoken by his standards, attacking the 
Government for its "evasive and negative" replies to previous 
Council resolutions in the Executive Chairman's Progress 
Report. 31 Deadlock was reached on a number of emotive issues, 
however, the Federal Party supporting exclusively coloured 
emancipation whereas Labour continued to be committed to equal 
rights for all South Africans. A Federal motion to the effect 
that non-coloureds be removed from coloured areas was amended to 
read that any open area be open to all race groups who could 
occupy trading and occupational rights there. The motion lapsed 
in terms of Standing Order No. 9 . When the Federal Party moved 
that coloured or Malay identity cards should not be issued to 
non-coloureds, Labour proposed instead that the "Race 
Classification" (ie. Population Registration) Act be repealed, 
but the motion also lapsed after exceeding the two and a half 
hour limit. 
Concurrence was reached on a few counts, however. Motions passed 
unanimously were requests that the Government implement equal pay 
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for equal work for all South Africans, that all laws relating to 
job reservation be repealed, and that solidarity be expressed 
with the people of Port Elizabeth in their protest against 
increased bus fares and other injustices. (The last issue 
referred to three weeks of rioting which had occurred for most of 
March in the Port Elizabeth coloured township of Gelvandale.) A 
motion by Arendse that the Government be urged to appoint a 
judicial commission to review all discriminatory legislation with 
a view to its ultimate annulment was passed 30 to 27 after being 
amended by the Federal Party to the effect that coloured people 
themselves and not a judge should identify such laws. 32 
While the Council was still in session, the last vestiges of 
coloured voting rights on the common roll were finally removed. 
In a press statement on 26 September, the Minister of Coloured 
Relations, J.J. Loots, said it was Government policy to enable 
coloureds to have their own municipalities as soon as possible. 
One of the provisions of the C.P.R.C. Act had been the promotion 
of local government through the gradual implementation of 
completely independent councils. Management committees would be 
succeeded by fully elected management councils which in turn 
would be replaced by autonomous municipalities. The franchise 
would be a national basis and an alternative to full national 
independence. 33 
What this meant was that coloureds were to lose their municipal 
franchise in the Cape, something that had been left untouched by 
the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951. Sonny Leon was 
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thereby disqua l ified from being a member of the Kimberley cit y 
council. The Local Authorities Voters' Roll Amendment Act became 
law on 10 November 1971 and only afterwards did the Minister in 
charge of Local Government, Franz Conradie, call for talks 
between coloureds and whites. 
A comprehensive analysis of the C.P.R.C . in action was published 
by Professor W.H. Thomas after the close of the third session . 34 
Eighty-seven motions had been tabled of which six had lapsed and 
more than half ( 42) had been passed unanimously. The highest 
degree of unani mity had been on those concerning remuneration and 
work conditions. 3 5 The motions could be roughly divided into 
three categories: general political and organisational (10), 
general aspects of discrimination (14) and socio-economic 
development, including Group Areas, work conditions, sccial 
services and housing, business and enterprise and education 
training . In addition, six general motions were passed 
unanimously in which the Council expressed its opinion on some 
contemporary issues, for example a motion of sympathy for those 
left homeless by the flooding of the Gamtoos River in 1971. 36 
Council members' performances in the three sessions were assessed 
by an initiative ranking based on the number of motions proposed , 
the number of amendment put, the number of formal questions 
tabled for oral and writt en reply by members of the executive and 
the number of other contributions during the proceedings. Of the 
20 members with the lowest initiative rankings, only 20 per cent 
came from the Labour Party, 50 per cent being Federal members 
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with four of them taking hardly any contribution at all. The 
relatively large number of inactive Federal members indicated a 
problem the Government had in finding Federal Party orientated 
persons willing to become C.P.R.C. On the whole the Labour Party, 
despite their commitment to boycott and non-collaboration, had 
been more active in Council proceedings. 
The F.C.P.P.'s shift to the left, 1969-1972 
The F.C.P.P . continued to have a strongly pro-coloured leaning as 
shown by caucus and conferenc e resolutions . However, the 
Government's negative and non-comrni ttal response to Council 
resolutions and in liaison meetings gradually led to a hardening 
of attitudes of many Federal members whose approach became less 
conciliatory . In November 1970, the caucus resolved that finality 
over living areas for coloureds should be reached by the 
authorities, that coloured workers in Zululand be exempted from 
having to obtain work permits and that job reservation be relaxed 
also as to allow coloureds to acquire skills whereby they could 
serve their own communities. 37 At the same meeting, it was 
pointed out that since the homeland option had been ruled out, 
the Government had no excuse to withhold full citizenship rights 
on the grounds of colour alone. These exclusive ethnic concerns 
were reflected in resolutions of a party congress in July 1971 
where the au.thcrities ·w-ere called upon to take more drastic 
prosecutory steps against those falsely obtaining coloured I.D. 
cards, and to establish larger and better consolidated coloured 
living areas. 
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Despite a continued commitment to a group identity separate from 
whites and blacks, Government policies came to be more 
forthrightly criticized. At its annual conference in Durban, July 
1971, the party scrapped all references to "apartheid", "separate 
development" and "parallel development" in its constitution. A 
month later, at a N.E.C. meeting, two of the more progressive 
members of the party, Jac Rabie (Transvaal leader) and W. D. 
Plaai tj ies, were of the opinion that representation in the 
central parliament was best in view of the insufficient attention 
given by the Government to the previous year's Council-
resolutions. 38 Swartz , however, still claimed in April 1972 
that he supported parallel development and that it was not for 
the Federal Party to strive for representation in Parliament. 
The Formation of the Social Democratic Party 
Towards the end of 1972, unity talks between the various C.P.R.C. 
parties were held, but before this a new political party was 
formed and Labour very nearly pulled out of the C.P.R.C. The 
expulsion or resignation of a number of Labour councillors after 
the 1969 election left a vacuum in the C.P.R.C. which E. Domingo, 
former Transvaal leader of the party, sought to fill when he 
formed the Social Democratic Party in February 1972. The party 
was "unashamedly and unambiguously anti-apartheid", despite 
Rabie's suggestion that it might make common cause with the 
Federals. 39 It criticized Labour for hypocritically making use 
of the Council while claiming to reject it, and for rejecting 
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dialogue with the Government. It accepted the C.P.R.C. as a · 
stepping stone to full common citizenship with the whites and as 
a means towards attaining the socio-economic upliftment of the 
coloured people in the interim. 40 The short-lived movement 
failed completely to come up with a coherent policy to 
distinguish it from other parties, and was never more than a poor 
cousin of Labour. In the 1975 election, it was almost wiped out, 
even the moribund Republican Party polling more votes. Domingo's 
death in April saw Rooks take over the leadership. 
In March, the Transvaal branch of the Labour Party passed a 
resolution to withdraw from the C.P.R.C. following increased 
outside pressure to take such a step. A motion to withdraw from 
the Council as soon as possible was then put at a full party 
conference in East London (6-8 April). Leon and the party 
leadership, afraid that such a motion might succeed, had 
anticipated this, so it was arranged that the editor of the 
party's newsletter, Carter Ebrahim, should give an address 
entitled The Labour Party and Participation in the C.R.C. before 
voting on the motion took place . It was an important speech, 
highlighting some of the central issues that had dominated 
"coloured" politics since the inception of the C.A.C. and the 
Anti-C.A.D. in the 1940s. No matter what the reasons for doing so 
might be, merely taking part in apartheid structures made the 
fineness of the line between a !:quisling!! and a ::realist:: all the 
more apparent. What were the differences, if any, between the 
Swartzites and their opponents? 
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Ebrahim began by setting out the main grounds of opposition to 
participation, these being firstly that the C.P.R.C. had been set 
up to implement separate development and that any association 
with it meant the acceptance of apartheid. 41 Next he pointed 
out that it was a worthless institution because it was powerless 
to enact any laws, that Labour's presence in it contradicted its 
demands for direct representation in the central Parliament and 
other governing bodies and that the "intelligentsia" were opposed 
to participation . He went on to dismantle these arguments by 
pointing out the bankruptcy of alternative strategies of the 
boycotting and emphasizing the achievements of Labour since 
entering the C.P.R.C. 
Proponents of a walk-out, he a rgued, were like fighters who would 
rather shadow-box in the dressing room than come out to fight and 
risk falling victim to the apartheid disease (Hendrickse was to 
use a similar sporting simile when justifying the decision to 
enter the tricameral Parliament in 1983, comparing remaining 
outside to trying to play a game of rugby on the touchlines). By 
doing so they would remain "Simon-pure and uncontaminated, with 
their principl8s intact on the day when full democracy dawns. How 
equal rights will come about we are not told ... perhaps while we 
remain in a state of virgin purity, a miracle will occur and 
equal rights will fall from heaven. 1142 
By taking part in the C.P.R.C., Labour had demonstrated to the 
world the utter rejection of apartheid by their victory at the 
polls and the insincerity of the Government in being forced to 
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resort to the expedient of packing the Council. The C.P.R . C., 
instead of becoming "the quiet, efficient machine designed to 
smoothly implement and rubber-stamp separate development", had 
instead become a public forum where the inequities of apartheid 
had been exposed and debated. Relatively modest though these 
victories were, they were what people needed to inspire them to 
greater achievement in the future. The Council had indeed been 
designed for stooges and yes-men, and a danger did exist that 
those who took part in it might be sufficiently deluded by the 
forms rather than the substance of Parliamentary representation. 
Labour's record ·thus far had not seen this happen. The party was 
there in the capacity of watchdogs of the people's interests so 
that nothing could be done against them without their knowledge 
and without their protest. Labour members had to "buckle down to 
the glorious task of helping themselves", Ebrahim concluded, 
"Does the mere sounding of the ram's horn of equal rights bring 
the apartheid walls of Jericho tumbling down?" 43 
The motion to withdraw from the C. P . R.C. was then amended to the 
effect that the party should stay in the Council until they 
controlled it and then force the Government to dissolve it. The 
amendment was carried. 
Ebrahim's speech has been given much attention since it provides 
a useful summary of the motivations behind Labour's continued 
participation at a time when such a policy was under attack from 
all sides . Non-collaborationists held that merely to take part in 
racist structures served to foster racism, no matter what the 
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intentions of doing so were. Moderate and conservative groups 
accused Labour of serving no constructive role since the only 
consequence of their participation on the Council was to block 
whatever progress could be achieved through it. Indeed, the 
Labour Party's position was rather anomalous. It was non-racial, · 
but it increasingly identified with Black Consciousness and 
tacitly accepted their coloured identity by participation on the 
C.P.R.C. It would frequently boycott Council proceedings but at 
other times attempt to use it as an arena for confrontation. It 
would advise coloured people not to register and at other times 
to vote for them. Later, senior Labour members would accept posts 
on the Council Executive and then refuse to fulfil the duties 
attached to those offices. 44 
Was the Labour Party's acceptance that it was compelled to work 
within Government policy "fatalistic"?45 Were there, in fact, 
other motives rather less idealistic than those outlined by 
Ebrahim? It is certainly true that to a large extent the 
Government's coloured preference policies were aimed at buying 
the loyalty or at least acquiesence of the coloured elites. 
Arendse commented that none of those who had received Coloured 
Development Corporation loans were politically active in the 
anti-apartheid movement. 46 Lofty Adams, when resigning from the 
Federal Party, accused many of its members (specifically Tom and 
Peter Swartz) of using the Council to feather their own nests. 
They had used their positions of power to obtain liquor licenses 
for themselves, and the reason why they had called on the 
Government to proclaim more coloured townships was for them 
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to have the opportunity to open more bars . 47 But even if this 
argument holds, there were more far-reaching implications of the 
coloured preference policy. Essentially, the need to protect 
coloured entrepreneurs from white competition was used as a 
justification for a policy of economic compartmentalisation. 48 
This meant that the aspirations of the coloured middle class 
would be channelled into specifically coloured areas of 
development. In this way they would provide the economic and 
intellectual core of the new coloured nation and not be tempted 
to pass for white. 49 
It is likely that at least . some Labour members were in the 
Council for what they could get out of it. Leon was later to 
attack certain members who just before the announcement of salary 
increases by the Government had indicated that they were not 
available for election but afterwards changed their minds. 50 He 
was to launch a similar attack at a later stage in which he 
accused certain Labour Councillors of being more concerned with 
their salaries and benefits than with party loyalty and devotion 
to principle. 51 On the other hand, Leon himself was to lay 
himself open to accusations of self-interest when, in the late 
1970s, he moved into a house which the State had paid for, 
something which added to the estrangement between himself and the 
rest of the party executive (see Chapter 6, p.209). A defence of 
Labour's participatory role appears at the end of Chapter 6. 
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Unity Moves, June 1972 and Rus-Ter-Vaal 
All political parties in the C.P.R.C., excluding the Republican 
Party, met in June 1972 for unity talks. The talks collapsed over 
the failure of delegates to choose a common candidate for the 
forthcoming Rus-Ter-Vaal by-election (the seat having been left 
vacant by the death of Domingo) , each party wanting its own 
man. 52 
The Rus-Ter-Vu.al by-election attracted considerable interest 
since it was the first time coloureds were going to the polls 
since 1969 and was regarded as a mini-referendum on parallel 
development. Labour had won the seat by only 79 votes in 1969, 
mainly thanks to the National Coloured People's Party splitting 
the pro-separate development vote. The N.C.P.P. again put up a 
candidate, but were not expected to gain many votes, and the 
Federal Party launched a vigorous campaign to capture the seat. 
Its exploitation of the anti-black fears of many Transvaal 
coloureds and attacks on the Labour Party for its Black 
Consciousness sympathies were effectively employed. Circulars 
were issued to voters in the area in which questions like "Do you 
want to live in Soweto? 11 , and "Do you want to be a servant of 
Black Solidarity? 11 If not, then you will agree that the multi-
racial society of the Labour Party will bring about a change of 
rulers, but it will aggravate the subservience of the coloured 
people 11 , were posed. 53 
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The Federal tactics, if crude, were effective, and the party 
gained 1 898 votes as against 1 751 for Labour and just 333 for 
the Nationals, thus winning by 147 votes and picking up more than 
12 per cent on their 1969 performance. Having unexpectedly 
bloodied their opponents ' noses, the Federal councillors could 
look forward to the fourth session of the C.P.R.C. with a little 
more confidence, but by this stage patience and optimism were 
wearing thin . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE C.P.R.C. IN DECLINE 1972-1975 
PROTEAVILLE 
Wat maak die volkies daar? 
Wat maak die volkies daar 
Hul raas 
Hul fop 
Hul dop 
maak hulself belaglik 
veraglik 
maar al verwerplik 
Arbeider, 'afhanklik, Federaal · 
se politiek is ewe kaal 
en ewe sander skaam; 
jol hul ook almal saam. 
Hul doen hul narredans 
'n hotnotsriel 
op wysie 
en op maat 
van saamwerk 
saamspeel 
net en vir 
Die Baas1 
The Educational Journal, October-November 1972, p.9 
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The C.P.R . C. Act Amended 
By mid-1972 it was evident that the C.P.R.C., having started out 
with a limp, had slowed down to a crawl. Swartz's shaky 
credibility had been further undermined the previous year by 
shock allegations in the Sunday Times that the Federal Party's 
election campaign had indeed received extensive backing from the 
Afrikaner Broederbond (see Chapter 2, pp.66-7). Even before this, 
the rift in the party's ranks had been caused by the circulation 
of a ''colouredstan" document. Purportedly written by Jac Rabie, 
it bore a suspicious resemblance to a paper written by Louis van 
der Walt, who controlled the coloured campaign of the 
Broederbond. It advocated the possible establishment of a 
coloured homeland in Malmesbury, despite the homeland option 
having been ruled out by the National Party. 1 
In future sessions the "Bond Scandal" was to be frequently 
brought up. Curry was quick to comment: "We will use the 
Government's platform to expose them and to expose you." 2 Rabie 
was accorded the unenviable nickname of "Tuislander". 
Defections to the opposition benches saw the Federal Party lose 
its overall majority, and there was a danger the Labour and 
Independent members would combine to wrest control of the Council 
from it. Afraid that Labour might then carry out its threat of 
rendering the institution unworkable by voting down the budget, 
the C.P.R.C. Executive made a point of discussing with the 
Minister ways of amending the principal Act of 1964 to ensure the 
Council's continued functioning. This resulted in the Coloured 
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Persons' Representative Council Amendment Bill being put before 
the Assembly on 2 June 1972 and passed on its third reading on 
the 12th. It was an emergency measure, a safeguard against "any 
breakdown on the political front", as Swartz put it, preventing 
the maintaining of essential services such as the paying of 
teachers and pensioners. 3 
The relevant clause (G) (c) provided that if the Council failed to 
provide the funds generally voted by Parliament, the Executive 
could do so. If the Executive also failed to make the necessary 
appropriations, the Minister for Coloured Relations would be 
vested with the necessary powers to implement the Budget. The 
measure was sharply criticized by the Opposition in the Assembly 
as being an ill-disguised usurpation of the Council's functions. 
Speaking for the United Party, Catherine Taylor remarked that had 
the Government not packed the Council after the elections but had 
instead allowed the victorious party to take it over, it would 
not have been necessary to resort to extraordinary legislation or 
ministerial interference. There was only one possible 
interpretation of the Bill, namely that it was "a grave admission 
of failure on the part of the Government to handle the electoral 
scene for the coloured people". Far from bringing stability to 
the institution, the system of nominated members had boomeranged 
to the extent that the foundations of the Council itself were 
clearly being endangered. 4 Nonetheless, the Amendment was 
passed, even though it represented an important admission by the 
Government that the C.P.R.C. was failing. 
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The United Party and the Coloured Question 
After the removal of coloured voters from the common roll, United 
Party policy had been that they should be restored and that 
furthermore, coloureds in the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
should also have some form of Parliamentary representation. From 
the early 1960s, the party's race policies had revolved around a 
proposed "race federation" in which a central federal Parliament 
composed of representatives of races rather than territories 
would be established. 5 The first stage of this plan would be 
the review and dismantling of controversial apartheid laws such 
as separate amenities and bans on mixed marriage. Next, coloured 
voters in the Cape and Natal would be restored to the common roll 
and coloured people in the Transvaal and Free State would be 
given some representation on the Senate. At the same time, 
African representation on a separate roll would be restored and 
enlarged in both houses and Indians would be accommodated in a 
manner to be determined after consultation. Finally, a number of 
communal councils for each race would be set up and 
representatives elected through them would sit in a central 
Parliament . 6 In terms of the party's race policy, it was 
admitted that a coloured person could become Prime Minister. 7 
The United Party's decision that coloureds in the two northern 
provinces would be g1ven only Senate representation on the 
grounds of their political inexperience was probably a political 
argument des:i.gned to appease Northern whites, as the 
constitutional compromise in 1910 had done. 8 It was a 
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compromise which exposed a deep ambivalence that characterised 
the party's race policy after 1948. It was recognised that United 
Party opposition to the removal of coloureds had cost it many 
votes in subsequent elections9 and that to call too stridently 
for coloured representation in Parliament would further weaken 
it. In August 1971, it was reported that the United Party 
advocated six M.P.'s for coloureds in the Assembly, eight for 
blacks and two for Indians, all three groups to be represented by 
their own people. 10 These numbers were to be subject to change 
only by a referendum of white voters. It would not be inaccurate 
to claim, however, that the party's race policies relating to the 
coloureds, as well as those of the Progressive Party which 
advocated no coloured policy as s uch but regarded all South 
Africa as a single viable multi-racial unit11 , were relatively 
unimportant during this period. As Rapport commented (15 August 
1971) , the debate was essentially one between coloured people and 
Afrikaners. Nor were coloured leaders particularly impressed with 
the United Party and its attitudes. It has been shown how 
Progressive Party candidates easily defeated their United Party 
opponents in the 1965 Cape Provincial Council elections (see 
Chapter 2, pp.59-60). In the early 1970s, when commenting on the 
United Party, leaders like Arendse, Adams, Curry, Leon and 
Middleton made it clear that they regarded it as crypto-
Nationalist although admittedly the lesser of two evils. 12 
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The C.P.R.C. and Black Consciousness 
The Fourth Session of the First C.P.R.C. was opened on 6 August 
1972 at a time when the ideology of Black Consciousness was 
having a profound impact on non-white South Africans, including 
coloured people. The Black Consciousness Movement had established 
itself as a mujor force on the South African political scene in 
the late 1960s when the South African Students' Organisation 
(S . A.S.O.), an exclusively black student movement under the 
leadership of Steve Biko, was formed after breaking away from the 
National Union of South African Students (N.U.S.A.S.). In 1972, 
B.C.M. intellectuals formed the Black People's Convention. The 
Black Consciousness philosophy sought to instil a sense of pride 
and dignity in black people and to free them psychologically and 
physically from the infe:r:ior position to which apartheid had 
relegated them. It was, R.E. van der Ross wrote, a "new 
perception of human dignity, organisational independence and a 
realisation of an innate power yet to be translated into 
structural or political forms" . 13 Together with the rise of 
militant independent black trade unionism and the revolt of the 
black youth, Black Consciousness was one of the pillars of the 
black political renaissance in the 1970s. 
~ -~ \ The coloured community was profoundly affected by the new 
ideology. Franklin Sonn, rector of the Cdpe Peninsuld College, 
said later that it was an important catharsis for the coloured 
people, giving them a sense of pride and self-discovery after 
years of alienation. 14 The question of coloured-white 
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relations, then so sore a point in Afrikaner nationalist circles, 
was becoming of less and less concern to a growing number of 
coloured people, particularly in the Western Cape and 
particularly the youth. Coloured students at the University of 
the Western Cape "totally immersed themselves in the Black ideal" 
and this led to the temporary closure of the University in June 
1973 when unrest followed the refusal of the university 
authorities to allow a S.A.S . O. speaker to deliver a lecture 
there. 15 
Black Consciousness ideals were whole-heartedly taken up by the 
Labour Party leadership in the early 1970s (David Curry and 
Norman Middleton advocated them particularly strongly). In 1972, 
the term "coloured" was omitted from the party's constitution and 
the amendment read that it was the intention of the party in the 
first instance to consolidate the position of all oppressed South 
Africans . 16 In June that year, Leon said that coloureds could 
not talk politics on racially isolated lines and had to talk on 
the basis of their oppression with other black groups. 17 
Meetings between Leon and Buthelezi as well as with Knowledge 
Guzana, leader of the opposition Democratic Party in the 
Transkei, had been part of a strategy of building a broad non-
white front to oppose racial discrimination. 18 It is noteworthy 
that in 1972 invitations were issued to Labour members to share 
political platforms with Black Consciousness representatives at 
u.w.c. 19 This showed that the party still had a fair degree of 
credibility in more radical political circles. By 1980, the issue 
of such invitations would be inconceivable. 
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The Fourth C. P.R.C. Session 
The Government's response to requests and resolutions put to them 
at the end of the third session had again been discouraging for 
the dwindling number of parallel development advocates in the 
council. For example, the equal-pay-for-equal-work resolution 
elicited nothing further than a promise that the matter would be 
looked into in the future, and the request for the abolition of 
job reservation was turned down outright since the system was, 
according to the Minister of Labour, Marais Viljoen, "nothing 
more than a safeguard against inter-racial competition". 20 
Heated debates took place between advocates of Black 
Consciousness and those in favour of having apartheid laws 
enforced to the benefit of coloureds. Middleton moved that the 
Council express its agreement with Black Consciousness and that 
the term "non-white" be replaced by "black" as the former was 
humiliating and negative . Rabie moved an amendment that the terms 
"black consciousness" and "black" be rejected and the term 
"coloured" be used for the race group represented in the Council. 
The motion lapsed in terms of Standing Order No. 9. Later W.J. 
Swartz put a motion that the Government be requested to remove 
all disqualified persons living in houses or owning property in 
coloured areas in terms of the Group Areas Act. The motion was 
carried 18 to 4, Leon, Middleton and Hendrickse abstaining in 
disgust. 21 A second motion by Swartz, that the procedure 
whereby a person was classified coloured be tightened up so as to 
prevent non-coloureds from obtaining false I . D. cards, was also 
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carried. When the Federal Party moved that the term "other 
coloured" in the Population Registration Act and similar terms be 
replaced by "coloured", Labour moved an amendment that the Race 
Classification Act be repealed. The amendment was defeated 30 to 
21. 
Labour succeeded in getting a motion condemning all forms of 
apartheid, be it called great or petty, passed unanimously after 
having been defeated the previous session. However, a motion by 
Tom Swartz calling on the authorities to end restrictions on the 
entry of coloured South Africans into South West Africa caused 
the fur to fly again when Labour moved that the words "coloured 
citizens" be substituted by the words "all the citizens of South 
Africa". The chairman ruled that the amendment was not 
acceptable, and the Labour members walked out. The party's 
withdrawal left the Council "in a lifeless condition, 1 ike a 
mechanical doll", as A.L.J. Venter put it. 22 On September 8th, 
the Council adjourned until August the following year although 
there were 51 motions still on the Order Paper . 
"The fourth session again demonstrated the inability of the 
C. R. C.'s architects to get the Council moving", commented the 
Education Journal, "They have to face the fact that they cannot 
breathe life into the skeleton they have assembled and 
consequently, have to inter the bones. 1123 Indeed, the sheer 
futility uf debating resolutions over whose ultimate acceptance 
or rejection they had no say whatever, was brought home to the 
disgruntled Councillors soon after the end of the session. 
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Government response to key resolutions was once again negative or 
evasive, underlying the powerlessness of the C.P.R.C. 
As to the condemnation of apartheid, great or petty for example, 
the executive had to be satisfied with assurances that in future, 
Government policy would be applied "in the most human way 
possible" and that the Theron Commission (see Chapter 5, pp.153-
62) would identify irritating measures that served no useful 
purpose. 24 The request that coloureds be allowed to enter South 
West Africa without restrictions, as in the case of whites, was 
turned down outright. 
Swartz further outraged his opponents and alienated his 
supporters by a number of undiplomatic utterances soon after the 
adjournment of the session. During the session, one of his 
party's most capable members, Lofty Adams, had resigned and only 
hours after doing so launched a scathing personal attack on 
swartz and his son Peter in which he accused them of using their 
positions to line their pockets, among other things. 25 
Infuriated, Swartz asked the Government for the power to dismiss 
nominated members who crossed the floor . He also expressed his 
distaste for the rising tide of Black Consciousness in no 
uncertain terms. In a "swart gevaar" speech in December 1972, he 
rejected majority rule and pointed to Uganda as an example of 
what might happen if it were granted. Coloureds, he claimed, were 
in danger of being swallowed by the new ideology . 
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swartz's anti-B.C.M. statements were broadly shared by other 
prominent members of his party who genuinely feared that the 
numerically inferior coloureds, whose distinct and separate 
identity they sought to protect, would be swamped by the 
overwhelming majority of blacks and lose what little privileges 
they had. During the 1972 session, Bergins appealed to the 
Government to "protect the Coloured from the Black man" and 
warned against racial intermixing between the two groups, further 
adding that it was wrong to allow thousands of Transkei blacks to 
establish homes among the coloured townships. 26 Rabie claimed 
in 1975 that Black Consciousness was a racist philosophy, 
stirring up only hatred and envy. Blacks had their own historical 
homelands and, more importantly, their own nationalisms. 
Furthermore, they themselves saw coloureds as being different 
from them and were racially prejudiced in that regard. 27 As we 
have seen, the Federal Party's attack on the Labour Party for its 
flirtation with Black Solidarity was enough to win it the Rus-
Ter-Vaal by-election in June 1972 (see Chapter 3, pp.104-5). At 
its National Congress in August 1973, the Federal Party rejected 
Black Consciousness on the grounds that it was "opportunistic, 
negative, anti-white and did nothing for the coloureds. 1128 
1973 was a stormy year for the Republic in terms of its race 
relations, the Durban Strikes and unrest at the University of the 
Western Cape bringing normalcy in those areas to a standstill. It 
was also a year in which very little happened in the C.P.R.C., 
the Government's negative attitude towards its own creation being 
made apparent by a number of insulting remarks or actions 
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concerning it by certain top Nationalists. The Minister of 
Coloured Relations, Dr S.W. van der Merwe (who had replaced J.J. 
Loots in 1972), was particularly undiplomatic, remarking that the 
Government had "given the coloured people their own little 
Parliament where they could talk as much nonsense as they 
wished. 1129 In response, Leon commented: "We will take his 
advice and make this a nonsense institution. 1130 
Labour's 7th Annual Conference 
The more militant stance of the Labour Party was reflected at its 
seventh annual conference held in May. The most notable 
development of the Conference was the decision of the parent body 
to allow the Labour Youth Organisation (L. Y. 0.) to open its 
membership to all races. L.Y.O. was particularly sensitive to 
criticism from S.A.S.O. for its exclusively coloured composition 
since the coloured youth at the time were most attracted to the 
Black Consciousness ideology. Under the leadership of Achmat 
Danger, it had taken the decision to go non-racial the previous 
year, and as a result 6 000 more coloured youths had joined. 
After the Conference decision, Danger said there were strong 
indications that many young blacks in the Transvaal and Indians 
in Natal had indicated their willingness to join. 31 In fact, 
as the years went by and the Labour Party came increasingly to be 
seen as upholders of the apartheid system, the Youth 
Organisation's numbers dropped drastically. 32 
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The Fifth C.P.R.C. Session 
The 5th C.P.R.C. Session was opened on 7 August. Before normal 
Council business could proceed, a storm broke out over remarks 
and action by Dr Connie Mulder, Minister of the Interior and 
widely tipped at the time to be the new Prime Minister. Both 
swartz and Leon were seriously offe nded, and relations with the 
Government were strained to a breaking point. 
In June, Mulder, in an address to a congress of the Afrikaner 
Studentebond, insisted that coloureds were not "brown Afrikaners" 
and had no claim to Afrikanership, a statement that elicited a 
bitter response from coloureds and unease in Afrikaner 
Nationalist circles. Two months later, Leon was refused a 
passport by the Minister after he had come out strongly in favour 
of sanctions and disinvestment while visiting Britain and the 
United States the previous year. 33 Within a few days of this 
snub, Mulder deeply offended swartz when speaking at a National 
Party meeting where he ridiculed the United Party for allowing 
the nominated chairman to address their Transvaal congress, the 
first time a non-white leader had attended a United Party 
Congress. 34 Swartz had "looked ridiculous" by speaking at the 
congress, Mulder said, and despite his nominated status was 
"accepted as a great coloured leader", even though previously the 
party had claimed in Parliament that he had no standing in the 
coloured community. 35 
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Anger and sympathy over the affronts to Leon and Swartz, who 
broke down in tears during the Council session, brought about 
unprecedented unity in the Council. A 16-man delegation 
representing all the parties was nominated to meet with the 
Ministers of Coloured Relations and the Interior early in 
September. The seven Labour members chosen later withdrew because 
a liaison committee rather than individual council members were 
to meet the Ministers and stated party policy was not to serve on 
liaison committees. 
The delegation, mostly Federal, met with the Prime Minister on 
September 11th. Swartz was assured that a misleading account of 
Mulder's speech had been given by Die Burger. This was sincerely 
regretted by all concerned and a correction was promised. As for 
the withdrawal of Leon's passport, Mulder was unrepentant . "The 
newspapers", he said, "can scream until they are blue in the 
face. 1136 Leon's application would be reconsidered on its merits 
if he gave an undertaking not to harm South Africa's interests 
while overseas. Leon retorted that he would rather die on his 
feet than crawl on his belly, fitting terms from an ex-
serviceman.37 
Council business was half-heartedly proceeded with in August and 
early September. Labour motions calling for the repeal of the 
Group Areas Act and for all persons other than whites residing in 
the Republic to be officially known as blacks, lapsed in terms of 
Standing Order No. 9. It was unanimously decided that the 
executive negotiate with the Government for the declaring of 
122 
December 1st a national day to commemorate the abolition of 
slavery. (This was subsequently turned down by the central 
Government on the grounds that there were too many national 
groups in South Africa for holidays to be declared for all of 
them.) 38 
Amongst other motions emerging from the session was a call for 
the repeal of the Masters and Servants Act. However, 27 motions 
remained on the Order Paper when the Council voted to adjourn 
until July 1974. 
Labour on the Mend 
Labour had for several sessions be en hamstrung by a spate of 
expulsions and resignations that had reduced their numbers from 
26 Council members in 1969 to 21 in mid-1973. By the end of the 
year, the pendulum was beginning to swing back in their favour. 
This was in part due to a shift in party policy at the 8th caucus 
meeting where it was decided that Labour would now serve on any 
committee of the Council that was potentially useful to it. Much 
later in the decade, Curry was to say that the party was 
determined not to repeat the mistakes and follies of the past, a 
cardinal one among them being "transforming the tactic of boycott 
into an iron principle". 39 
In contrast to the ideological rigidity and repressiveness of the 
1960s, South African politics began to show increasing signs of 
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fluidity in the early 1970s. Technological advancements, the slow 
but steady advancement of non-whites in the job market and 
growing pressure on apartheid from within and without the 
Republic all put pressure on the maintenance of the status guo. 
Moreover, South African blacks had begun to experience a revival 
in political thought and organisation, articulated in the 
philosophy of Black Consciousness while Afrikanerdom, 
particularly following the 1969 H.N.P. split, had lost much of 
its formidable ethnic solidarity. Events in the C.P.R.C. after 
1973 reflected these trends, a sharp swing to the left finally 
breaking the conservative hold and sweeping Labour into the 
ascendancy. 
By-elections, Resignations and the Federal Decline 
The Labour Party began steadily replenishing its numbers, winning 
two by-elections in November 1973. The Eastern Cape seat, left 
vacant by the death of J. E. Nash, was recaptured after a 
comfortable victory by Peter Mopp over Peter swartz. The Newclare 
seat of Les du Preez, who had resigned from the C.P.R.C. during 
the previous session, was contested by the Labour, Federal and 
Social Democratic Parties. Labour won it, albeit with a greatly 
reduced majority (869 votes to the 776 of the Federals and 772 of 
the Social Democrats in a 32 per cent poll). 
At the beginning of 1974, the Federal Party was still comfortably 
the majority party in the Council with 29 seats to Labour's 23. 
The odds were evened 
( "Barkie") Savahl, a 
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out somewhat in February when Mogarnat 
nominated Federal member and Malay 
representative, went over to Labour and M. D. Arendse rejoined his 
old party. In March, a by- election was fought in the Swartberg 
constituency , formerly a Federal seat, between D.C. Loubser 
(Labour) and D.C. King (Federal). Labour captured the seat with 
a narrow majority of 300 votes (3 507 to 3 172 in a 35 per cent 
poll) . The Federal Party was now down to 28 seats against the 26 
of their opponents, and for this reason the forthcoming Karee by-
election was of crucial importance, corning as it did just before 
the July short session. 
A Federal win, together with the expected pro-Federal nominee to 
take the place of Peter Swartz, would give Swartz 30 seats to the 
30 of the combined opposition, the Federals retaining control of 
the Council through the casting vote of the chairman, Sanders. 
Labour put up Barend Andrews in a constituency where the Federal 
Party had been active since 1964. He made some inroads, but Louis 
Hollander ran out an easy winner on June 5th with 4 169 votes to 
2 538 in a 37,3 per cent poll. 40 
In a brochure put out by the C.P.R.C. Executive at the beginning 
of the 6th Session, the achievements of the Council since 1969 
were listed. It was pointed out that the Council's budget had 
been increased from R 46 550 000 in 1969-1970 to R 11 143 500 in 
1973 and that the salaries of coloured personnel had been 
increased by 17 and a half per cent as opposed to 15 per cent for 
whites. {Overall parity in salaries and pensions was as far away 
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as ever, on the other hand, and the substantial increase in the 
budget had come nowhere near to remedying this.) 
There had been some modest advances on the educational front, 
compulsory education starting with seven year olds from 1974 
having been introduced and the numbers of primary and secondary 
school pupils and teachers in training showing a significant 
increase. Technical education had been promoted by, inter alia, 
the establishment of training centres and the converting of 
vocational schools offering tuition to apprentices into technical 
colleges. There was an increase in the number of people taking 
part-time classes and achieving Senior Certificates. 
Over the vital questions of housing and living areas, the 
extension of political rights and the abolition of at least the 
hurtful and unnecessary aspects of apartheid, the authorities had 
turned largely a deaf ear to the Council's requests. A Federal 
resolution asking that removals under the Group Areas Act be 
suspended until the areas proclaimed Coloured had been fully 
developed and the housing needs of applicants catered for, for 
example, was turned down. Even requests that the obviously absurd 
system of taxi apartheid be abolished were met with nebulous 
generalities, half-promises and evasiveness. 41 By July 1974, 
the writing was clearly on the wall for the C.P.R.C. and its 
backers. 
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The July 1974 Session 
The sixth Session of the Council was opened on July 19th. It was 
to be brief and stormy, ending in chaos. Leon's No-Confidence 
motion called for the abolition of all parallel development 
institutions and for the granting of direct representation in 
Parliament to all So~th Africans. 42 
On the 23rd, Rabie moved an amendment to Leon's motion to the 
effect that the C.P.R.C. be retained until coloureds, on a 
separate roll, obtained direct representation in Parliament. This 
would take the form of 60 M.P.'s who, together with a further 40 
M.P.C.'s, would constitute an electoral college to elect coloured 
representatives to the Senate. Swartz bitterly opposed the 
amendment since it not only represented a radical departure from 
his party's policy, but also an undermining of his leadership by 
the more progressive Federals. 
That same day W.D. Plaaitjies, an elected Federal member for Free 
State Central, dropped a bombshell when he crossed over to the 
Labour benches. With the two independents, Essop and Adams, and 
one Social Democrat, Rooks, expected to vote with the Labour 
councillors, and the sole Republican, S.M. Brown, expected to 
abstain, the Federal Party faced defeat. To make matters worse, 
the piqued swartz and ~hree others abstained from voting on the 
25th and the Labour motion was carried 30 to 25. 
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swartz refused to resign as chairman, despite the vote of no-
confidence in him, and introduced the part appropriation 
resolution on the 25th. On the 26th, it was defeated and he moved 
that the Council be prorogued. Pandemonium ensued as this extract 
from the C.P.R.C. debates shows: 
Mr. Leon: 
Hon.members: 
He is calling for this Council to be 
prorogued. If he said that this Council 
should be abolished I would agree with him. 
Change it to abolish. 
Change it! Change it! ! Abolish! ! ! 
(UPROAR) 43 
The harassed chairman of the council had no choice but to adjourn 
the Council until after the weekend. The mask of parallel 
development had finally slipped; the C.P.R.c. had become a 
circus. 
On the 29th, Swartz moved that the Council adjourn until 
prorogued. Leon accused him of being advised to do so by white 
officials to save face for the white Government and the motion 
was defeated. At this, the Federal members walked out of the 
Council chamber, returning the next day only to listen to a 
statement by the Minister proroguing the Council. 
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The End of Tom Swartz 
The defeat in July was the end of the road for Tom Swartz. Moves 
were afoot behind the scenes within his party to oust him as 
leader and change the party's name since it was synonymous with 
him. At the Federal Party's National Congress in October, Rabie 
stood against the ailing veteran in a bid for the leadership, but 
was defeated 43 to 25 after the Cape unanimously stood behind 
swartz. Not to be denied, Rabie threatened that he and his 
supporters would vote with the opposition in the Council's 
forthcoming budget debate if he did not stand down. Soon 
afterwards a stroke removed Swartz from the scene. Bergins took 
over as acting leader for the forthcoming session. 
Tom Swartz died in September 1975 at the age of 71. According to 
Dr Bergins, he had been a very honest man who genuinely had the 
interests of the coloured people at heart. His views just before 
his death had become "rather radical" and it was sad that he died 
at a time when he had been about to present a different angle on 
things. 44 It should be noted that by the end of his life, even 
the attitude 0f Swartz's enemies towards him had come to be 
tinged with a measure of sympathy. Leon was able to write: "Tom, 
in spite of our political differences, was a friend. 1145 
Tension mounted before the opening of the seventh C.P.R. c. 
sess i on in November 1974. It was opened by Vorster who, 1n a key 
speech, outlined some far-reaching changes in the composition and 
functions of the Council envisaged by the Government (see Chapter 
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5, pp.151-2). In an amendment to the No-Confidence motion, 
Bergins rejected the principles of separate development, but 
accepted the C.R.C. as an interim measure . W.J. Swartz, now an 
independent, complained that he was the only member in the 
Council who still supported separate development. Godfrey Julies 
called him "Gifkopj ie", earning himself a rebuke from the 
chairman. 46 The absence of M. R. Fakier and Rooks wrecked 
Labour's chances of repeating their July triumph when it carne to 
the vote, and with the two sides deadlocked at 29 votes each, 
Sanders' casting vote settled the matter in favour of the Federal 
Party. The budget, increased toR 140 000, was passed in the same 
way and shortly afterwards, the first C.P.R.C. adjourned for the 
last time. 
The Second C.P.R.C. Elections, 1975 
The gradual radicalisation of coloured politics and the failure 
of the Council to win more than minor concessions for coloureds 
resulted in a far less enthusiastic response by potential voters 
to the announcement that elections would be held in March, 1975. 
Of the estimated 900 000 , persons qualified to register 
nationwide, only 521 557, or 58 per cent, did so. 47 
Just before the election, the Anti-Coloured Representative 
Council Committee (ACRCOM) was formed. It was not a political 
party, but believed that any involvement in the policy of 
separate development, whether direct or indirect, fostered 
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racism. Its aims and objects were to vigorously campaign against 
the March elections, informing voters of the dangers of continued 
participation in the C. R. C. and to discourage the so-called 
"coloured" people from continued participation in such 
institutions. 48 It rejected the rationale of those advocating 
participation, and argued that to make the best of a bad 
situation was to yield to blackmail since the state had counted 
on certain coloureds being willing to accept half a loaf in 
preference to none in order to get its oppressive structures to 
function . ACRCOM was composed of members of the South African 
Students Organisation (S.A . S.O.) and the Black People's 
Convention, both Black Consciousness movements which had 
considerable influence in the coloured communities, particularly 
in the Western Cape. 49 It was actively involved in the boycott 
campaign during the election, and was later estimated to have had 
considerable influence. 50 
At its annual conference in Umtata, the Labour Party decided to 
contest all 40 seats and found candidates in all but five. One 
surprise was the axing of Peter Mopp in the Eastern Cape in 
favour of Jody Nash. Mopp decided to stand as an independent. 
M. D. Arendse was also not considered as a candidate as were nine 
other former Council members, the party wishing to be rid of its 
"dead wood". 51 Two of the new nominees were Jaap Muller 
(Swartberg) and Lofty Adams (Kasselsvlei) , both of whom had long 
chafed at being nominated Federal members of the Council before 
joining Labour (Adams had only done so at the end of 1974). 
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The Federal Party showed renewed vitality, its ideological shift 
at least partially countering its "stooge" image. At its 1974 
Transvaal congress it declared that the C.P.R. C. would never 
satisfy the peoples' aspirations and should be abolished, and in 
its election ~anifesto stated that the party would settle for 
nothing less than direct representation in the Republican 
Parliament. The faltering Republican Party contested seven seats, 
all in the Cape, and the Social Democratic Party contested six, 
four in the Transvaal and two in Natal. There were eleven 
independents including four piqued Labourites who had been 
overlooked for nomination (Arendse r Mopp, Esau Jones and the 
Excitable Norah Potts). 
That Labour would win easily was never in doubt, and the real 
question was how many would turn out to vote for it in the face 
of strong boycott campaigns . Just over half (251 631) of those 
registered cast their votes in a 48,3 per cent poll (25,3 per 
cent of potential voters as opposed to 35,7 per cent in 1969) . 52 
Labour gained 151 410 votes to the 75 851 of the Federals. The 
Republican party was reduced to 2 934 after polling over 30 000 
in 1969 and the Social Democrats fared even worse. Neither minor 
party won a seat and both dissolved themselves soon afterwards. 
That the discredited Federal Party at this late stage could still 
attract at least a fair percentage of the coloured vote would 
seem surprising but for two factors: the almost complete demise 
of other moderate parties and the fact that what supporters they 
had were not of a boycottist temperament, usually making the 
effort to cast their votes. The only successful 1 
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independent was again Solly Essop, who substantially increased 
his majority in Bokkeveld. Defeats meant the end of the road for 
figures like Rooks, S.M. Brown, Norah Potts and Peter Swartz, who 
narrowly lost to Jaap Muller in Swartberg. 
The Labour Party executive retained their seats with ease, 
Hendrickse routing H.A. Mallick of the Federal Party with a 
majority of nearly 10 000 votes in Bethelsdorp, there being a 
high percentage poll of 74,5 per cent. The wretched S . M. Brown, 
who had been unwise to contest this Labour stronghold, could 
muster only 323. Federal majorities were reduced everywhere 
except in Reigerpark where Rabie increased his majority thanks to 
the absence of the N.C.P.P. whose candidate had nearly defeated 
him the previous time. Three U.C.C.A. veterans retained their 
seats (S.S. Cloete in Steinkopf, P.J. Pietersen in Wuppertal and 
H. J. Coverdale in Northern Transvaal, by four votes!) and the 
party managed eight seats in all. 
Labour made no inroads in the Free State apart from W. D. 
Plaaitjies comfortably retaining the seat he had won as a Federal 
candidate, their other two candidates losing heavily. The party 
again made a clean sweep of Natal, however, the only real 
opposition coming from Social Democrats. The six Transvaal seats 
were shared three apiece with Labour narrowly capturing Rus-Ter-
Vaal . 53 Whereas a majority of votes had been cast for 
conservative parties in 1969, barely one third were in 1975, this 
despite the Federal and Republican Parties having removed all 
references to separate development in their constitutions and 
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identifying themselves with the aims of Labour almost completely. 
In all, Labour won 31 seats and were thus assured of a majority, 
no matter whom the Government nominated for the other 20 
positions. This time the Government did not pack the Council, 
nominating four Labour members (who would be invaluable when the 
party faltered badly later in the decade), nine Federals 
(including Bergins, like Swartz before him, beaten in Kasselsv~ei 
and w.s. Africa) and one Social Democrat (Morris Fynn). Of the 
non-party nominees, Alathea Jansen was the most notable for the 
role she was to play later. Victory for the Labour Party, 
convincing as it had been, in the end caused as many problems as 
it solved whereas the Federal Party, later to rename itself the 
Freedom Party, was to be considerably more effective as 
opposition later in the decade. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COLOURED QUESTION AND THE NATIONALIST 
RETHINK 1971-1979 
"Whether vle acknowledge it or not, the 
National Party's policy of separate 
development will succeed or fail with the 
implementation of its coloured policy." 1 
"Deep down, every thinking Nationalist knows 
that parallel development must one day give 
way to either integration or separate 
development based on a coloured homeland." 2 
Dr Andries Treurnicht, Hoofstad, 23 April 1971 
John D'Oliveira, Argus, 9 July 1971 
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The Coloured Question under Vorster 
In the early 1970s, the profound differences within the National 
Party over the political future of the coloured people were 
manifested in a series of bitter debates and controversies, not 
so much at Cabinet and caucus level as amongst its membership 
throughout . the country. Pundits included, among others, 
sociologists, historians, economists, mathematicians, members of 
law faculties, clergymen and student leaders. Had the C.P.R.C. 
been running smoothly, it is doubtful whether the debates would 
have had the same urgency or intensity or even if they would have 
taken place at all. What the evident rejection of parallel 
development by most coloureds demonstrated to party members was 
that the Government's policy would not work in the long term and 
that a new solution had to be found. The Government as much as 
admitted this when Vorster said in Parliament that the final 
formula for the nature of liaison between whites and coloureds 
would have to be solved by future generations. 1 
Broadly speaking, the National Party was divided into three 
camps: the Parallelists, the Integrationists and the Home landers. 
The Parallelists advocated the Government view, namely that 
coloureds were a nation in the making whose destiny it was to 
develop separately but within the same geographical territory as 
whites until it hdu complete autonomy over its own affairs. This 
meant that whites and coloureds could not evolve too close to one 
another. Therefore, the latter would vote for C.P.R.C. candidates 
and for e l ections to coloured local government bodies . 2 There 
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was to be no coloured involvement or representation on white 
government institutions and instead there would be liaison 
between the C.P.R.C. Executive and the white Parliament. In the 
fullness of ~ime, twin Parliaments could develop in which 
coloured leaders could govern their own people independent of the 
white one . 3 
The Parallelist's view was only superficially persuasive, a fact 
of which Nationalist ideologies were well aware. Verwoerd had 
already admitted that for the system to work, one Parliament 
necessarily had to have greater powers than the other (see 
Chapter 2, p.50). In May 1968, the Minister of Interior said in 
the Assembly that coloured people would never have exactly as 
much say as the white man in the country that was governed by the 
white man. 4 It was this admission that the present system of 
representation in fact doomed the coloured people to a permanent 
position of inferiority, that many more enlightened Nationalists, 
particularly in the Cape, found unacceptable. Their reservations 
were not new. Not all Cape Nationalists supported the removal of 
coloured voters from the common roll in the 1950s. 
Malan had at first delayed the introduction of the Separate 
Representation of Voters Bill so as not to alienate Havenga, 
leader of the Afrikaner Party and loyal to the memory of Hertzog 
who had undertaken to protect coloured voting rights. 5 In 1960 
D.P. Botha, a Sendingkerk minister, published Die Opkoms van ons 
Derde stand, a moving and influential book that recognised the 
role coloured people had played alongside Afrikaners in their 
139 
history. The well-known Afrikaans poet and playwright, N.P. van 
Wyk Louw's haunting assertion in the foreword to the book, "Die 
bruinmens is ons mense", touched on what was for many a bitter 
dilemma. 6 Coloured people shared a common language (Afrikaans) 
and historical homeland (the rural areas of the Western Cape) and 
many individual Nationalists shared a common ancestry, seldom as 
this was admitted. Many Cape Nationalists were well-disposed 
towards coloured intellectuals and regarded coloured people as 
Brown Afrikaners deserving a closer association with the 
whites. 7 As has been shown, the coloured question emerged as a 
hotly debated issue in the early 1960s . Dawie, political 
columnist for Die Burger, wrote (Die Burger, . 10 December 1960) 
that there had not been as great a flood of letters to the 
newspaper on a single topic as there had been on the National 
Party coloured policy. When Verwoerd indicated that coloured 
people had to remain a minority group with restricted economic, 
political and social rights forever, it came as a shock to those 
Nationalists who had regarded the existing arrangement as being 
temporary or transitional while coloureds were being raised 
socio-economically by a "new deal" to better things. 8 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the first important articulation of the 
integrationist point of view appeared in a Transvaal publication, 
the Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Beweging' s Woord en Daad in an 
article entitled Volk? Sender Land? (April 1971). The article 
urged that coloureds be treated as citizens, not subjects, with 
personal and political rights equal to whites. 9 
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Also in April, Professor S.P. Cilliers, Head of the Department of 
Sociology at Stellenbosch University and one of the most 
outspoken proponents of coloured advancement, gave an address in 
which he stressed that while homelands provided a partial answer 
to accommodating non-white political aspirations, those 
permanently domiciled in the country, including coloureds, Asians 
and urban blacks, ought to be given the opportunity to attain 
full citizenship in a common society. 1° Cilliers was noted for 
his thorough knowledge of the coloureds, their history and 
present-day social conditions. For this reason his views were 
widely noted. In the same year he published his book Appeal to 
Reason, in which he argued that the National Party policy of 
postponing political rights while the process of social, cultural 
and economic upgrading was proceeding, was not working and that 
an equitable power-sharing solution had to be found quickly. 11 
In July the integrationist cause was further boosted when 29 
academics, mostly from UNISA but also from the Universities of 
the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, issued a public "Declaration of 
Faith" in which they came out strongly in favour of the social 
and political integration of coloureds and argued that a middle 
course between this and the homeland option was not a permanent 
solution. Four of the 29 signatories later clarified their 
position by distancing themselves from concepts like "full 
citizenship" and "integration" but calling for the repeal of all 
"negative" legislation such as group areas and job reservation, 
a common franchise for whites and coloureds, equal salary scales 
and equal access to all public amenities. 12 
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Nationalists' newspapers in the Transvaal, traditionally more 
conservative and suspicious of liberal tendencies within the 
party than the cape's Die Burger, reacted to the declaration with 
considerable hostility. Die Transvaler rejected it "in the 
strongest terms" and Hoofstad said that the road indicated by the 
academics would be fraught with wrangling, enmity and 
rejectionism which in turn would permanently sour and embitter 
the country's political life. 13 Die Burger, on the other hand, 
while not endorsing what the declaration said, nevertheless 
praised its authors for clarifying the issues of the controversy 
and using reason rather than emotionalism to deal with it. 14 
Die Burger's attitude accentuated the growing cleavages in the 
Nationalist press that were eventually to go well beyond the 
coloured question. It also indicated that the Cape paper was 
regaining its status as a cornerstone of Afrikaner political 
thrust which it had largely lost to Northern papers like Die 
Vaderland and Transvaler after 1948. 15 The North-South split 
was to an extent mirrored in the division into two main press 
groups, the southern Nasionale Pers (consisting, inter alia, of 
Die Burger, Beeld and Volksblad) and northern Afrikaanse Pers 
(Dagbreek en Landstem , Vaderland and Hoofstad). The two were 
particularly divided on the coloured issue. When, for example, 
the Stellenbosch Student Representative Council decided against 
effective contact with that of U.W.C. and 2 000 students 
demonstrated against the decision, Nasionale Pers supported the 
latter's show of independence while Die Vaderland and Hoofstad 
rejected it . 16 
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In the view of the Homelander faction, the coloured population 
was a nation in the making, not appendages of the whites, and 
therefore it was necessary that they be given the opportunity to 
deveiop to the status of a nation. This meant that they would 
have to control their own affairs and the assurance that they 
would have their own country in which to do so. 17 In the 
Assembly in 1968 Connie Mulder, Minister of the Interior and 
leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, rejected that 
coloureds were brown Afrikaners. The fact that they used the 
Afrikaans language and belonged to the same creed made no 
difference at a11. 18 The creation of a coloured homeland was 
put forward by Dr Andries Treurnicht in March 1971 in Hoofstad, 
a right-wing Pretoria newspaper of which he was editor. When the 
Conservative Party was formed under his leadership just over a 
decade later, it adopted the creation of a "colouredstan" as a 
key aspect of its policies. 19 
The Coloured Homeland idea had first gained prominence in the 
early 1960s. It was rejected by Verwoerd and continued to be 
rejected by the Party for years afterwards, but a minority within 
it continued to discuss the question. Although a homeland might 
accommodate only a small part of the total coloured population 
and appear illogical as a result of the majority of its citizens 
being absent in the "white" areas, it would be no less different 
from the situation in the bantustans, a large proportion of whose 
putative "citl.zens" lived and worked outside of them. 20 Some 
commentators noted that the support for the idea was particularly 
strong in the Transvaal because it would not be their land that 
would be used for creating such a homeland. 21 
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The homeland issue and the issue of coloured identity was 
particularly hotly debated at a congress of the Afrikaner 
Studentebond in June/ July 1971. Vorster opened the Congress, 
repeating his earlier statement that the coloured question was 
not for his generation to solve but the next's, and reminding his 
audience that the homeland option had been ruled out at Cabinet 
level on 4 December the previous year. 22 This did not 
discourage the student delegates from hotly debating it, however. 
In a much reported address, the Rector of the Rand Afrikaans 
University, Professor G. van N. Viljoen argued that the gradual 
and systematic build-up of coloured areas could eventually lead 
to their consolidation into viable geographical units. It was 
vitally important that these areas should not remain dormitory 
locations for coloured workers dependent on the white areas, but 
that they become economically self-sufficient. 23 To have sundry 
coloured group areas scattered haphazardly across the country, as 
was presently the case, would have politically fatal consequences 
for the future and to resolve this, coloureds had to be 
restricted to specific areas of development. 
Viljoen also attacked the "violent, often bitter and 
fundamentalistic rejection and condemnation of any thinking in 
the direction of a coloured homeland" which had emanated from 
certain Nationalist newspapers. While fully aware of the 
practical difficulties, he found it strange that the mere 
possibility that something might come of it and that 
circumstances could develop in such a way as to make separate 
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freedom in a sovereign geographical territory, was being so 
vehemently precluded. 24 
In essence, the Colouredstan option was ruled out because of its 
impracticality. Coloured people were scattered too thinly around 
the country and the enormous cost of settling even a portion of 
them in a separate area (which as later estimated, probably 
conservatively, at 20 billion Rands25 ) made most Nationalists 
wary of the idea. Had the creation of a homeland been feasible, 
it might well have come about. In 1961, Verwoerd said that if the 
National Party could have settled coloureds in a part of the 
country quite on their own, in their own area like the blacks, 
they certainly would have done so. 26 One should not discount 
the role played by the more moderate Nationalists in the 
continued rejection of the colouredstan theory by the Cabinet, 
however. Nor can the strong opposition of such newspapers as 
Rapport and Die Burger be ignored. In response to Vilj oen' s 
speech, the latter newspaper attacked the "deadly error" of 
making the poJ.itical future of the coloured people a straight 
choice between a homeland or integration when in fact a third 
way, the Government's policy of parallel development, existed. 27 
Furthermore, the homeland option was "practically, morally and 
politically indefensible" and threatened not only to drive a 
wedge between whites and coloureds, but also between 
Afrikaners. 28 The result was that the homeland idea was 
stillborn and the debate on it remained merely at an academic 
level. 29 
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The Parallelists believed, meanwhile, that in order for the 
system of parallel development, as envisaged by Verwoerd, to 
work, the existing representative machinery for coloureds would 
have to be extensively upgraded. The first hint at what would 
become of the tricameral Parliament was made by Professor Nic 
Rhoodie of Pretoria University in an interview early in August. 
He pointed out that a new "umbrella constitutional body" or super 
parliament in which whites, coloureds and Indians would be 
represented, might have to be established eventually. Whites, 
because of their level of development, would play a major role 
but representatives of the other two communities would share in 
the decision-making process. 30 Rhoodie later wrote that the 
solution to the white-coloured problem was "democratic 
pluralism". This would entail a) giving maximum autonomy to each 
group with regard to their own communal affairs, and b) 
consultation and co-operation at the highest levels of government 
to discuss matters of common interest. 31 
Dr Dennis Worrall, the future Nationalist Ambassador first to 
Australia and then to Great Britain, foresaw things remaining as 
they were for perhaps two decades, and a confederal type 
constellation of states emerging afterwards in each of which one 
race group or another would be dominant, irrespective of numbers. 
This foreshadowed some of the key findings of the constitutional 
committee he was to chair in 1982. 32 Thus Nationalist 
ideologies were beginning to move away from a constitution based 
on the one-person-one-vote concept towards that of a parliament 
of communities sharing in the decision-making process. 
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The wrangling over a coloured homeland meanwhile had accentuated 
the North-South split, verligte Nationalists in the Cape like 
Defence Minister P.W . Botha clashing with Transvaal hardliners 
like Treurnicht and Connie Mulder . Mulder, in particular, angered 
many Cape Nationalists with a number of ill-timed and 
uncompromising statements as well as bedevilling chances of 
negotiating with an offended C.P.R.C. In 1973 he declared that 
coloured were no 11 brown Afrikaners 11 , having no claim to 
Afrikanership and also made hurtful and insulting remarks about 
Tom Swartz, belittling his nominated status (see Chapter 4, 
pp.l20-1). His worst diplomatic blunder came in July 1974 when 
opening a National Party congress in Windhoek. Re-emphasizing 
that coloureds were not appendages of the whites but a people in 
their own right on the road to full autonomy, he then insisted 
that there would never be any representation for them in the 
white Parliament, then or at any time in the future. 33 Rapport 
lashed the Minister's bluntness, saying on 28 July that he was 
the wrong man saying the wrong thing at the wrong time in the 
wrong place. Mulder reacted bitterly with a fierce attack on 
Rapport in Die Burger, saying that it was a sad day when 
newspapers in South Africa prescribed political policy to the 
political party to which they belonged. 34 
Tensions were heightened when Mulder claimed that the Cape did 
not have special rights in deciding upon the coloured question. 
Piet Marais (Karoo) rejoined in the Assembly that it had to be 
borne in mind that two-thirds of South Africa's coloureds lived 
in the Western Cape and the Boland . In a verligte speech he went 
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on to argue that points of contact between white and brown South 
Africans would have to be greatly augrnented. 35 It can be argued 
that Mulder's attitudes greatly harmed his chances of becoming 
the next Prime Minister. The rift between him and Cape M.P.'s 
never really healed. 
National Party Coloured Policy in the Early 1970s 
During the 1970s the Government carne gradually to realize that 
its apartheid policy was failing . Despite t he huge number of 
arrests for pass law infringements, the process of African influx 
into "white 11 a r eas could not be hal ted, let alone reversed. 
Bannings and arrests had temporarily quelled the forces of black 
political and industrial resistance in the 1960s, but these 
forces returned in a more powerful and durable form after 1970. 
The spread of the Black Consciousness ideology and the rise of 
independent black trade unions were two important aspects of this 
revival. Abroad, anti-apartheid sentiment was growing in 
intensity and manifested itself in South Africa's expulsion from 
international sport. In 1970 the New Zealand national rugby team 
toured South Africa, but only after Vorster had agreed to the 
inclusion of several Maori players in the side36 , a departure 
from apartheid orthodoxy that contributed to the breakaway of the 
Herstigte Nasionale Party. The realization that certain aspects 
of apartheid were morally indefensible led to a selective 
relaxation of certain more peripheral measures such as those 
relating to separate amenities , particularly in places where 
there was a high degree of sophistication. 37 
148 
It was also coming to be openly acknowledged within Nationalist 
circles that the C.P.R. C. was not functioning in the manner 
intended and merely gave coloured leaders the opportunity to blow 
off steam. 38 Die Burger returned to the theme of coloureds as 
brown Afrikaners, despite Mulder's denial thereof in the Assembly 
two years previously39 (2 December 1970) and it was reported in 
a survey by Mark-en-Meningsopname that 45 per cent of white 
respondents considered coloured people to be Afrikaners and 18 
per cent were unsure. 40 The idea that race could not remain the 
basis of discrimination was, in fact, taking root in Nationalist 
thinking. The emphasis was now shifting from rigid biological 
characteristics to more cultural and spiritual ones. 41 What was 
of concern to an increasing number of Nationalists, particularly 
in the Cape, was that coloured people were coming actively to 
reject their Afrikaans roots and were relating increasingly to 
Black Consciousness philosophies. This is shown to an extent by 
the fact that the special coloured supplement (Ekstra) , published 
by Die Burger, had a very low circulation in coloured areas, 
notwithstanding the fact that 80 per cent of coloureds in Cape 
Town spoke Afrikaans . 42 
The important shifts in sentiment within its ranks and within a 
large part of its constituency were, by and large, not reflected 
in the National Party's stated coloured policy which remained, at 
least outwardly, firmly wedded to parallel development which, 
through a concerted effort by all concerned, would become a 
viable alternative to integration or a coloured homeland. 43 In 
January 1972, Dr S.W. van der Merwe delivered a paper to the Abe 
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Bailey Institute for Intergroup Studies in which he stated the 
Government's position. In it, he held that while coloureds were 
not yet a nation, nevertheless they could become one since they 
showed "certain distinctive characteristics" and most had had 
coloured forebears for many generations. The first and main 
objective of the Government was coloured socio-economic 
improvement, and already progress had been made in the fields of 
education and social welfare. Both representation of coloureds by 
coloureds in the central Parliament and a coloured homeland were 
rejected. Political development under the Government's policy 
would be pursued alongside socio-economic upliftment but more 
cautiously so as not to bring about heightened expectations 
leading to disillusionment and friction. Part of this programme 
would be liaison between the C.P.R.C. and the Government at the 
highest levels, and this liaison machinery would be extended and 
improved upon in the future. If coloureds co-operated to make 
such a system work, great advances could be made, particularly in 
coloured socio-economic upliftment. 44 
What the Government would do, if the coloured people did not in 
fact co-operate, Dr van der Merwe did not say. Nor did his party 
set about upgrading the C.P.R.C.'s liaison machinery as promised. 
The National Party coloured policy can best be described as 
Hamlet-like, characterised as it was by indecision, half-
heartedness and procrastination. When the Theron Commission was 
appointed in 1973 (see Chapter 5, pp.153), it was intended to 
remove a thorny issue from the party's agenda for the time being 
as well as to contain a growing revolt in party rank~. 45 
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In the middle of 1974, the disastrous near-collapse of the 
Council (dealt with in the previous chapter) made it clear that 
the Government could delay no longer. Afrikaans newspapers like 
Rapport, Die Burger and Vaderland joined English newspapers in 
calling for a decision on the coloured question. Rapport 
acknowledged (28 July 1974) that parallel development was not 
going to work as a long-term solution and that the fiasco on the 
C.P.R.C. had been a long time in coming. Vaderland, a Transvaal 
paper, said that it had come about following years of white 
indecision of the coloureds' political future. 46 Much of the 
criticism was :evelled at the C.P.R.C. itself. R.E. van der Ross, 
writing under .the pseudonym of Gus Adams in Rapport, said that it 
had no philosophers, no planners, no intellectuals, none t o 
advise caution and no political theorists. 47 In November 1974, 
Council members were attacked for their puerile interjections , 
barracking and their "dreary arguments over preposterous motions" 
(Cape Herald, 23 November 1974) . "Na vyf jaar", commented Die 
Burger on the Council, "is dit pateties."48 If this was true, 
much of the credit should go to the Labour Party for making it 
so. The crisis on the Council and reaction to it had the effect 
of shaking the Government out of its lethargy . 
Vorster made an important speech at the opening of the seventh 
session on 8 November 1974, in which he spelled out a number of 
proposed changes in its composition and functions . He 
distinguished between three spheres of interest under parallel 
development, being spheres where coloured interests were decisive 
and to be dealt with by coloured institutions, white spheres of 
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interest to be dealt with exclusively by white institutions and 
finally, spheres where overlapping interests required joint 
deliberation and decisions by means of suitable liaison 
machinery. This anticipated the divisions into 11 own" and 
ttgeneral" affairs in the Government's 1977 constitutional 
proposals and in the tricameral Parliament. 
Vorster conceded that the C.P.R.C. Act had become restrictive and 
had to be changed since it no longer served its objects. It would 
have to be transformed into a body with concrete powers, its 
executive being given cabinet status with the means to enforce 
its own decisions by means of its own administration. Complete 
control of coloured urban areas, as was already the case with 
rural areas, would be attained by the extension to full municipal 
status of township management committees. The Administration of 
Coloured Affairs could be reorganised into separate departments, 
each under the authority of an executive member, as was the case 
with Ministers of the Republican cabinet. The Council would be 
fully elected from the commencement of its third term. 
Vorster emphasized that while there could not be two sovereign 
parliaments in one land and power would remain vested in the 
white Assembly, nevertheless coloured leaders would be allowed to 
have a say ir. matters mutually affecting the two population 
groups. Therefore the time had come to transform the Liaison 
Committee into a Consultative Cabinet Council which would 
function under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and would 
consist of the C.P.R.C. Executive and an equal number of white 
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Cabinet Ministers. The decisions of this body, to be reached 
through consensus, would carry much weight by themselves, and the 
vesting of it with statutory legislative authority as well as its 
meeting for a fixed number of times annually could also be 
considered. Direct representation in the Republican Parliament 
was out, however, and Vorster advised coloured leaders not to 
dissipate their energies by making this a central goa1. 49 
Vorster had clearly not differed from the National Party's stat ed 
policy in his speech. What he meant was that the existing system 
of representation would be modified and upgraded as Government 
spokesmen had already indicated. Parallel development was not 
being move d away from, but was being refined . For this reason 1 
the Labour Party decided not to involve itself in the new 
initiatives, although the Federal Party accepted the m in 
principle. 50 In an address to the House of Assembly , Vorster 
justified the scheme by claiming a coloured person could air his 
grievances far more effectively and have far more opportunities 
to speak in the new system than he would otherwise have in 
Parliament. 5 1 
The Appointment, Proceedings and Findings of the 
Theron Commission, March 1973 - June 1976 
On 2 February 1973, it was announced in the Assembly that the 
Government had decided to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to make 
a thorough evaluation of the socio-economic and constitutional 
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progress of the coloured people since 1960, examine their present 
position and make recommendations for their future 
development. 52 Professor Erika Theron of Stellenbosch was 
appointed chairman of the Commission, which was requested to 
report within 18 months. The Commission differed from its 
predecessors, the Wilcocks Report (see Chapter 1, pp.21-3) in 
that political as well as socio-economic issues had to be looked 
into, a clear admission of how the C.P . R. C. was failing as a 
viable political body. Six coloured men were appointed to serve 
on the Commission, including Professor R.E . van der Ross, Jac 
Rabie and M. D. Arendse' s son, Dr . S. I . Arendse, who was a 
nominated C.P.R.C. member after 1975. (The others were Dr H.M. 
Beets, A. J . Arendse and J.S. Feldman . ) 
Soon after the decision to appoint the Commission, Labour at an 
N.E . C. meeting in February 1973, rejected it since its terms of 
reference did not include the recognition of full citizenship 
rights for the coloured people of South Africa. The Government, 
it was claimed, was shifting its responsibilities by not clearly 
defining how it would deal with the resolutions and demands 
passed by the previous C.P.R. c. sessions. 53 Labour members 
undertook not to serve on the Commission if asked to do so. 
The report took more than twice as long to complete than 
expected, corning to a massive 567 pages divided into 22 chapters 
with five main sections and appendices. Its findings s howed up in 
I 
grim detail the full extent of coloured poverty and the 
destructive effect of Government legislation concerning the 
coloured people. 
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It was found that the Group Areas Act considered "appearance and 
acceptance" to be valid criteria for group membership whereas the 
Population Registration Act emphasized descent, leading to 
situations where, for example, a person could cohabit with a 
"white" person in a "white" area but not own property in such an 
area. It was recommended that the Population Registration Act be 
amended so as to make both acceptance and descent valid criteria 
for classification purposes. 54 Apart from the serious moral and 
religious issues involved in the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
and Immorality Acts, confusion was caused by the prohibitions not 
being extended to unions between coloureds and other non-whites. 
It was found that both Acts should be repealed. 
The Group Areas Act was found to have caused considerable 
suffering. By 31 December 1974, 53 203 coloured families had been 
resettled compared to only 1 570 white families. A further 22 369 
coloured families were still to be resettled after that date. 55 
Surveying the economic position of coloured, the Commission found 
that the share of total personal income in South Africa earned by 
that group had been 7,2 per cent in 1974/5 and was expected to 
rise to 8,2 per cent in 1979/80. It had risen over the past 15 
years more rapidly than that of any population group, largely the 
result of rapidly increasing wages and the increased upward 
mobility of workers . However, the large number of dependent 
children, 45 per cent of the population being in the age group o-
14 years, had largely dampened these increases. 56 19,2 per cent 
of all households earned less than the Minimal Subsistence 
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Level. The per capita income of coloured people was five times 
smaller than that of whites. 57 
Perhaps the most controversial of the Commission's 
recommendations was that which advised the Government to reaffirm 
the policy that the Western Cape be a white and coloured Labour 
preference area and take steps to enforce this. The policy dated 
back to 1955, when the Government announced that preference would 
thenceforth be given to coloured over African workers West and 
South of the Breede River line. Black women and children, 
disqualified from staying in these areas, were sent back to the 
reserves and only contract migrant workers were admitted. In 
1967, the line was moved East to the FishjKatjAliwal North line, 
the long-term aim of the policy being to decrease the number of 
Africans working in the Western Cape by 5 per cent per annum. 58 
Despite his own strong opposition to the labour preference 
policy, van der Ross acknowledged a certain ambivalence in the 
coloured community over it. Colour-bar legislation meant very 
real benefits for coloured people, particularly for the emerging 
middle class and the growing number of artisans in the building, 
furniture, leather, textile, garment and engineering industries . 
Semi-skilled coloured workers were employed in textile, knitting, 
garment, chemical and other factories while blacks were excluded 
from all but menial or unskilled occupations . Coloured-owned 
business establishments had come or were coming into being, often 
with capital assistance or business training from the Government-
sponsored Coloured Development Corporation. Given the 
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indisputable fact that coloured people were benefiting at the 
expense of Africans, they were likely to be thrown into a dilemma 
if asked to forgo their privileges . 59 
The Federal Party had, of course, made no secret of its support 
for the colou~ed labour preference policy and in Council sessions 
had frequently asked for its stricter enforcement (see, for 
example, Chapter 3, p.86). The Labour Party's attitude was more 
ambiguous . In terms of its philosophy, all colour bars, including 
the coloured labour preference policy, had to be abolished and 
none of its members ever publically advocated otherwise. It i s 
noteworthy, however, that in the C.P.R.C. debates and in the 
evidence submitted by the Labour Party to the Theron Commission, 
the · revocation of the policy was never c a lled for . Job 
reservation was only condemned when coloured advancement was 
blocked in favour of whites, not when coloureds were protected 
from African competition. 60 
In reviewing the socio-cultural position of coloured persons, the 
Commission again found evidence of great inequality. Only 1,2 per 
cent of all coloured persons held the senior certificate compared 
with 26,1 per cent of whites, in 1972 only 3,4 per cent of 
coloured pupils being in Standard 8, 9 and 10 compared with 18,2 
per cent of whites. It was recommended that all universities be 
thrown open to coloured students and that U.W . C. be permitted to 
enrol approved white students at post-graduate leve1. 61 
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The shortfall of housing for the 336 000 urban coloured families 
was estimated to be 131 000 dwelling units, and 33 000 houses 
would have to be built each year for 25 years to overcome the 
shortage. Among other things, the Commission criticized the Group 
Areas Act and though not going so far as to call for its repeal, 
recommended that District Six, which had been declared a white 
area in 1968, be declared a coloured area. 
It was found that in the cultural sphere, coloured people were 
lagging behind their white counterparts. In a majority 
recommendation, it was held that the idea that the coloured 
population was a community that was culturally different and 
culturally distinguishable from the white population group, be 
abandoned once and for all. The advancement and pursuit of 
culture ought to be dealt with within the same organisational 
framework as for Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking whites 
in South Africa. 62 A minority of commissioners still insisted 
that the coloured be regarded as a distinct cultural community in 
the South African population. 
The Theron Report differed from the Wilcocks Report in that far 
more attention was given to the political position of the 
coloured people. After assuming the role and performance of the 
C.P.R.C., it was found that the great majority of coloured people 
were dissatisfied with the existing set-up. Disillusionment had 
meant that the limited measure of co-operation there was at the 
beginning of the seventies had gradually dwindled. It was doubted 
that any expansion of the Council's powers were possible since 
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its jurisdiction was not territorial but only applied to coloured 
people. 63 
Low registration and voting figures and the system of nominating 
members prevented the c.P.R.C. from reflecting the opinions and 
political groupings of the coloured people. Council resolutions 
were not t~bled in Parliament, but were dealt with in special 
meetings involving the Minister of Coloured Relations together 
with the Minister and his secretaries to whom the resolution 
applied. This system had resulted in Council resolutions not 
receiving the necessary attention, despite the Minister's promise 
that the liaison machinery would not remain static but would be 
expanded. 64 Of the 151 motions agreed to between 1969 and 1974, 
less than half had been accepted, partly accepted or favourably 
considered. Furthermore , the amount voted annually by Parliament 
had not been enough to meet the needs of the different 
portfolios, there being in particular a big shortage in respect 
of education and for the payment of salaries and pensions on a 
scale equal to that of whites. 65 The Council had been more 
successful as a forum where the demands and grievances of every 
section of the coloured population had been voiced. In the 
presence of the press and diplomats, interests, desires and needs 
had been articulated as never before . It was also noted that a 
larger proportion of the coloured population than before had been 
involved in the running of coloured affairs, despite the 
restricted sphere of competence of the Council. 
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As a sui gener is Authority, the Council failed completely. 
Whereas it had jurisdiction over only one section of the 
population in respect of education, local government, rural areas 
and agriculture, conventional (white-controlled), central, 
provincial and local authorities had territorial jurisdiction 
over all the persons in the area of jurisdiction concerned. This 
led to jurisdictional overlapping which was particularly mar1ced 
in matters of local government. None of the three laws passed by 
the first Council (see Chapter 3, p.93) could be described as 
original or of any real significance. 66 
The Commission found that 59 per cent and 39 per cent of the 
total annual expenditure of the Council had been spent on 
educational and welfare services respectively, showing how these 
fields far and away formed the centre of gravity of its social 
welfare policies. Nearly three-quarters of what remained had been 
spent on rural areas. 67 It appeared that the amount granted 
annually to the Council by Parliament was totally inadequate to 
meet the needs of the various portfolios. This was particularly 
true in the fields of education and in respect of the payment of 
salaries and pensions on a scale equal to that of whites . 68 
A Change to the Westminster Model 
Given the existing obstacles and anomalies which, in the 
Commission's opinion, could not be eliminated satisfactorily, it 
was recommended that (a) a provision be made for satisfactory 
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forms of direct representation and a direct say for coloured 
people at the various levels of government and on the various 
decision-making bodies, and (b) that in the process of 
constitutional adjustments it would have to be accepted that the 
existing Westminster system of government would have to be 
changed to adapt it to the requirements peculiar to the South 
African plural population structure. 69 This was Recommendation 
17 8, the most important and significant of the Commission's 
findings. 
The Theron Report was tabled in the Assembly in June 1976, a 
conservative document, at all times operating within the 
framework of separate development and which made no radical 
departures from that policy, particularly in its acceptance of 
the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts. Whereas the 
reaction of the English and Afrikaans press ranged from the 
enthusiastic to the luke-warm, the coloured reaction was almost 
uniformly negative. The Education Journal was particularly 
dismissive, calling the Report "a piddling, pseudoliberal, petty 
reformist effort by the professional social 'scientist' or 
chronic slummer who steered well clear of the guts of any 
question" and "the academically and politically still-born brat 
of Tante Erika and a group of house slaves she apparently dubbed 
her 'boys'." 70 
Jakes Gerwel, a lecturer at u.w.c., wrote that in essence, the 
recommendations of the Theron Commission represented "a blueprint 
for the gradual integration of a Mulatto group into the ruling 
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white power structure" (Sunday Tribune, 20 June 1976). At the 
time of writing, the Soweto Uprising, that had erupted four days 
previously in the Johannesburg black townships and spread 
countrywide subsequently, was overshadowing the Commission's 
findings (see Chapter 6, pp.192-3}. This upheaval and the strong 
support shown by the coloured youth for the black protestors, 
graphically demonstrated how specifically coloured-white issues, 
which were so sore a point in Afrikaner circles during the 1970s, 
were no longer the concern of a growing number of coloured 
people, particularly in the Western Cape. 71 
Conservative as the Report was, the Government's reaction to it 
in the provisional comments showed that it had not been 
conservative enough. These comments claimed that numerous 
recommendations made were in accordance with Government policy 
and had already been implemented or were in the process of being 
so . However, recommendations that would amount to the recognition 
and development of the identity of various population groups 
being broken down were not conducive to the orderly and 
evolutionary advancement of these groups. 72 For this reason the 
Government was not prepared to change its standpoint on the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts. It was also 
held that parallel development held many opportunities for 
advancement and material benefits for the coloured people, and 
the recommendation that direct representation in Parliament, 
Provincial Councils and local institutions be granted to 
coloureds was also not accepted. However, Recommendation 178(c) 
was accepted since "the Westminster system of government did not 
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necessarily have to be followed slavishly in South Africa". 73 
As a result, a cabinet committee chaired by the Minister of 
Defence, Mr P.W. Botha, in his capacity as Cape leader of the 
National Party, was entrusted with the assignment of formulating 
proposals for a new constitution. 
Government Initiatives and the C.P.R.C. 1975-1979: 
The Failure of the Cabinet Council 
After Labour's victory in the March 1975 elections, the party's 
executive was approached on numerous occasions with regard to 
their participation in the proposed Cabinet Council. At its tenth 
annual conference (Upington, January 1976), the Cabinet Council 
was rejected and in the short term the Government was forced to 
turn to the Federal and Independent members of the C.P.R.C., 
together with the South African Indian Council to get its plan 
off the ground. 
In February 1976, the South African Indian Council decided in 
principle to participate in the Cabinet Council, and in June it 
was finally decided, by 21 votes to 5, to give the new scheme a 
12-month trial. 74 It is interesting to note that Amichand 
Rajbansi, the future leader of the Indian House of Delegates in 
the tricameral Parliament, resigned from the S.A.I.C. executive 
in protest against this decision. The five Council members who 
had voted against participation later formed the Reform Party, 
led by Y.S. Chinsamy, which was to join the South African Black 
Alliance (see Chapter 6, pp.201). 
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The first meeting of the Cabinet Council was held on 24 September 
1976, two more meetings following, on 26 November and 7 March 
1977. Nothing was achieved beyond an exchange of views on such 
issues as the different budgets and portfolios, and education. 
vorster was apparently bored and aloof in the meetings. 75 
Of the coloured representatives serving on the Council, only two 
(Jac Rabie and Phillip Sanders) had successfully stood for 
election . The Government admitted that the current composition of 
the coloured component in the Cabinet Council was 
unrepresentative and their presence had to be seen as a temporary 
arrangement until the duly elected C.P.R.C. Executive was 
prepared to participate. 76 In fact, despite strenuous efforts 
to that end by the Federal Party and several dissident Labour 
members, the Labour Party never did change its stance. 
The National Party admitted that the system was not progressing, 
giving the reason as being the "lack of responsibility on the 
part of certain coloured leaders" (ie. the Labour Party 
executive). 77 The Cabinet Council was not, however, a failed 
experiment to be eventually consigned to historical oblivion, but 
represented an important shift in the National Party's coloured 
policy from total segregation to reincorporation within a multi-
racial framework . The distinctive feature of this was a division 
into "own affairs" (matters exclusively concerning each 
particular ethnic group) and specific affairs in respect of 
communal interest which would be dealt with by way of dialogue 
and consultation. 78 The Cabinet Council, even before the 
164 
tabling of the Theron Report, was an attempt to allow coloureds 
and Indians to participate in discussions regarding spheres of 
interest relevant to all South African citizens. What the Theron 
Report did was to strengthen the hand of those Nationalists, 
particularly in the Cape Province, who believed that coloureds 
had to be brought back into the Parliamentary fold, albeit within 
a pluralistic (multi-racial) framework where segregation would 
continue to be applied. 79 The failure of the Cabine t Council 
to get off the ground was a set-back for the Government , but the 
system was in any case replaced in August 1977 by the revealing 
of a new constitutional plan. 
The New Constitutional Proposals , August 1977 
As a result of Recommendation 17 8c of the Theron Commission, 
which suggested that the existing Westminster system might have 
to be changed to accommodate South Africa ' s multi-ethnic 
population, P.W. Botha was appointed chairman of a Cabinet 
committee to investigate "possible and desirable adjustment to 
the existing constitutional order ... in respect of the political 
system for the coloured and Indian communities. 1180 
During August 1977, a new constitutional plan was put to an 
National Party caucus meeting, in terms of which the institution 
of a single, sovereign all-white Parliament was (apparently) 
dispensed with. In the place of the Westminster model was to be 
a quasi-federal constitution . A flexible, unitary constitution, 
165 
Professor L. M. Thompson had argued, had met the needs of the 
British because they had become a comparatively homogenous 
people, their respect for constitutional conventions, political 
compromise and personal liberty being a safeguard against 
arbitrary action by the government of the day. In South Africa, 
however, the peoples were extremely heterogeneous, white colour 
consciousness and Afrikaner national exclusiveness being potent 
enough to override such moral constraints. 81 A flexible 
constitution had provided no safeguards against arbitrary 
government. 
The proposed constitution, in a step away from the British model, 
envisaged executive and legislative government through inter-
group negotiation, compromise and joint decision-making at a 
national level between whites, coloureds and Asians, thus 
envisaging a quasi-consociational rather than a majoritarian form 
of government. Perhaps a more accurate term for the dispensation 
would be "consociational authoritarianism". 82 In the event of 
an irreconcilable deadlock between the three groups, the decision 
of the Executive State President was to be final. The numerical 
advantage of whites in relation to other groups and the exclusion 
of opposition groups from the electoral college would mean, in 
effect, that he would be the choice of the white governing party. 
Only the reconciliation of conflicting interests through 
negotia~ion and compromise could ensure such a system's success. 
The Executive State President was to be elected by an electoral 
college constituted by 50 whites, 25 coloureds and 13 Asian 
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members, such numbers to be entrenched so as to ensure a white 
majority, even if the combined populations of the two non-white 
groups later outstripped that of the whites. Those chosen were to 
be exclusively representative of the majority parties in the 
assemblies of the three parliaments (no provision being made for 
the possibility of hung parliaments, one of the many unanswered 
questions in the new plan). This would prevent the collusion of 
white opposition party representatives with coloureds and Asian 
members to secure the election of their own nominee. In terms of 
the South Africa Act 32 of 1961 (s 1), the State President had 
largely ceremonial functions with a -greatly circumscribed 
exe cutive discretion, but the position of Executive State 
President would have an independent executive authority. He would 
be responsible to the electoral college which could be convened 
on an ad hoc basis when the need a rose, not to any of the three 
assemblies (whereas the white Prime Minister was responsible to 
Parliament for all his actions). 
The Executive President, both the ceremonial head of state and 
the head of the Government, would also be chairman of a Council 
of Cabinets to be constituted by the Prime Ministers of the 
white, coloured and Indian parliaments which would also supply 
six, three and two ministers respectively . The Council would be 
equivalent to an institutionalised grand coalition government, 
designed to accorrunuud·le the conflicting political aspirations of 
the three groups involved. In substance, however, it was no more 
than Vorster's Cabinet Council writ large. The proposals entailed 
ret~ining separate social and political institutions for 
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different race groups coupled with an endeavour to achieve 
unified and integrated leadership at the national executive 
level. 83 
This would mean that non-whites would have the chance to debate 
and negotiate where it really counted, though their ministers, 
and even prime ministers, could be unilaterally dismissed by the 
President. The proposals did not comply with the requirements for 
consociational government as outlined by Arend Lijphardt, these 
being grand coalition government, a mutual veto, proportionality 
and segmental autonomy (Politicon, Vol 4; No 2, 1978). The system 
would remain oligarchical through the exclusion of blacks (whose 
needs would continue to be catered for in the 11 independent 11 
homelands). There would be no mutual veto since this could 
paralyse the decision-making process complete l y. What the 1977 
proposals did show, however, was how the rigidly separatist 
racial character of the state in terms of previous National Party 
policy was changing and becoming more cultural/community 
orienta ted. 84 This, to use Nic Rhoodie' s phrase, would mean 
"accommodation in place of integration, pluralism in place of 
segregation". 85 
Four executives were envisaged , the Cabinet Council and the 
white, coloured and Indian cabinets, the first three being 
r esponsible to their respective assemblies. At the community 
level, they would correspond completely with the Westminster 
rnodel. 86 Legislation would be debated, prepared and initiated 
in the Cabinet Council. Since real political power was vested in 
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this Council :cather than in the three parliaments, embryonic 
power sharing could be discerned in the body, though Vorster was 
quick to deny this. 
The white assembly had 165 elected and 20 nominated members, the 
coloured 82 elected and 10 nominated, and the Asian 41 and 5. To 
arrive at these numbers, the ratio 4:2:1 was used, roughly based 
on the current population figures. Dr Dennis Worrall argued that 
this was in accordance with the principles of proportionality and 
that it guaranteed meaningful participation for the Indian 
minority. 87 The coloured parliament would be called the "House 
of Representatives" and the Indian the "Chamber of Deputies". The 
Senate was to be abolished, another clear move away from the 
Westminster system. 
The new dispensation contained elements of federalism, 
particularly in its division of powers between general and 
regional authorities. Each of the three population groups had an 
elected parliament with exclusive legislative powers in respect 
of those matters which were solely the concern of the relevant 
population group. Regarding matters of common interest, the three 
group parliaments would in effect serve as chambers of a central 
tricameral legislature. All legislation would be initiated here, 
and although the executive president could assent to a Bill in 
the event of a deadlock, the coloured and Indian parliaments 
would have a de facto delaying power, as the Senate enjoyed in 
respect of non-fiscal legislation, despite having no final powers 
of veto. 88 
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It was made clear, however, that legal sovereignty was to vest in 
the white parliament. The coloured and Indian parliaments could 
not even make irrevocable decisions that were their exclusive 
ethnic concern. The consent of all three bodies was needed if the 
composition of the electoral college was to be changed or in 
cases of . proposed constitutional amendments. In all other 
matters, the white electorate was able to enforce its will 
against the opposition of the other two groups and could, if need 
be, govern alone. In its election manifesto, the National Party 
reiterated its commitment to safeguarding exclusive group powers 
in their own affairs and to consultation and co-responsibility on 
matters of common concern. 
The abolished Senate was to be replaced by a President's Council 
with 55 members, 3 5 of whom would be elected by the three 
assemblies in a 4:2:1 ratio (ie. 
five Asians) . The remaining 20 
Executive President on the 
20 whites, 
would be 
ten coloureds and 
appointed by the 
grounds of their special 
qualifications or standing in their respective communities. The 
Council would only have advisory status, but did have the merit 
of making inter-group negotiations at the highest level a 
permanent feature of the political process. Also to be abolished 
were the Departments of Coloured Relations and of Indian Affairs 
as well as the original Cabinet Council. 
The unilateral formulation of the new proposals and the take-it-
or-leave-it nature of their presentation militated against their 
being accepted by coloureds and Indians, particularly as they 
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would have to operate by consensus and compromise. Both verligte 
and verkrampte elements in the National Party accepted the 
dispensation. Later it became evident that the interpretation of 
the 1977 proposals of the conservative faction differed from that 
of the progressive one, differences coming to a head in 1981. 89 
When it became clear in 1982 that there was to be a single 
Parliament with three ethnic chambers, the verkramptes broke away 
(see Chapter 7, pp.224-8). 
Just before the opening of the C.P . R. C. session, a special 
report-back meeting of the Labour N. E . c. was held . There the 
Government's dispensation was totally rejected . The N.E.C. saw 
the formal ethnic divisions as entrenching racism in the 
constitution , and pointed out that not only would the State 
President be given too much power, but all power would be 
concentrated in the hands of the National Party. The plan sought 
to create an alliance of whites , coloureds and Indians, and even 
if this alliance were to comprise equal partners, which it 
clearly did not , it was still unacceptable since it excluded 
blacks, thereby intensifying racial conflict instead of 
eliminating it. 90 
Black domination, the Labour Party believed , could be avoided by 
constitutionally forbidding the existence of racially exclusive 
parties, a prerequisite for the proper functioning of a non-
racial democracy which was the party's ultimate goal. Bitterly 
critical of the fact that the proposals were solely those of the 
Nationalist Government, the N.E.C. resolved finally that the only 
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acceptable solution would be the holding of a national convention 
representative of all South Africans in order to formulate a new 
constitution for the country. 91 
After the opening of the Second Council's third session, Leon 
moved that the proposals be rejected and national convention 
called instead to negotiate the country's future. His motion was 
adopted only with the aid of the chairman 's casting vote, many 
Labour members believing that if the Government's plan were put 
into operation, the party would have no choice but to take part 
in it. 92 Thereafter the Council approved a motion by Leon on 
23 Septembe~, calling on the State President to dissolve the 
C.P.R.C. forthwith and call a C.P.R.C. election on 30 November to 
ascertain the will of the electorate regarding the new proposals. 
Vorster turned down the request, giving Labour's long-standing 
record of non-cooperation, lack of time to organise, and the need 
to make fresh delimitations of seats if the elections were to be 
called on the basis of a fully elective council, as his reasons 
for doing so. 93 
On 21 October, a meeting was held between the C.P.R.C. and the 
Government to discuss the proposals. Labour took everyone by 
surprise by deciding at the last moment to attend, as a result of 
which the talks never got off the ground and a furious P. W. 
Botha, after threatening the Labourites, picked up his hat ~nd 
coat and walked out of the meeting. 94 A further blow to the 
Government's plan was struck in November when the South African 
Indian Congress also rejected the proposals. 
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At the twelfth Annual Conference of the party, Labour delegates 
stood staunchly behind the N.E.C. decision. Fred Peters, in his 
reminded them that Jimmy Kruger, 
earlier called the two non-white 
and that if the "coloureds" or 
address as Party Secretary, 
Minister of Justice, had 
parliaments "talking shops" 
"Indians" pushed for increased powers, even in the year 2000, 
whites would say: "This is what we gave you in 1977. We will not 
allow it to change." 9 5 
Despite these set-backs, the Government set about laying the 
groundwork for a dispensation in which whites, coloureds and 
Indians would have joint control over their own affairs and in 
which matters of common interest would be dealt with through 
joint consultation and responsibility. Part of the · process 
towards this was the passing of an amendment to the C.P.R.C. Act 
in June 1978 in which the vote was extended to all coloured 
people over the age of 18. This measure, which would deal with 
the long administrative process of general registration prior to 
settling on a new constitution, would increase the number of 
registered coloured voters by 165 000. 96 Soon after this 
measure was passed (without opposition from the P.F.P. or 
N.R.P.), the S.A.I.C. Amendment Bill became law. This made the 
S.A.I.C. almost wholly elective (40 elected, 5 nominated) and 
also was identified as a forerunner of the changes that were to 
come. 97 
By the late 1970s, the more progressive wing of the National 
Party was in control and was now essentially moving towards co-
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opting coloured and Indian South Africans into the white power 
structure rather than overseeing their development in completely 
separate institutions. P.S . Marais, Nationalist M.P. for 
Morreesburg, described his party's policy as being "the granting 
of full and equal citizenship, or a credible prospect of gaining 
such citizenship, within a single political dispensation to 
people of another colour in a way that would eliminate group 
domination and its inherent dangers of disruption . 1198 The 
question was whether people of colour in South Africa could be 
given an equal opportunity to share in the privileges, wealth and 
opportunities that flowed from full citizenship rights. At the 
same time, the race classification system, since it ensured "the 
harmonious and peaceful existence of multi-nationalism in South 
Africa", had to be retained. 99 
The much maligned 1977 constitutional proposals were articulated 
in full that same month in a Draft Bill published in the Gazette 
(April 1979, Vol 166, No 6386). That they had never been meant to 
promote serious power-sharing was made patently obvious by, among 
other things, Clause 26(1) (a) which stated that "the legislative 
power of the Republic shall be vested in the Assembly", meaning 
that sovereign legislative power lay with the white parliament 
with the other two necessarily subordinate. Clause III determined 
that the white parliament alone could change the constitution and 
could thus abolish the coloured and Indian parliaments if it so 
wished. The latter two bodies would have the same powers as the 
C.P.R.C. and the S.A.I.C., albeit slightly upgraded and with 
scope for expansion. By the end of the 1970s, however, it was 
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being recognised in Government circles that even representative 
bodies without real authority were ineffectual and that a new 
dispensation had to be worked out. The Bill was not passed and a 
series of constitutional committees under the supervision of the 
Prime Minister were formed to discuss South Africa's political 
alternatives, the first under the chairmanship of Dr Alwyn 
Schlebusch. 
At its regional conference in the Eastern Cape, the Labour Party 
refused to give evidence to the commission since it would negate 
its own bargaining power and allow the Government to claim 
legitimacy for its schemes. 100 This question, the future of 
the C.P.R.C. and the new constitutional proposals were discussed 
with the Prime Minister by the C.P.R.C. Executive on 9 November, 
1979. Sonny Leon, who had become increasingly estranged from his 
colleagues , was the only member of the executive not to attend. 
The meeting turned out to be a highly acrimonious one and was a 
forerunner of a series of bitter confrontations between Botha and 
the new Leader of the Labour Party, Allan Hendrickse, in the late 
1980s. The main issue over which the two disagreed was that of 
the Labour Party giving evidence to the Schlebusch Commission of 
Enquiry into Constitutional Change (see Chapter 7, pp.223-4). The 
Labour executive flatly refused to submit the findings of its own 
constitutional committee (which had been chaired by Les du Preez 
and had submitted its report in April 1979). Their reasons for 
not doing so were that merely submitting evidence was not the 
same as negotiating from an equal position of strength. 101 
175 
(Later du Preez resigned from Labour in protest against this 
stance and submitted his committee's report to Schlebusch in an 
individual capacity.) The meeting with P.W. Botha and the 
resulting stalemate saw whites and coloureds enter the 1980s as 
uncertain as ever about the nature of their future coexistence. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PARTY POLITICAL GROUPINGS AND THE DEMISE 
OF THE C.P.R.C. 1975-1980 
"S . A.B.A. sees its historical task not only 
as the liberation of blacks from oppression, 
but the liberation of whites from the 
consequences of their own folly''. 1 
steadfast, March/April 1978 
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The C.P.R.C. Amendment Act, March 1975 
Predictably, Labour had won the second C.P . R.C. elections with a 
huge majority. Almost at the same time as the election, the 
Government, well aware that the demoralised Federal Party would 
be lucky to retain the seats it already had, was making further 
provision for the continued functioning of the Council by means 
of another amendment to the 1964 Act. In June 1972, with Swartz 
in danger of losing his majority, the first C.P.R.C. Amendment 
Act had been passed, ensuring that in the event of the Council or 
the Council's executive failing to appropriate monies for the 
services it controlled, the Minister would be able to do so (see 
Chapter 4, pp.109-111). Evidently believing that this measure did 
not go far enough, and anxious that the Council should not be 
allowed to "commit suicide", further legislation was introduced 
by the Government. On 18 March, the day before the election, the 
Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations moved that 
leave be granted to introduce a new Bill amending the C.P.R.C. 
Act (see Appendix 5). The amendment would enable the Minister to 
take over all the Council's functions if necessary, including 
legislative ones. 1 
Colin Eglin, leader of the Progressive Party (which now had seven 
seats in the Assembly after the 1974 white election), spoke first 
in opposing the motion for leave to introduce the Bill. His 
reasons for doing so were that it amounted to a complete negation 
of the undertakings given by the Government to the coloured 
people, heralding the complete collapse of the C.P.R.C. as a 
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representative institution. 2 In terms of the notice of motion, 
the Minister was anticipating the end of parallel development if 
a single white Minister could take over the Council's function 
and thus make it neither coloured nor representative. Sir de 
Villiers Graaff took a different line on behalf of the United 
Party (which was still the official opposition with 37 seats, but 
on its last J.egs as a political force otherwise). The Bill, he 
maintained, should be read since it quite obviously meant the end 
of the road as far as the C.P.R.C. was concerned and would force 
all the cards onto the table. 3 
Speaking after the Second Reading, the Minister of Coloured 
Relations explained why the new legislation was not, as it seemed 
on first glance, superfluous. The provision contained in the 
previous amendment to the Act only applied in the event of 
Council or its executive failing to appropriate monies estimated 
by Parliament for the services it controlled. However, should the 
executive fail to prepare draft estimates and submit them in the 
prescribed manner, no other statutory provision existed for 
otherwise obtaining the funds from the central Government. 4 
Apart from matters relating to the provision of funds, there were 
other ways in which effective administration could be paralysed, 
for example, failure to exercise powers which had been delegated, 
authority that had been granted or duties that had been imposed. 
So as not to be seen to be taking over the C.P.R . c . in its 
entirety, the Minister was willing to move ~n amendment in the 
committee stage ensuring that legislative, as well as 
administrative power was not granted to him. 
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In reply, Graaff said that the legislation was the result of the 
Minister seeing the way things were going in coloured politics 
and panicking. If the attitude of the people taking over the 
Council was such that by rendering it inoperable they were 
carrying out the wishes of the voters, then he would have to face 
up to the fact that the C.P.R.C. had reached the end of the 
road. 5 
Graaff's motion that the Bill be read that day six months hence 
was opposed by both Schwarz and Eglin. The latter pointed out 
that low percentage polls, far from showing up the political 
immaturity of the coloureds, revealed just the opposite, for many 
had boycotted the system because they found it futile and 
degrading. The Federal Party had only 16 per cent overall of 
coloured support and the election as a whole clearly represented 
a massive vote against the whole system of apartheid. 6 
Dissension in the Labour Party 
Having won the March elections on the destroy-the-C.P.R.C. 
platform, the victorious Labour Party now faced a serious 
credibility crisis when it became clear that it was not going to 
withdraw from the Council. The passing of the C.P.R.C. Amendment 
Act No 32 of 1975 had rendered such a move futile since the 
continued functioning of at least its administrative role was 
assured. Leon therefore said that the party would use the Council 
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as a temporary platform- a boycott at that stage merely playing ' 
into the Minister's hands. This abrupt policy reversal severely 
damaged Labour's credibility with the more hard-line elements in 
the coloured group, particularly with the youth. On 23 May, Leon 
was pel ted with eggs by students of U. W. c. for his alleged 
'selling out'. Together with Buthelezi three years later, he was 
driven away from the funeral of the former Pan-Africanist 
Congress leader, Robert Sobukwe, also for being a "collaborator". 
Leon alienated the remainder of his executive when he stated that 
although Labour was opposed to nominations in principle, 
nevertheless it would accept nominated Labour members onto the 
Council to ensure the party's continued monopoly. 7 On 2 April, 
at a meeting of the party caucus in Kimberley, it was decided by 
16 votes to nine that 16 names would be submitted to the Minister 
to be considered for nomination, and also that Leon would accept 
the appointment to the post of Chairman of the Executive. 
Labour's hard-line stance on nominations had been modified 
somewhat at its East London conference on 10 April 1972, where it 
was decided that nominated Council members who wished to do so 
could join the party. However, there was a big difference in 
allowing people to join by their own free will from tacitly 
recognising the Government's power to determine the composition 
of the Council by submitting the names of nominees when required 
to do so. 
The more militant members of the party, led by Hendrickse, Curry! 
and Middleton, refused to accept the caucus decision. This led t~ 1 
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a dramatic confrontation at an N. E.C. meeting at Uitenhage on 12 
and 13 April, where this more uncompromising faction clashed 
head-on with Leon and his supporters. Two issues were under 
consideration, the first being the competency of the caucus to 
take decisions in conflict with the party's constitution and 
expressed party policy and the second whether or not the decision 
to allow Leon to accept the appointment of Executive Chairman and 
to submit 16 names suitable for nomination should stand. 8 When 
a motion that the Kimberley decision be declared null and void 
was defeated, Curry and Hendrickse tendered their resignations at 
which Leon burst into tears. Leon's friend Norman Middleton 
confirmed later that the defiance had come as something of a 
shock to the Labour leader. 9 
After much discussion, it was decided that Leon accept the 
chairmanship and further that the caucus be allowed to nominate 
members to the Council executive as well. It was also recommended 
that Leon's "regrettable" decision to submit names of those 
suitable for nomination had been due to his being misguided by 
the Kimberley decision and that he withdraw such names. 10 curry 
and Hendrickse then withdrew their resignations. ·The rift had 
been healed for the time being, but the incident was the first of 
a series of blows to Leon's standing in the party that would lead 
to his eventual resignation as leader in 1978 and from the 
C.P.R.C. and the party in January 1980. 
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The Federal Party after the Election 
and the First Session of the Second C.P.R.C. 
on 10 July 1975, the Cape Congress of the Federal Party was held. 
Bergins defeated Rabie 32 to 25 when voting for a new party 
leader took place. This ended what had turned into a prolonged 
leadership struggle dating back to Swartz's incapacitation . It 
was a bitter blow for the ambitious Rabie who was to become an 
independent after 1975 . Bergins attacked Labour in his acceptance 
speech, claiming they had been two-faced in seeking election on 
a destroy- the- C.P . R.C. platform and thereafte r deciding to remain 
in it. He was only echoing what many dissatisfied Labour 
supporters were already sayi ng. However, Labour' s n e w willingness 
to co-operate at least to some extent with the authorities also 
had the effect of rendering the Federal opposition redundant . 
Further, the collapse of parallel development had left the latter 
without its raison d'etre. 
The first full session of the second C.P.R.C. was convened in the 
first week of September and was opened by the incoming State 
President, Nico Diedrichs. The entrance to the council chamber 
was picketed by a number of coloured students who jeered at 
arriving members and guests. Feelings had been running high at 
the University of the Western Cape, and a general student march 
on the C.P . R.C. building was narrowly averted . 
In the no-confidence debate, Bergins again criticized Labour for 
hoodwinking the electorate and collaborating with the apartheid 
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system when they had previously condemned it. The motion was 
defeated 34 to 22, independent members abstaining or siding with 
the Federals. Leon refused to deliver the budget speech on the 
lOth, saying that it had not been prepared by the executive (ie. 
Leon, Middleto~, Hendrickse, Curry and George Fortuin) and he did 
not agree with its proposals. Leon moved then that the Council 
stand adjourned until suc h time as the Government should meet the 
demand of the coloured people as expressed by the first Council 
during its sessions. These demands included, inter alia, the 
repeal of the Group Areas Act, the implementation of equal pay 
for equal work and full representation in Parliament. 
On 12 September, the Council voted 33 to 24 to adjourn to 19 
March 1976, bringing Council proceedings to a standstill after 
only five days. The Minister su~sequently made it clear that he 
would ensure that the Council would continue to function through 
existing legislation empowering him to unilaterally take over its 
administrative functions. 11 
The Budget Crisis 
The Labour Party hierarchy had made no secret of its intention, 
once it gained control of the Council, of rejecting the Council 
budget. ln the debates leading up to 1975, they stressed the 
pointlessness of even paying lip-service to the charade of 
discussing what was a fait accompli. Hendrickse once asked: "Is 
it really relevant that we even consider debating a budget or a 
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hand-out of the white Government?" 12 The Federal Party were 
able to point out that from a paltry sum of R46 550 000 in 1969, 
the amount granted to the Council had been substantially 
increased each year so that by 1974, it had reached R139 468 000, 
almost triple the original grant. Labour continued to reject it 
since it remained insufficient to bring about parity between the 
salaries and pensions of whites and coloureds. "Negotiation in 
the hands of the Federals", a Labourite commented, "has become so 
bastardised that it is more akin to begging. 1113 
Monies to ensure the running of the Council, including the 
payment of teachers and pensioners, were not worked out by the 
Council, but by Parliament in accordance with the estimates 
prepared by the Council's executive. Once presented with the 
budget for the coming fiscal year, the Council could not change 
it, but only vote on whether or not to appropriate it. The Labour 
Party had constantly voted against quiescently accepting 
Government hand-outs in this way as it gave the impression to 
observers that the C.P.R.C. handled its own finances. 
With Labour in full control of the Council and its executive 
after the March elections, the question of accepting the budget 
dominated in the latter half of the year. Though the passing of 
the C.P . R.C. Amendment Act, No 32 of 1975 had taken some of the 
sting out of the debate, it was nevertheless a thorny issue for 
Labour, particularly in the light of its declining popularity. 
Leon could hardly sign the budget submission without seriously 
compromising party principles, but if he did not, there was the 
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risk that 150 000 pensioners and 25 000 teachers might not have 
been paid after 7 November when funds ran out. The party's 
leadership held countrywide meetings to explain their stance and 
gauge public opinion, receiving considerable support. 14 
After the Council voted on 12 September to adjourn to 19 March 
1976, the Minister over-ruled the decision and instead prorogued 
it, an action that further demonstrated the powerlessness of the 
Government's own institution. On 23 October, the budget was laid 
before Leon for him to sign. In an emergency meeting of the 
C.P.R.C. executive, it was decided that he should not do so on 
the grounds that it was racially discriminatory, that the ruling 
Labo'lr Party had played no part in the preparation of the 
estimates and that insufficient funds had been provided. 15 
Though pro-Government newspapers were trying to shift the onus of 
responsibility onto Leon's shoulders should the teachers and 
pensioners go unpaid, it was clearly a bluff as S.W. van der 
Merwe had already indicated that he would use the necessary 
provisions in the C.P.R.C. Act to pass the budget. 
An N.E.C. meeting on 8 November, endorsed the executive decision 
and Leon returned the budget unsigned. On ~he lOth, his 
appointment as Chairman of the Executive was revoked, and he was 
replaced by Alathea Jansen, a nominated C.P.R.c. member with no 
party affiliation and who had not contested an election. Soon 
afterwards, the remainder of the c. P.R. c. executive resigned 
their offices. Leon's decision not to sign the budget was 
unanimously endorsed at the lOth Annual Conference of the Labour 
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Party in January 1976, Fred Peters praising him for seemingly 
wavering to sign something which had been played up by the press 
and was to the party's advantage. 16 In reality it had not been 
so straight-forward. According to George Fortuin, Leon had been 
prepared to sign the budget under protest, but had been 
intimidated by the hard-liners into rejecting it. 17 Fortuin 
oppose d the rejection of the budget, and was also unhappy at 
having t o resign from the Council's executive after Leon was 
dismissed. 
The crisis was a major boost for Labour's and particularly for 
Leon's flagging popularity as a series of protest meetings around 
the country proved. Holding 3 6 mee tings in 3 0 days, Labour 
a ttracted more than 62 000 supporters who publicly endorsed the 
party leader's refusal to accept the budget. In addition, Jac 
Rabie was dismissed as Transvaal leader of the Federal Party for 
his opposition to Leon's s a cking, angry that the party's 
leadership in a meeting with Vorster on 29 October, had asked 
that Leon be dismissed . 18 Rabie, one of the most capable of the 
Federal Party's leaders, became the de facto leader of the 
independent group in the Council . He joined the Labour Party at 
the end of the 1978 Council session. Leon himself did not take 
his dismissal well. "He didn't like being dismissed as Chairman 
of the Executive," van der Ross observed, "it came as a bit of a 
shock to have his bluff c alled 11 • 19 
With their prestige having been restored for the time being over 
the budget issue, Labour delegates met for their lOth Annual 
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Conference at Upington in early January 1976. The same executive 
was re-elected amidst shouts of "We shall overcome!" and 
"Amandla!", Peters asserting to extravagant applause that Labour 
had become the real opposition to the National Party. 20 The 
decision of the South African Indian Council to accept the 
Cabinet council as a step in the right direction was roundly 
condemned as were liaison committees in general. 
The 1976 Soweto Uprising and the Third C.P.R.C. Session 
Although the coloured community rallied to the side of the whites 
and largely ig~ored calls by blacks to stay away from work during 
the Sharpville crisis of 1960, a large number of coloureds 
actually took part in the 1976 unrest. 21 The Cillie Commission, 
which was later appointed to investigate the causes of the riots, 
found that the sense of solidarity that existed between black and 
coloured youth had been a strong contributory factor. 22 Black-
coloured relations were usually cordial, but there had also been 
very little contact between them at the social and organisational 
level. The solidarity that emerged during the 1976 turmoil was 
thus an important breakthrough, even if the coloured youth 
returned to normal activities much sooner than blacks did. 23 
It was against this turbulent backdrop that the Third Session of 
the C.P.R.C. was opened (10 September 1976). Allan Hendrickse was 
not present, having been arrested on 26 August and subsequently 
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held without charge in Grahamstown. He was elected to the Council 
executive in abstentia together with Middleton, Curry and 
Leon. 24 The No-Confidence debate began on the 13th. It was 
interrupted when a motion by Rabie that the Council should 
adjourn until 22 September and in the interim send a joint 
deputation to meet with the Prime Minister, was unanimously 
accepted. The meeting took place with Vorster and S.W. van der 
Merwe on the 21st, among the issues discussed be.ing the detention 
of Hendrickse and other detainees and the prevailing unrest in 
the country. Vorster refused to release Hendrickse and other 
detainees, but agreed to ask the Minister of Justice, Jimmy 
Kruger, to review the detention of the former. 
Jansen, the Federal representatives and the independents accepted 
the principle of the Cabinet council but Labour members decided 
to consult their party caucus before making a decision. 
Subsequently the Government was informed that a previous decision 
taken by the party conference not to take part in the Cabinet 
council had been endorsed. 25 Hendrickse was released on 24 
october, returning to the C.P.R.C. on the 27th. He never found 
out why he had been detained, though it was rumoured that 
participation in the Cabinet Council had been the price the 
Labour Party might have to pay for his release. 26 
The no-confidence debate was resumed on the 22nd and Bergins' 
motion was defeated 28 to 15 the following day. On the 
budget was rejected by a majority vote, but Jansen had been 
authorised to sign it on behalf of the Council. Council 
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proceedings continued in a haphazard fashion in October, with the 
question of participating on the Cabinet Council and the findings 
of the Theron Report being discussed. On the 25th a motion that 
Jansen resign and the C.P.R.C. Act be so amended so · as to allow 
for the Council and not the Government to select the Chairman of 
the Executive was passed. On the 27th the Council adjourned until 
26 August 1977. 
Leon had first indicated his wish to stand down as party leader 
at the Upington conference the previous year, though he did not 
formally tender his resignation. At the Athlone conference, 
however, his dissatisfaction was far more strongly worded. 
Wishing to be relieved of all positions and his resignation from 
the party considered, he said that he was not prepared to be a 
figure-head to rubber-stamp policy, nor did he have to justify 
himself to everyone, being able to act on his own discretion if 
he saw fit. 27 Leon's influence and popularity carried the day 
on this occasion, the delegates refusing to accept his 
resignation and passing a unanimous vote of confidence in him. 
George Fortuin, who had not been re-elected to the C.P.R. c. 
Executive in September, since his place had been taken by Alathea 
Jansen, resigned from the party. He gave his reason as being 
dissatisfaction with the decision to boycott the Cabinet Council. 
Fortuin later became an implacable enemy of the party, attacking 
his former colleagues with considerable venom in Council 
sessions. 
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Despite the defiant nature of the rhetoric, it was clear that the 
party had landed itself in something of a cul de sac, the 
conference earning its members a scathing dismissal from the 
usually sympathetic Cape Herald: "They showed yet again that the 
Government initiative is the only thing that keeps them going. 
When the Government kicks them, they have something definite to 
do - howl in chorus. But when the Government ignores them they 
can only squawk around in circles, getting nowhere, like .a 
gramophone record that is stuck11 • 28 
To an increasing extent in fact, the Labour Party was falling out 
of step with changes in the broader coloured community and the 
wider society in general. This trend was accentuated after the 
1975 election when Labour, no longer in opposition to pro-
apartheid groups entrenched in power, came increasingly to be 
seen to have replaced the moribund Federal Party in the 
collaborationist role. The more moderate Labour members, as has 
been shown, had managed to resist attempts to secure a withdrawal 
from the C.P.R.C. (see Chapter 3, pp.99-102). By 1974, too, the 
party leadership had to a large extent retreated from its Black 
Consciousness stance and had become more orientated towards the 
internal affairs of the coloured community. 29 
The coloured community in 1977 was far more highly politicised 
and upwardly mobile than that which had voted in relatively large 
numbers for C.P.R.C. parties during the 1969 elections. 
Urbanisation was taking place at a rapid rate with 56,7 per cent 
of coloureds living in metropolitan areas in 1970 as opposed to 
195 
74 per cent in 1976, according to the Theron Report. 30 Income 
levels had risen and were continuing to rise and an increasingly 
large proportion of coloureds were moving into skilled and semi-
skilled positions in the labour market. The Theron Commission had 
found that the percentage in unskilled and agricultural labour, 
had dropped from 52 per cent in 1960 to 42,6 per cent in 1973 for 
coloured males and from 62,4 per cent to 45 per cent for coloured 
females in the same period. 31 On the educational front there 
had also been progress, particularly at U.W.C. where the number 
of students had grown from 164 in 1960 to 2 073 in 1975. 32 
Urbanisation and the socio-economic advancement of the coloured 
people, instead of leading to their developing apart from the 
white community, in fact led to increasing contact between the 
two. This served to change the image of coloured people held by 
many whites and led also to further calls for the removal of 
obstacles to further coloured advancement. 33 The rising 
coloured middle class and intelligentsia were forthright in their 
rejection of institutions meant to foster a separate coloured 
identity, even if such institutions were to be used for short 
term gain only or as platforms for resistance. As has been 
discussed (see Chapter 2, p.73), the least degree of support for 
C.P.R.C. parties tended to be shown by coloured people living in 
urban areas, who were relatively well educated and held a higher 
socio-economic status. As the upward mobility of coloureds 
continued 1 therefore 1 so did the C.P.R. C. support-base 
correspondingly shrink. 
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More and more coloured people were finding common cause with 
black South Africans, whose numbers in the Western Cape increased 
from 200 000 in 1970 to over 250 000 in 1975. 34 The B. C.M. 
served to politicise a generation of coloured youth who viewed 
with hostility attempts by coloured moderates to reach 
accommodation with Nationalist Governments. This in part explains 
why the Labour Youth Organisation lost so much support after 1975 
(see Chapter 4, pp.119-20). Other important changes were 
occurring in the wider society that were affecting the lives and 
loyalties of many coloureds , notably the rise of militant, 
independent black trade unions after 1974. These, particularly in 
the Western Cape, proved to be more successful than the Non-
European U~ity Movement and the Labour Party in breaking down 
barrie.rs between blacks and coloureds. 35 These and other 
changes all contributed to the failure of the coloured preference 
policy to create a separate coloured identity and drive a wedge 
between blacks and coloureds. 36 It also meant that the Labour 
Party was becoming increasingly irrelevant . 
Relations between Leon and the rest of the executive continued to 
deteriorate in the course of the year. On 6 July, at the 
invitation of Rabie, unity talks were held in Kimberley with 
Bergins and Leon, Leon having decided to attend without 
consulting the rest of the executive. Nine Labour Party C.P.R.C. 
members attended the talks, which were confined to finding a 
conunon basis to confront the Government inside and outside the 
C.P.R.c. 37 
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The N.E.C. meeting took place on 23-24 July, where a motion was 
put that the committee approve post facto the decision taken at 
the Kimberley meeting which only involved unity in the C.P . R.C. 
An amendment was moved that instead the alliance and decisions 
taken at the Kimberley meeting be set aside, and that any person 
agreeing with Labour policy should join the party at branch 
level . The amendment was carried and Leon, interpreting this as 
a vote of no confidence in his leadership, tendered his 
resignation for the second time . Once again, however , he was 
prevailed upon to withdraw it. 38 
The Fourth Council Session 
1977 was dominated by the publication of the Government ' s new 
constitutional proposals as well as by unsuccessful attempts by 
those concerned to get the Cabinet Council off the ground. 
Labour, since their victory in March 1975, had lost five members 
to the independent benches and were in danger of losing their 
overall majority, controlling the Council only through their four 
nominated members and by the Chairman's casting vote in the event 
of a deadlock. 
Labour's opponents made much of the estrangement of Leon from his 
colleagues in the No-Confidence debate. Bergins said that it had 
not bca~ the Hendrickse ' s, Middleton's and Curry's who had begged 
Leon to return and sympathised with his friend Sonny Leon who had 
been abused. 39 "Daar is twee groepe in die Arbeiderparty, die 
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Curry-groep en die Sonny Leon-groep , " claimed George Fortuin. Not 
all Labour members had been happy with the decision to boycott 
the Cabinet Council and some were admitting privately that if the 
Government's constitutional plan was to be put into operation, 
they would have no choice but to take part in the new system. It 
was to be this steady shift to the centre after 197 5, that 
eventually saw the party enter the tricameral Parliament . On this 
occasion, the party held together and defeated the no-confidence 
motion 31 to 28 on 14 September. More independent members 
supported the rejection of the budget on the grounds of it being 
discriminatory. Bergins and his party accepted it "under 
protest" . Having been rejected by the Council, the budget was 
signed by Jansen. 
The new constitutional proposals, rejected by the two minority 
groups they were supposed to benefit, were overwhelmingly 
endorsed by the white electorate in the general election of 
November 1977. The National Party was returned with the largest 
majority in its history, helped to a large extent by the demise 
of the wretched United Party. Soon after the election , the Labour 
Party held i~s 12th Annual Conference in Oudtshoorn (December 
l977). It was reported by the secretary that unity overtures by 
Bergins had been rejected , mainly because he had been set on 
pushing for the acceptance of the new constitutional proposals. 
Unity talks in Kimberley, initiated by Rabie, had also failed, 
since their purpose, it had been realised, had been to create a 
more favourable attitude to the Cabinet Council. 40 
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Federal becomes Freedom 
The Federal Party made a belated attempt to change its image at 
its national conference in January 1978. Bergins said that the 
colour ed people had to be convinced that the party was going all 
out for their freedom , hence its name had to be changed . 41 The 
Federal Party thus became the Freedom Party, Bergins remaining 
its leader. A new constitution and policy were drawn up at its 
founding conference in June which made it almost 
indistinguishable from Labour. It still differ ed in its adherence 
to a separate coloured identity though this was far from 
advocating that the coloureds were a nation in the making as 
Le Fleur , swartz, Fortuin and other conservative coloured leaders 
had done in the 1960s. The party supported the retention of the 
race classification system, albeit in a more "just and realistic" 
form. 42 The new constitutional proposals were accepted as a 
basis for further negotiation to attain full citizenship for all 
South Africa's peoples . 
The Format i on of the South African Bla ck Alliance 
While the old Federal Party was trying to adapt itself to the 
decidedly different post-1976 climate, the Labour Party was 
taking part in the formation of a new political grouping, 
consisting of non-white organisations working within the 
apartheid structure. Leon had often warned that the persist ent 
refusal by the whites to make concessions with the coloured 
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population would result in the latter making common cause with 
other oppressed groups. He said so most explicitly after a 
meeting with Vorster on 19 August 1974, which confirmed that the 
Government would continue to keep the coloured people in 
political limbo. 43 Relations between the Labour Party and 
Buthelezi' s Kwazulu-based Inkatha movement became steadily closer 
in the course of the 1970s. 
In January 1975, a Labour Party delegation led by Reginald 
Apollis, on its way to a Labour Party conference, met with 
Buthelezi. 44 At the meeting, it was suggested that a Zululand 
Coloured Peoples' Committee be formed which would help Africans 
and work with Inkatha. Buthelezi had hoped to build an alliance 
of homeland leaders, who would reject the "independence" the 
Government wanted to foist on them but would nevertheless accept 
the leadership of their respective territories. This scheme was 
dealt a crippling blow in 1976, when Chief Kaiser Matanzima 
agreed to accept "independent" status for the Transkei, after 
which Buthelezi decided to turn to the Coloured and Indian 
political organisations to form a broad-based movement of anti-
apartheid organisations working within the system. To this end, 
in December 1977, he met with Y.S. Chinsamy of the Indian Reform 
Party, which had increased its numbers to just over 3 000 since 
being formed in June the previous year. That same month Inkatha 
General Secretary, Professor S.M.E. Bhengu, suggested at a 
Labour's 12th Annual Conference that the two parties join 
forces. 45 
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on 11 January 1978, a meeting took place between Inkatha 
officials, the Labour Party executive and representatives of the 
Indian Reform Party under Dr N. Chinsamy at which S.A.B.A. - the 
south African Black Alliance - was formed . An alliance rather 
than a straight merger was decided on, the latter being ruled out 
by the Prohibition of Political Interference Act. It was 
unanimously decided that Buthelezi be chairman of the Alliance. 
Three Labour members (Curry, · Hendrickse and Peters) were 
appointed to an interim co-ordinating committee of nine. 
The rationale behind the three movements coming together was that 
they were representative of the oppressed people in South Africa, 
had common aims and objectives and had the same prinGiples in 
their constitutions . 46 One important difference between Labour 
and Inkatha, it later transpired, was the latter's objection to 
economic sanctions against the Republic as being counter-
productive whereas the former advocated disinvestment as being a 
means of bringing pressure to bear on the white Government. 
Norman Middleton was a particularly vociferous believer in 
sanctions, pointing to the efficacy of the sports boycott as an 
example of how sanctions worked. The first president of the non-
racial South Arican Council of Sport (S.A.C.O.S.), Middleton had 
actively taken part in persuading overseas sports bodies not to 
play in South Africa. In 1976, he had been refused a passport 
after failing to promise not to commit, while overseas, any act 
designed to prevent South African sportsmen and women from taking 
part in international competition. 47 In an address to the 11th 
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Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Middleton endorsed a 
resolution taken by S.A.C.O.S. in 1974, which said that nothing 
less than non-racial sport from club to school level, the merit 
selection of all teams and the control of each code of sport by 
a single national body would be acceptable. 48 What is 
interesting to note is that S.A.C.O.S. had strong links with the 
Non-European Unity Movement which had assumed a virtually 
uncontested monopoly over radical coloured politics since the 
banning of the Coloured Peoples' Congress in 1962. 49 This meant 
that Middleton was the only Labour member of note to bridge the 
gap between the C.P.R.C. and the more radical elements in 
coloured politics who were strongly opposed to participation on 
it for whatever reason. 
Buthelezi hoped that in time, S.A.B.A. would become the 
recognised voice of black liberation movements in South Africa 
with which Vorster would ultimately be forced to negotiate. 50 
since he was president of the Alliance, this would increase his 
stature enormously, and these considerations should not be 
discounted when assessing his motives. Pro-Government newspapers 
reacted with alarm to the formation of S.A.B.A., seeing it as a 
threat to the new constitutional proposals which depended on the 
participation of coloureds and Indians. Coloured fears of racial 
domination were played on and S.A.B.A. was called the first step 
towards a ll Zulu-dominated unitary state;; by Die Vader land. 51 
Despite his assertion that through S.A.B.A., coloureds and 
Africans had found each other and that no amount of buying off 
the Labour Party would succeed (Natal Mercury, 9 June 1980), 
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Hendrickse could not have been altogether happy about Buthelezi's 
dominant role in the Alliance. This is borne out to some extent 
by his comment to Middleton after Labour had decided to enter the 
tricameral Parliament (see Chapter 7, pp.230-l), that he was not 
going to be dictated to by a homeland leader. 52 
The first meeting of the three founder members of the alliance 
was held in Cape Town on 3 March 1978 and was attended also by 
representatives of the Dikwankwetla Party of QwaQwa. Here the 
name of the alliance (S.A.B.A.) was chosen and Leon was elected 
vice-chairman. A draft constitution was drawn up, important 
aspects being the aims of endeavouring to create a just society 
in South Africa, to determine a common strategy in the struggle 
against apartheid and to lay the groundwork for the calling of a 
national convention representative of all South Africans to 
devise a non-racial constitution. 53 It was decided that for the 
time being, whites were to be excluded since there was a need to 
consolidate the black masses and prepare them for the future. As 
a direct result of this alliance's deliberations, the Labour 
Party formed a constitutional committee to devise constitutional 
alternatives to the Government's proposals (see Chapter 5, 
p.l75). 
At its third meeting in July, S.A.B.A. was joined by KaNgwane. 
It was agreed that there could be a differing of opinion over 
disinvestment while members would work out a common strategy to 
prevent the exploitation of black workers by commerce and 
industry. 54 Relations between Labour and Inkatha were briefly 
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strained in August when Leon said that his party would 
participate in the new system if it was implemented, comparing 
this to Buthelezi's use of the homeland system through which to 
combat apartheid. Buthelezi denied the validity of the statement, 
claiming that his role pre- dated the homeland system by 16 years 
and sharply asked Leon to desist from making naive public 
statements about Inkatha. 55 The incident was a prophetic one, 
foreshadowing the shock decision of the Labour Party to take part 
in the tricameral Parliament in January 1983. That volte face 
would prove as crippling to ·s . A. B.A. as Matanzirna's decision to 
accept independence for the Transkei had been to Buthelezi's 
earlier atte~pts to create an alliance of homeland leaders. 
By the middle of the year it became increasingly clear that Sonny 
Leon's days as Labour leader were numbered. Two more incidents 
after his ill-considered statement about participating in the new 
dispensation brought matters to a head: On 26 August, his lone 
decision to attend the funeral of the late State President, Nico 
Diedrichs, further estranged the rest of the party hierarchy that 
had resolved to boycott it . The last straw carne when he accepted 
an invitation by the South African Defence Force to visit the 
operational area in South Africa with Alathea Jansen , Freedom 
Party members and independents. When he returned, he was sent a 
letter demanding that he account for his actions and it was c lear 
that many of the party hierarchy had become determined that he 
should go the same way M.D. Arendse had gone in 1970 (see Chapter 
3, pp.82-3). Leon's response was to tender his resignation as 
party leader yet again at an N.E.C. meeting at Kraaifontein on 3 
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September, and this time no-one begged him to reconsider. 56 
That same month Vorster resigned as Prime Minister to become 
State President and P.W. Botha replaced him. Later Botha was to 
use the Information Scandal to force Vorster's retirement from 
politics altogether. 57 
At the beginning of the 1978 C.P.R . C. session on 8 September, 
Labour had lost their majority and were in danger of losing the 
No-Confidence motion. Four nominated members had joined the 
Freedom Party, giving the latter 20 members in the council to 
Labour's 28. The 12 independents held the balance. In August, the 
Freedom Party had unexpectedly pipped their opponents in the 
Tafelberg by-election, polling 1 115 votes to 1 025 . Thus 
encouraged, their members made a strong bid to wrest the control 
of the Council from Labour. They attacked their opponents for 
their inability to bring about the development of the coloured 
community, their continuous confrontationalism and their failure 
to provide an acceptable constitutional dispensation. 58 Labour 
were said to be the tool of Buthelezi, S.A.B.A. a racist alliance 
and its leaders the allies of the terrorist organisation, 
S.W.A.P.O. (Middleton having recently expressed solidarity with 
that organisation). 59 The Labour Party ·was in disarray after 
Leon's resignation and the unpopularity of its acting leader, 
David Curry, also militated against it. 
When it came to the vote, six independents, including three 
former members of the Labour Party (Jaap Muller, W.D. Plaaitjies 
and George Fortuin) voted with the Freedom Party. Despite this, 
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the no-confidence motion was defeated, thanks to the abstentions 
of Morris Fynn and Jac Rabie and the support of Solly Essop. Had 
the voting gone the other way, modern South African history could 
have taken a radically different course. The tricameral 
Parliament in its original form could have been implemented as 
early as 1980, the National Party might never have split, Labour 
might not have left S.A.B.A. and the nationwide unrest following 
the inauguration of the tricameral Parliament in 1984, could well 
have been more muted. 
On 18 September, a Labour motion propos ing the premature 
adjournment of the Council was adopted 33 to 21, which meant that 
the budget was not discussed or adopted. At the 13th Annual 
Conference of the Labour Party in Bloemfontein, Allan Hendrickse 
was elected National Leader. Middleton became Deputy Leader and 
curry National Chairman. The Freedom Party's brief surge was not 
maintained, the Party, in 1978, being rent by personal rivalries. 
Four of its members repudiated the leadership of Bergins, who 
suspended them in terms of the party's constitution in July. The 
following month, Bergins submitted new policy proposals to the 
national council of the party which showed a significant shift to 
the left . The pro-Government and pro-coloured stance that had 
been the hall-mark of the old Federal Party since 1964, was 
played down and instead a single Parliament representative of 
all South Africans, including urbanised blacks, the 
decentralisation of power on a geographic basis and a federation 
of economically integrated states was proposed. The C.P.R . C., 
Bergins said, should be abolished, all discriminatory legislation 
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scrapped and a national convention held to work out a new 
constitution, this to be implemented after a referendum. 60 All 
this would make the party a slightly more moderate version of the 
Labour Party, though differences of accent remained- the former, 
for example, rejected the South African Black Alliance and 
repudiated sanctions. 
s.s. Cloete, Phillip Sanders and Willie Africa claimed that 
Bergins had acted unconstitutionally in unilaterally suspending 
the four members and that they should be reinstated. As a result, 
Bergins terminated his membership of the party and left politics. 
The Freedom Party split soon afterwards , four C.P.R.C . members 
going over to Labour and three with one independent forming the 
South African Alliance, a "third viewpoint" rather than a third 
party that was officially launched as a political party in 
october. This marked the end of any real opposition to the Labour 
Party. 
Towards the end of 1979, Labour also suffered their hiccups. 
Les du Preez resigned in protest because the report of t he 
committee he had chair ed had not been submitted as evidence 
before the Schlebusch Commission (see Chapter 5, pp.175). Lofty 
Adams, the ex-Federal nominee and Chief Whip of the party, was 
expelled for going on a one-man peace crusade nationwide, 
preaching reconciliation between coloureds and whites (angering 
party militants). Relations were worsening between Leon and the 
rest of the executive. On 20 June 1979, Leon attended the 
inauguration of the new State President, Marais Viljoen, claiming 
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that he did not know the party had decided to boycott the 
occasion. Later he moved into a state-provided house in Belhar 
(Cape Flats), going back on a previous commitment not to accept 
this Government grant. In November, he did not accompany the rest 
of the C.P.R.C. executive to Pretoria for the meeting with the 
Prime Minister whom he told in a private letter that his views 
contrasted too greatly with those of his colleagues. 61 
Leon resigned from the Labour Party and the C.P.R.C. in January 
1980. He gave the refusal to give evidence before the Schlebusch 
Commission as his main reason for leaving. 62 Hendrickse 
remarked that Leon had been found wanting when the party moved 
from confrontational to negotiation politics, and that the 
political situation had outgrown him. 63 R.E. van der Ross 
agrees with this view. "Leon was not a negotiator," he said. "He 
struck a pose and wouldn't budge, but he didn't have the 
negotiating skills to bargain with members of the Cabinet. 1164 
Bergins saw it differently . "He came over to our point of view," 
he commented. "He realised that instead of confronting the 
Government, you should try to persuade them." 65 
The last C. P.R.C. session was held in September 1979. Labour were 
comfortably poised with 3 3 members, the Freedom Party were 
reduced to 14 and there were 12 independents, including the four 
members of the South African Alliance. The new Minister of 
Coloured Relations, Marais Steyn, officiated, saying in his 
address that the C.P.R . C. would be abolished as it had proved to 
be an inadequate instrument of the policy of shared 
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responsibility. It had taken the National Party 12 years to learn 
this. 
A spirit of goodwill prevailed in the Council. Ten acrimonious 
years of frustration, rivalry, mistrust and failure, it was felt, 
were at last drawing to a close. No no-confidence motion was 
submitted by the Freedom Party and instead both parties drafted 
a joint motion that was moved by Labour and accepted unanimously 
by the C.P.R.C. Among the principles in the motion that the 
Council resolved to accept were that South Africa be governed by 
all its peoples, that all discriminatory legislation be repealed, 
that a national convention be called representative of all South 
Africans to draft a new constitution and that the wealth of the 
country be shared on a fair basis. The joint drafting of this 
motion was an historic act of unity by the rival parties. From 
this point on, in fact, party political differences were to play 
a relatively minor role in coloured politics. A common basis for 
future co-operation had finally been arrived at by those coloured 
leaders working within the system, the real issue now being 
whether or not to take part in such a system at all. The Freedom 
Party virtually disappeared after 1980, many of its key members 
throwing in their lot with the Labour Party. However, for many in 
the coloured community, "consultation and co-operation were 
becoming dirty words" . 66 
By early 1980, everyone accepted that the C.P.R.C. was a dead 
institution and that all was left was for the white Parliament to 
bury the corpse. In the Assembly on 3 March, the Minister 
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expressed the intention of dissolving the C.P.R.C. and 
establishing an interim body in its p l ace. This would be called 
the Coloured Persons' Council (C.P.C.) which would consist of not 
more ' than 30 nominated members and would have virtually the same 
functions as the C.P.R.C. except insofar as its powers to make 
laws went. 67 Admitting that such a body was not a satisfactory 
form of political representation for the coloured people, the 
Minister said that it was nevertheless better than trying to work 
out a new constitution while having to contend with a C.P.R. C. 
resembling "an overheated oven". Somewhat bitterly, he went on to 
slate the Labour Party for its refusal to do their part in making 
Government initiatives work, saying that the behaviour of some of 
their members had not been a credit to the coloured community or 
a reflection of their standards of civilization and 
development. 68 
Colin Eglin replied on behalf of the P.F.P. opposition and cal led 
the Bill "another squalid episode in the story of the National 
Party, the coloured people and their political rights ... a story 
of intrigue, infidelity and the cynical manipulation of the 
politically weak by the politically strong". 69 The Labour Party 
was equally dismissive, resolving to dissociate itself from that 
"ill-conceived and undemocratic body". In August 1980, after a 
meeting between Labour representatives and the Prime Minister, 
plans to implement the C.P.C. were dropped. The C.P.R.C., 
dissolved by proclamation from 1 April, went unmourned. "We have 
no regrets," said Hendrickse. "Today is a day of celebration, it 
is history. We have achieved that which we have set out to 
achieve. 1170 
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The significance of Labour's Participation in the C.P.R.C 
If Hendrickse's claim is to be seen as being more than an attempt 
to grab the credit for the C.P.R.C.'s demise at a time when his 
party's credibility in the eyes of the coloured public was 
already in decline, it is important to analyse the effect 
Labour's participation had on the failure of the Council . Was the 
C.P.R.C. indeed a "pre-fabricated disaster". 71 If so, the 
Council was doomed to failure from the start and Labour's 
participation at best, merely hastened its collapse. However, 
even so staunch a critic of the Labour Party as Franklin Sonn was 
to acknowledge that, par~icipation in the tricameral parliament 
notwithstanding, Labour did indeed play the central role in the 
collapse and abolition of the C.P.R.c. 72 
The National Party's attempt to build up an independent coloured 
Parliament failed for a number of reasons. It fai led because from 
the start the vast majority of coloured people were opposed to 
it , a fact borne out by the low percentage polls in the two 
elections. In that sense the Labour Party's role may have been 
detrimental since its participation ensured a higher percentage 
poll than would have been the case had only pro-apartheid parties 
been involved. It failed because too many Nationalists themselves 
lost faith in it as a long-term solution. Two independent 
parliaments could not co-exist within the same geographical area 
unless one had superior powers to the other, something which 
Verwoerd envisaged (see Chapter 2, pp.47-50), but which later 
Nationalists found unacceptable. Since parallel development a s a 
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permanent recipe for coloured inferiority was morally and 
practically indefensible, the ultimate solution had to be the 
creation of an independent coloured homeland or reintegration 
within the white Parliamentary structure. By 1980, the majority 
of Nationalists had adopted the latter point of view. 
The main contribution of the Labour Party during the 1970s was 
that it did more than any other coloured lobby to bring about 
this 
Party. 
important ideological 
By infiltrating the 
shift within the ruling National 
Government's parallel development 
structures and ultimately taking them over, it made it impossible 
for the Government to claim that its policies were supported by 
the majority of coloured people or to close its ears to coloured 
demands for full citizenship rights. It has been shown how the 
National Party in the 1960s attempted to build up a strong 
conservative coloured body with a distinct coloured ethnic 
orientation in order that it might become a focus and channel for 
coloured people's aspirations without challenging white supremacy 
(see Chapter 2, pp.54-5). The participation of the Labour Party 
decisively thwarted this strategy. Despite years of planning and 
covert financial backing, the Federal Party was heavily beaten in 
the 1969 election and the Government's nomination of 20 Federal 
members, apart from merely delaying the inevitable, was a massive 
public relations reversal . The decision to back the Council also 
hardened the Labour Party's resolve to destroy the Council and in 
the years that followed it was able to use the Government's 
action to discredit and demoralise its opponents at every 
opportunity. It was not only through the ballot box that Labour 
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were able to weaken the pro-apartheid group, but also during the 
council sessions where its arguments and motions led to the 
Federal Party itself adopting a more confrontationalist stance. 
By 1975, the Federal Party had removed all references to separate 
development in its constitution and largely identified itself 
with the aims, though not necessarily the strategies, of the 
Labour Party. 
The Government could not ignore the Labour Party because the 
latter had built up its large constituency using the very 
structure that the Government had itself set up to represent the 
coloured people. In the past, Nationalist apologists had claimed 
that in fact most coloured people supported their policies and 
that dissension was the preserve of a minority of isolated 
radicals. 73 Labour's convincing victories at the polls put an 
end to such assertions. 
The Labour Party's achievements, particularly in the 1969-1975 
period, were also of a propagandist nature and to its credit it 
was able to use the C.P.R.C. fairly effectively as a vehicle 
through which to challenge various aspects of discrimination, 
give vent to coloured grievances and demand full democratic 
rights. The importance of this at a time when non-white political 
activism was severely curtailed by security regulations should 
not be played down. The party did not have the power to force the 
Government to do its will, but it proved to be a constant source 
of embarrassment to it. Boycotts of Council openings, walk-outs, 
disruptions and obstructionism all served to turn what was meant 
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to be a fledgling parliament into a national laughing stock. By 
provoking crises and forcing the Government to intervene to keep 
its institution running, it underlined the powerlessness of the 
C.P.R. C., its subservience to the White Parliament and the 
continued failure of the policy of parallel development to bring 
about the autonomy promised by Verwoerd in the early 1960s. 
Examples of this include the packing of the Council in 1969, the 
1972 and 1975 amendments to the C.P.R.C. Act, the removal from 
office of Sonny Leon following the budget crisis and the refusal 
to issue passports to Leon and Norman Middleton. Labour's unco-
operative stance not only sabotaged the C.P.R. C., but also 
ensured the failure or non-implementation of other Government 
institutions created to supplement or replace it. The Cabinet 
Council was a signal failure, the 1977 proposals were never 
implemented and the nominated Coloured Persons' Council of 1980 
was never constituted. All this was due to the Labour Party's 
refusal to participate. 
Afte'r 1975, Labour's dominance of the Council was an established 
fact, and the National Party gradually carne to recognise that 
none of its schemes regarding coloured representation could be 
expected to succeed without its participation. It indicated an 
important shift from the unilaterally formulated structures of 
the past and the take-it-or-leave-it nature of their imposition. 
Elements of consultation and persuasion now carne to characterise 
Government dealings with the coloured people and these played an 
important part in the decision of the Labour Party to enter the 
tricarneral Parliament in 1983. 74 
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By articulating coloured grievances and disrupting the smooth 
running of the chosen instrument of parallel development, the 
c.P.R.C. , the Labour Party played an important role in keeping 
alive the debate on the ultimate political future of coloured 
South Africans and in forcing the National Party to confront an 
issue whose resolution it had tried hard to postpone or gloss 
over. To be sure, other factors were at work that were 
influencing the shift in the National Party's coloured policy. 
Black political and industrial movements, driven underground by 
bannings and arrest in the 1960s, returned in a more durable and 
better organised form in the 1970s. The rise of militant 
independent trade unions, the emergence and rapid spread of Black 
Consciousness, the growing international backlash to apartheid 
and the spontaneous eruptions of popular revolt of which the 1976 
Soweto uprising was the most serious, all served to radically 
alter South Africa's pol itical landscape. Given the support shown 
by many coloured people, particularly the youth, for Black 
Consciousness, coloured participation in the 1976 riots and 1980 
schools boycott and the formation of the South African Black 
Alliance, many Nationalists came to realise that a solution to 
the coloured question was a matter of urgency. Unless such a 
solution was found, it was argued, whites would lose their 
potential coloured allies to a broad black front . 75 The 
findings of the Cillie Report on the causes of the 1976 unrest 
indicated that the "sense of solidarity" between coloured and 
black youth was a major cause of the riots. 76 
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The 1970s also saw steady changes in the workplace with coloured 
semi-skilled and skilled workers rapidly moving into white-collar 
and skilled jobs. This decline of the coloured share in the lower 
manual and unskilled occupations was most marked in the Western 
Cape. 77 Far from the aspirations of the growing coloured middle 
class being channelled into separate ventures, however, those in 
the upper strata and best-educated desired to be assimilated with 
the whites all the more. The more they advanced, the more 
restrictive cclour-bars became with labour preference policies 
improving their position relative to blacks but not to whites. 78 
The National Party- in 1980 now had to take into account the needs 
and aspirations of a ~oloured community far more politicised and 
sophisticated than it was in the 1960s, and its policy shifts 
must in part be attributed to that. 
The role of the Labour Party should not be seen in isolation as 
its actions were at all times affected directly or indirectly 
these and other trends operating in the wider society. 
Nevertheless, it would be fair to conclude that in the narrow and 
constricted arena in which it chose to operate it took the lead 
in discrediting and sabotaging the C.P.R.C. in the period 1969-
1980 and in doing so ensured the failure of one of the key 
aspects of the Government's apartheid policy. This was achieved 
in the face of heavy-handed Government interference, growing 
apathy in the coloured community, active hostility to continued 
participation from within and without the party and the enormous 
frustration and powerlessness that plagued its members during the 
long, fruitless Council sessions when its resolutions were 
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ignored and many of its motions blocked by an opposition with a 
built-in majority. The successful part the Labour Party played in 
paralysing the C.P.R . C. needs to be borne in mind when assessing, 
in the final chapter, its controversial decision to take part in 
elections to the new tricarneral Parliament. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FROM THE C. P.R.C.'S DISSOLUTION TO THE 
TRICAMERAL PARLIAMENT 1980-1984 
"There was naivete to the belief that 
because coloured and Asians were being co-
opted into the political centre, some 
"movement", "change", "reform" was 
inevitable. I feared then, as I do now, that 
nothing was going to give reform as bad a 
name as a constitution that was brought into 
being by its promise, but proved incapable 
of bringing it about." 1 
"Any case, die blerr ie ding gaan nie werk 
nie." 2 
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Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament, 
p.l14 
Ibid., p.l20 (A senior Nationalist MP) 
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This thesis has attempted to cover the period between the 
validation of the Separate Representation of Voters Act in 1956 
to the dissolution of the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council in 1980. It would be incomplete, however, without an 
overview of the years following the C.P.R.C.'s dissolution and 
leading to the inauguration of the tricameral Parliament in 
September 1984. The following concluding chapter will cover this 
period of "political no-man's land" assessing the changes made by 
P.W. Botha's constitutional committees to the original 1977 
proposals and the ambiguous, highly controversial role played by 
the Labour Party in their apparent volte face in January 1983. It 
is a complex area whose full significance it is perhaps too soon 
to pin down accurately. For this reason, the final chapter is not 
a comprehensive account but rather lays the groundwork for 
further study. 
The Schlebusch Report 
The Schlebusch Commission was appointed on 4 July 1979 and 
presented its report to the State President on 6 May the 
following year. Most notable of its recommendations was that 
which proposed the abolition of the Senate. The place of the 
abolished upper house would in effect be taken by the creation of 
a President's Council, consisting of 60 members (not 55 as in the 
1977 plan) chosen proportionately from the white, coloured, Asian 
and Chinese communities. These members would be appointed in part 
by their own representative institutions, the remainder by the 
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state President from among people recognised by their respective 
communities as leaders as well as acknowledged experts in their 
respective fields. 
The functions of the President's Council would be to advise the 
State President on any matter which it considered to be in the 
public interest, to consider draft legislation submitted to it by 
any institution other than a local authority and to consult with 
a council of African citizens of the Republic established in 
terms of an Act of Parliament. It was to be divided into at least 
four committees 
Community Relations. 
Economic, Constitutional, 
As a result of the Commission's Findings, 
abolished and the President's Council came 
Planning and 
the Senate was 
into being. It 
consisted of a chairman and 60 members. The proposed advisory 
council for blacks never came into being as no credible black 
leaders were prepared to have anything to do with it. The names 
of 54 members of the Council were announced in October 1980 and 
its coloured component included Sonny Leon, Lofty Adams, Les du 
Preez and William Africa. 1 
The National Party Split 1977-1982 
In 1977, both verligte and verkrampte functions in the National 
Party accepted the new constitutional proposals. This acceptance 
represented an important victory for Cape Nationalists. 2 The 
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election of P.W. Botha to the premiership in 1978 was another 
important breakthrough for the former group. Not only was Botha 
the first Cape-based Prime Minister since D.F. Malan retired in 
1954, but he set about dealing with the coloured question with a 
purposefulness that had been lacking in the performances of Prime 
Ministers up until then. Many within his party felt that he was 
doing so to the detriment of party unity and Verwoerdian 
principles. 3 The manner of his election, in which the 
Information Scandal had been adroitly used to discredit and later 
politically destroy his Transvaal rival, Mulder, served further 
to alienate this grouping. 4 
It gradually become evident, moreover, that the interpretation of 
the 1977 proposals by the conservative faction, led by Mulder and 
Andries Treurnicht, differed from that of the progressive one. 5 
In November 1977, in a speech to his constituents in Randfontein, 
Mulder denied that the proposed dispensation was in any way 
power-sharing. It would only be power-sharing, he said, if all 
three groups were represented in the same Parliament. 6 In fact, 
incorporation within the same structure was what a growing number 
of Nationalists had in mind. In November 1978, Treurnicht said 
that the Council of Cabinets in the 1977 proposals would not be 
a super cabinet with its own portfolios over and above that of 
the cabinets of the three ethnic parliaments, but was to be 
solely a consultative, liaisonary branch between the three 
cabinets. This statement refuted Vorster's interpretation which 
held that the Council of Cabinets would function in the same way 
as the current cabinet and would have executive authority. 7 
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In 1980, differences of opinion over the party's coloured policy 
came out into the open within the ranks of the party itself, the 
question no longer being confined to disputes amongst the 
Afrikaner intelligensia. In November, in an address to the 
National Party executive committee of the Transvaal, Treurnicht 
said that he was not in favour of col oureds being in Parliament. 
A specific group from among the more than 200 delegates carne out 
strongly in his support in what was interpreted by many Botha 
supporters as an orchestrated challenge. 8 During the Piketberg 
by-election on 22 September 1981, Treurnicht said that it was 
unreasonable and unrealistic to create one political structure 
for whites and coloureds. This was rebutted by Constitutional 
Development minister Chris Heunis, who said that the country had 
to evolve from a political system in which political power was 
primarily vested in the hands of one group to a system in which 
all groups would have a share in governrnent . 9 
In the early 1980s, the leading faction within the National Party 
was coming more and more to accept that coloureds, whites and 
Indians, as well as blacks living within the same geographical 
territory, would have to have a share in the decision-making 
process of the country. P . W. Botha defined party policy as being 
one of consultation and co-responsibility without sacrificing the 
principle of self-deterrnination. 10 There could not be more than 
one sovereign Parliament in one country, he said, and it was 
self-evident that control of the finances and treasury could 
ultimately only be vested in one central authority. 11 In 1981, 
Botha also said in Parliament that he did not view the coloureds 
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as being a homogenous group or a nation in the making. 12 This 
important statement can be viewed as one of the final nails in 
the coffin of the Nationalists' attempt to foster an independent 
coloured nationalism. 
These principles Treurnicht and his supporters could not accept. 
In a letter to Dr J. Grobler, chief information officer of the 
National Party, Treurnicht wrote that in terms of the 
Government's policies, there would be one mixed government in 
which coloured and Indian ministers would co-govern over himself 
and over all other whites. This was a completely unacceptable 
notion. 13 In March 1982, the long-expected split occurred when 
Treurnicht and 17 of his supporters broke away to form the 
conservative Party. One should not overstate the importance of 
the coloured question in precipitating the split. To a degree, 
the issue was used to settle a host of personal and political 
differences that had been accumulating since the late 1960s. 
Treurnicht had, in fact, considered joining the Herstigte 
Nasionale Party in 1969, but at the last moment had deserted 
it. 14 Instead he had chosen to fight dangerous tendencies in 
the party from within the party itself without resorting to 
splinterings off. 15 What is important to note is that no single 
issue so constantly bedeviled National Party unity as that of 
coloured representation and citizenship. This thesis has 
attempted to show how this issue constantly flared up during the 
period 1960-1982, particularly in the early 1960s and 1970s 
during which times perspicacious commentators noted that the 
profound differences of opinion and approach within the National 
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Party's support base could lead to a final break. Unity was 
preserved by the attempt to channel coloured aspirations into the 
machinery of the C.P.R.C., an attempt which deferred rather than 
resolved the question . By 1980, with the C.P.R.C. a costly and 
embarrassing failure, grasping the nettle could be postponed no 
longer. 
The van der Merwe Report 
The report of the constitutional sub-committee of the President's 
Council, chaired by S. W. van der Merwe, tinkered with the 
original 1977 proposals without making any substantial changes. 
In the place of the Council of Cabinets, there was to be a 
"general affairs" cabinet whose members would include the leaders 
of the three houses of a single Parliament. Parliamentary 
legislation was to be divided into Own and General Affairs, the 
Executive State President having the final say as to which was 
which. An "Own Affair" would be separately voted on, the state 
President giving his ceremonial assent to it . A "General Affair" 
would be discussed and voted on separately, and in the event of 
a deadlock between the houses, the matter would be referred to 
the President's Council whose decision would be final. The 
composition of the latter body ensured that the ruling white 
party would always get its way, and Clause 26(a) of the 1979 
Bill, which vested legislative power in the white Assembly, was 
in essence incorporated. 
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An important difference between the van der Merwe report and the 
1979 Bill was the presence of entrenched clauses regarding the 
constitution itself which required a two-thirds majority in all 
three houses to be changed and over which each house had a 
complete and final veto. Thus the white Assembly could not 
unilaterally abolish the coloured and Indian houses as had been 
the case in the 1979 Bill. The most disturbing aspects of the new 
plan centred on its conferral of sweeping powers upon the State 
President. His powers included the ability to suspend the 
constitution and rule by decree if necessary, and van der Merwe 
admitted that he could thus become a dictator. 16 
The Labour Party and the "new" Proposals 
The Labour Party had categorically rejected the 1977 
constitutional plan (see Chapter 5, pp.170-1). The 1982 plan, 
apart from a few minor modifications, hardly differed at all from 
that of 1977, and it seemed reasonable to expect that the party 
would continue to reject it. At a meeting of the South African 
Black Alliance, Labour undertook not to enter the proposed 
tricameral Parliament (December 1982) . Buthelezi, who had refused 
to have anything to do with the proposed advisory council for 
blacks, was dead against any constitution that excluded the black 
majority. Prior to the Labour Party conference in January 1983, 
an N.E.C. meeting was held where it was unanimously decided that 
the party would not enter the new system. 17 
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Had the Labour Party stuck to this decision, it is likely that 
the National Party would not have implemented its plan. When 
Heunis heard about the National Executive's stand, however, he 
arranged a meeting with its members, including Hendrickse, Curry 
and Jac Rabie. The D~puty Leader of the party, Norman Middleton, 
knew nothing about it. The long meeting was an event of decisive 
importance and testimony to the persuasive powers of the Minister 
of Constitutional Affairs. Heunis "wooed, cajoled and pleaded" 
with the Labour leaders; he "hinted, suggested and implied, but 
not once was a definite public promise extracted or a definite 
shift in Nationalist policy offered" . 18 When it was over, the 
Labour leadership had resolved upon a somersault in policy. 
Middleton realised something was amiss just before the Party's 
annual conference , contacting Hendrickse about the rumoured 
switch in policy. Hendrickse was evasive and advised him not to 
listen to idle talk. 19 The conference was held at Eshowe on 3 
January 1983, and it became clear . early on that the leadership 
had resolved to enter the proposed new system, come what may. 
Very few in the end voted to stay out. 
Middleton was furious at the decision and left the Labour Party, 
taking with him all the members of the Natal branch. The 
secretary-general of Inkatha, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, said that 
coloureds and Indians who accepted participation in the proposed 
tricameral Parliament would thereby "accept the status of 
partners in propping up white supremacy and (would) be rightly 
regarded as co-oppressors". 20 Hendrickse, according to 
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Middleton, retorted that he would not be dictated to by a 
homeland leader . 21 
Hendrickse's view was that it was better to negotiate from within 
a political system . and thereby attempt to change it than to 
remain impotent upon the sidelines. Unlike the 1977 proposals, 
with their three ethnic parliaments within the same territory, 
the single Parliamentary structure of 1983 afforded far greater 
opportunities to agitate for changes in the South African social 
and political framework. The fact that no law could be passed 
without the consent of the Labour Party meant that the latter 
could at least delay legislation by occasionally forcing the 
white House of Assembly to resort to the expedient of the 
President's Council, and no constitutional changes could be made 
without the consent of the majority party in the House of 
Representatives. This, as Hendrickse pointed out, led to P.W. 
Botha being forced to agree to the holding of an election in 1989 
after he had failed to persuade the Labour Party to agree to its 
postponement to 1992. It is also noteworthy that Hendrickse was 
impressed by Botha's willingness to split his own party in order 
to push his reformist plan, and this had some bearing on his own 
decision. 22 
David Curry called the party's decision a "calculated risk" since 
the new dispensation was too small a step away from traditional 
apartheid but nevertheless it offered scope for a party working 
within it to improve it and make it more acceptable. 23 Labour 
would use platforms like the House of Representatives to project 
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its constitutional demands and to play a mediating role between 
whites and the rest of the population. 
Jac Rabie pointed out that the House of Representatives gave its 
members more freedom of action than the C.P.R.C. had. Own-affairs 
legislation could be introduced without governmental permission 
and no longer had to be assented to by the Minister of Coloured 
Affairs. This was significant even if the party did not endorse 
the own-general affairs distinction. 24 More importantly, 
coloureds would now be in Parliament itself where they could 
argue more directly with the Government over discriminatory 
measures and where whites could hear for the first time directly 
how coloureds felt. The presence of non-whites in the cabinet for 
the first time was also of significance. 25 R.E. van der Ross 
defended the decision: "Pragmatically and politically, it was the 
only decision the Labour Party could have made. They had already 
committed themselves to working within the system. What was so 
generically different about taking part in the tricameral 
Parliament?"26 
The Constitutional Referendum 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act was passed in the 
Assembly on 31 August 1983. However, the Government remained 
uneasy, shaken by the defection of its far-right wing and decided 
to put the question to the white electorate in the form of a 
referendum. A simple YesjNo answer was required. This was 
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criticized by the leader of the Official Opposition, van Zyl 
Slabbert, on the grounds that it prevented voters from expressing 
an opinion on specific aspects of the plan, for example the 
exclusion of blacks. 
The referendum campaign , van Zyl Slabbert wrote, saw the 
Nationalist Party Information Department discover the power of 
political marketing on a grand scale. 27 In addition, the 
Nationalists largely had the support of the business community 
which believed that the new constitution was a step in the right 
direction. The manipulation of radio and television by the ruling 
party d~sguised the constitution's inadequacies and portrayed it 
as a bold and far-reaching reformist step . 
In the face of such handicaps, the effectiveness of the P.F.P.'s 
propaganda fell far short of the quality of its arguments. So 
complicated was the new constitution that for many the party's 
objections were mere sophistry, and large numbers of P . F. P. 
supporters turned against what was seen as negativism or self-
defeating radicalism. Even newspapers hitherto supportive of the 
party, such as the Sunday Times and the Financial Mail, whose 
editorials condemned the constitution as being fatally flawed , 
nevertheless urged a "Yes" vote in order that the system be given 
a chance. Van Zyl Slabbert lamented that the Nationalists had 
come up with a plan so defective and ill-conceived that, if 
implemented, would set back the process of reform for at least a 
decade. 28 When voting took place on 2 November, just under 66 
per cent of those who went to the polls voted "Yes" while it is 
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safe to assume that the majority of "No" votes came from 
supporters of the two right-wing parties . 
The Formation of the U. D.F. and the Elections 
to the New Houses 
Two extra-parliamentary groupings - the United Democratic Front 
(U. D. F.) and the National Forum (N. F . ) , were formed while the new 
proposals were being discussed . The U. D. F. was a non-racial 
organisation which by 1984 had the support of some 600 
organisations and an estimated 3 million people. Its first major 
organised protest was the "Million Signature Campaign" aga~nst 
the new constitution and a campaign to dissuade voters from 
participating in the coloured and Indian elections. The 
Government, anxious that their plans should not be wrecked , 
attempted to suppress the movement through raids, bannings and 
detentions, but it continued to be the largest unified, non-
racial opposition to the Government since the Congress Alliance 
of 1955. 29 
The coloured and Indian elections were held in August 1984 and 
were disastrous from the Government's point of view. Instead of 
peop l e peacefully going to the polls to endorse the much-vaunted 
"reform" measure, boycotts, intimidation and violence were the 
order of the day. It was a one-horse race as far as the coloured 
election went. The Freedom Party was on its last legs as a 
political force. After 1980, a number of its members, including 
I 
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Louis Hollander and Phillip sanders, joined Labour and many of 
its veteran stalwarts, like s.s. Cloete and H.J. Coverdale from 
the u.c.c.A. days, retired from politics. What was left split at 
the beginning of 1984, a dissident faction forming the Reformed 
Freedom Party. The third party attempting to wrest the fruits of 
off ice from Labour was the People's Congress Party, formed 
towards the end of 1980 by dissident Labourites including Lofty 
Adams, Sonny Leon and Peter Marais (a Cape Flats civic leader). 
As expected, Labour almost swept the board, winning a massive 76 
of the 80 seats contested. Veterans of the C.P.R.C. elected were 
Allan Hendrickse, David Curry, Fred Peters, Peter Mopp, carter 
Ebrahim, Louis Hollander, Jac Rabie and Solly Essop. M.D. 
Arendse, who had the dubious distinction of winning the Tafelberg 
seat by three votes in a 2,2 per cent poll, was also re-elected. 
Later it was found that he had bribed a number of voters and he 
was fined and unseated. Zakeera Hussein replaced him as the sole 
Freedom Party representative. One People's Congress Party member 
was elected and two independents. 30 The Labour Party gained a 
total of 200 355 votes in the election. The Peoples' Congress 
Party came a poor second with 31 701, the Freedom Party a feeble 
third with 13 505 and the Reformed Freedom Party a wretched 
fourth (2 632). The remaining 19 204 votes were cast for 
independent candidates. 
The real issue in the election had been whether or not to vote at 
all. The percentage poll as well as the actual number of votes 
cast in 1984 was considerably lower than in the 1969 and 1975 
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elections. Whereas the percentage of registered voters who went 
to the polls in 1969 had been 49,1, in 1984 it was 30,9, this 
despite the fact that the House of Representatives was a 
considerably upgraded version of the old C.P.R.C. More revealing 
are the number of potential, as opposed to registered voters who 
cast their ballots, this declining from 35,7 per cent in 1969 to 
25,3 per cent in 1975 and a mere 17,6 per cent in 1984. 31 This 
last figure is roughly the percentage of voters who supported the 
pro-separate development parties in 1969 and showed how the 
Labour Party had replaced the old Federal, Republican and 
National Peoples' Parties as the instrument of moderate and 
conservative coloured opinion. 
The percentage poll for the Indian House of Delegates was even 
lower, 20,29 per cent of registered and 16,2 per cent of 
potential voters braving intimid,ation and ostracism to vote. 
However, there was an increase in the percentage of votes cast in 
1984 over those cast in 1981 for the South African Indian Council 
(20,29 per cent of registered voters as opposed to 13,4 per cent 
in 1981). The National Peoples' Party of Amichand Rajbansi became 
the ruling party in the House of Delegates when it narrowly edged 
out Dr J.N. Reddy's Solidarity grouping by 18 seats to 17. Both 
Hendrickse and Rajbansi were given places in the state 
President's cabinet as ministers without portfolio. 
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1956-1984 - Assessment and Conclusion 
The shock decision of the Labour Party to enter the tricameral 
parliament makes the 1956-1984 period, one in which the politics 
of co-option replaced common roll representation for the coloured 
people, very difficult to assess. Indeed, the very title of this 
thesis, the failure of the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council and its constitutional repercussions, becomes open to 
criticism. Did the C.P.R.C. actually fail? The Labour Party 
constantly voiced its intention of destroying what it saw as a 
powerless substitute for direct Parliamentary representation, and 
to its credit this goal was achieved. Yet in the end, the party 
settled for the House of Representatives, no more than an 
extension of the system they had so vociferously opposed. 
The House of Representatives was an upgraded version of the 
C.P.R. C. It was a 
administrative powers 
legislation affecting 
fully elective body, 
and had more leeway in 
coloureds only. It 
had extended 
the passing of 
could not be 
unilaterally abolished by the white Parliament, had a limited 
input at cabinet level and had to be consulted if the 
constitution was to be changed or abolished. For all that, it was 
still a powerless institution, in effect an auxiliary parliament 
with persuasive powers at best. Furthermore, the power to 
legislate on coloured "own affairs", commentators remarked, 
served to validate an elaborate institutional superstructure 
which allowed for continued control by the dominant group, and 
that since there were few matters of importance to whites, 
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coloureds and Indians exclusively, the concept was retained as a 
constitutional fiction only. 32 Moreover, the lirni ted 
improvements to the political position of the coloured people 
were gained at the price of entrenching in the Parliament for the 
first time the status of the coloured people as a separate racial 
law-making community. 
It has been shown at the end of Chapter Six how the Labour Party 
could claim much of the credit for the failure of the C.P.R.C., 
a fact which justified its decision in the 1960s to take part in 
the Council's proceedings. In 1983, however, the Party no longer 
had the excuse that the Government would make use of pro-
apartheid coloured groups to justify its policies if it did not 
participate. In the 1960s, Labour decided to participate on the 
C.P.R.C. in order to destroy it. In 1983, its decision to 
participate in the tricarneral Parliament actually ensured that 
the institution carne into existence. If anything, it was an 
enormous victory for the politics of co-optation, comparable to 
Kaiser Matanzirna' s acceptance of "independent" status for the 
Transkei in 1976. No matter how much Hendrickse et al pledged 
that their entering was a starting, not an end point, it could 
not disguise the fact that the National Party policy of setting 
up separate, impotent representative institutions for the 
coloured people had attained its most sophisticated form yet. 
There was certainly more behind the Labour Party's decision to 
take part in the tricarneral Parliament than the reasons given by 
its leaders. Without a platform, the party could not have 
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continued to exist since it had come into being and been 
sustained by its activities within state structures. By 1983, 
after three years in the political wilderness following the 
dissolution of the C.P.R. C., it had been recognised that the 
politics of boycott_ had reached their effective limit. 33 Nor 
can factors like prestige or financial self-interest on the part 
of at least a section of the party be excluded . The ordinary 
coloured M.P. would receive R40 000 a year, a luxury home, a 
chauffeur-driven car and numerous other perks. 34 Even allowing 
for factors like inflation, this was a vast improvement on what 
C.P.R.C. members had received in 1969 (see Chapter 2, p.51). 
For all this, the verdict of the extra-parliamentary 
organisations and many commentators that the Labour Party was 
selling out, based entirely on the Eshowe decision, was premature 
and unfair. The party had already proved that Government 
platforms could be effectively utilised to oppose apartheid 
policies, and judgement should have been reserved until the 
tricameral Parliament had been operating for at least a year so 
that the Labour M. P.'s would have had a chance to demonstrate how 
they had put their aims into practice . The quick, and at times 
virulent, repudiation of the party that in fact occurred, was an 
indication of how much the political temperature had risen in 
South Africa, particularly since 1976. An increasingly literate 
and wealthy elite had risen in the coloured community which 
rejected establishment parties as being opportunistic and 
unsophisticated. If anything, their response to the new 
constitutional dispensation and Labour's part in it, showed how 
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out of touch both the Government and Labour Party were with the 
militant new mood of the coloured population. P.W. Botha and 
Hendrickse now discovered that yesterday's radicals did not make 
contemporary heroes. 35 
How then is the Labour Party to be judged for its dangerous and 
highly controversial decision? Norman Middleton is of the opinion 
that it is not the original Labour Party at all, that its 
adherents are now mostly former Federal Party supporters and that 
it should change its name. 36 The former leader of the Freedom 
Party, Dr W.J. Bergins, agrees with this view, saying that Labour 
is now walking the same road as the Federal Party walked in 
1969. 37 Professor van der Ross, always pragmatic, points out 
that the process of co-opting people into your system need not be 
one of plain sailing. In other words, co-optation is not 
necessarily the same as co-oper~tion. 38 Only when the 
tricameral Parliament is abolished, can the decision to enter and 
the subsequent performance of the Labour Party be fairly and 
accurately assessed. And much of the verdict will depend on the 
direction the country takes as it enters into the final decade of 
the Twentieth Century with its future and well-being very much in 
the balance. 
And what of the coloured people, that down-trodden, humiliated, 
belittled, ignored and manipulated minority, squeezed between 
rival nationalisms and denied their role in the destiny of the 
country to which they have shown so much loyalty? In the last 100 
years, they have shown a dedication to democratic principles and 
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concern for the well-being of all South Africans under the most 
trying conditions. Those amongst them who have yielded to 
opportunism and group chauvinism have always been a minority, 
despite the intransigence and frequent deceitfulness of ruling 
white governments. It is to be hoped that the great apartheidean 
lie of the existence of a separate "Coloured race" will be broken 
down and that the people currently classified as such will take 
their rightful places as full citizens in the land of their 
birth. 
1 . R . R . S . , 19 8 0 , pp . 4-7 . 
2 • Goldin I, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of 
Coloured Identity in the Western Cape ( Longrnans 19 8 7), 
p.180. 
3. Ibid., pp.186-7. 
4. See Rhoodie E, P.W. Botha- the Last Betrayal and The Real 
Information Scandal. 
5. Wiehahn N E, Wiechers M, van Vuuren D J, Rhoodie N J (Eds), 
S.A.- Challenge of Reform (Owe n Burgess 1988), pp.150-152. 
6. R.D.M. , 12 November 1977 . 
7. Dornrnisse A, Ries A, Broedertwis (Tafe1berg 1982), p.74. 
8. Ibid., p.95. 
9. Ibid. p. 10 3. 
10. H.A.D., 19 April 1979, Vol 80, Col 4455. 
11. Broedertwis, p.114. 
12. Goldin, p.184. 
13 . Broedertwis, p.110. 
14 . Ibid., p.62. 
15 . Hoofstad, 10 October 1969. 
242 
16. Report of the Van der Merwe Committee, November 1982, 
Sections 10.47.2-10.48.10. 
17. Interview No 3, Norman Middleton, 18 December 1989. 
18. Slabbert F van Zyl, The Last White Parliament (Tafelberg 
1987), pp.109-110. 
19. Middleton Interview. 
20. Van der Ross R E, The Rise and Decline of Apartheid - A 
Study of Polit ical Movements among the Coloured People of 
South Africa 1880-1985 (Tafelberg 1986), pp.352-3. 
21. Middleton Interview. 
22. Coetzer P , Awaiting Trial - Allen Hendrickse (Librarius 
1984) , p.157. 
23. Du Pisani J A (Ed), Divided or United Power- Views on the 
New Constitutional Dispensation by Prominent South African 
Political Leaders (lex patria 1986), p.114 ; Sunday Times , 
23 January 1983 . 
24. Ibid., p.125. 
25. Ibid., p.126. 
26. Interview No 2, Van der Ross, 27 October 1989. 
27. Slabbert, p.112. 
28. Saunders C (Ed), Illustrated History of South Africa- The 
Real Story (Readers Digest 1988) , p.469. 
29. Ibid. p.472. 
30. Van Vuuren D J, Wiehahn N E, Lombard J E, Rhoodie N J 
(Eds) , South Africa- A Plural Society in Transition (Owen 
Burgess 1985), p.7. 
31. Vander Ross, Rise and Decline, pp.356-7 . 
32. Van Vuuren D J, Wiehahn N E, Rhoodie N J, Wiechers M (Eds), 
South Africa : The Challenge of Reform, pp.150-152. 
3 3. Pottinger B, The Imperial Presidency - P . W. Botha, the 
First Ten Years (Southern Book Publishers 1988), p.158. 
34. Ibid.; Goldin I, Making Race, p.220. 
35. Pottinger, pp.157-8. 
36. Interview No 3, Norman Middleton, 18 December 1989. 
37. Interview No 1, W.J. Bergins, 21 October 1989. 
38. Interview No 2 , van der Ross, 27 October 1989. 
(Based on Table of Results found in Tom Swartz Papers) 
APPENDIX 1 
The First C.P.R.C. Elections 1969 = Successful Party) 
---
Cape Province: RP NP CP IND. % Vote Candidate Maier: 
Adendorp ....... . 
Bergrivier ..... . 
Bethelsdorp .... . 
Bokkeveld ...... . 
Bonteheuwel . . .. . 
Breerivier ..... . 
Diamant ........ . 
Elsiesrivier ... . 
1533 
Gelvendale ..... . 
Genadendal .. . .. . 
Haarlem ........ . 
Heideveld ...... . 
2976 
Kalahari .. ..... . 
Karee •... . ...... 
Kasselsvlei ..... 
Liesbeek ...•.... 
Mamre .......... . 
Eastern Cape ... . 
outeniqua ...... . 
Pniel . ......... . 
Rietvlei ....... . 
Steinkopf .... .. . 
Strandfontein .. . 
South Cape ..... . 
Swartberg ...... . 
Tafelberg • ..... . 
Visrivier ... .•.. 
Wuppertal .....•. 
Total ..•........ 
Natal: 
Natal Interior .. 
Greenwood Park .. 
Wentworth . . .... . 
Tot a 1 .... . .... . . 
1946 4828 
5611 1921 
8207 ~334 
1538 2059 
2830 1640 
5494 1994 
6326 2990 
3435 1902 
7870 3023 
3691 3291 
4591 
3928 952 
;>400 3299 
Unop 
5632 
2388 
4187 
6281 
6766 
7921 
4760 
3855 
2557 
2303 
4147 
4134 
3402 
1163 
1677 
437 
1168 
4719 
3735 
2340 
220 
8089 
1566 
981 
5101 
1076 
2805 
6723 
4537 
3687 747 
844 
471 2317 
1115 
303 
1979 
491 
4951 2049 
401 
1753 264 
807 
1754 
513 
2382 
1029 2088 
437 
2322 416 
1992 415 
2306 
461 
437 
240 3030 
195 
156 
357 
589 
123 
981 
1449 
55 
39 
77 
54.1 
20.2 
45 
57 
25. 1 
74.6 
48.7 
62.6 
24.5 
48.3 
48.8 
12.2 
42 
73.1 
63 
54.4 
38.5 
68.4 
19.2 
18.4 
60.9 
26.3 
51 
53.2 
115772 74961 30241 11959 2435 10183 
2672 1230 
3802 66 
3260 920 
9734 2216 
326 
291 
164 
781 
75 
61.6 
75 
s Smith 
R ArE'ndse 
HJ Hendrickse 
S Essop 
WJ Meyer 
GJ Fortuin 
LS Leon 
V Sass 
GI Julies 
P Meyer 
SM Brown 
FE Peters 
FW Theron 
LW Hollander 
W Johanne s 
A Stanley 
J Oosthuisen 
JE Nash 
N Potts 
D Curry 
JD Petersen 
ss Cloete 
EF Jones 
MT Fakier 
G du Preez 
MD Arendse 
JL Seegers 
PJ Pietersen 
ED Dunn 
EG Rooks 
N Middleton 
) range Free State: 
ll'orth Free State 
f ree State Central 
r'ree State South 
rotal .......... . 
r ransvaal: 
~ewclare ....... . 
~orthern Transvaal 
Protea . . •.... . .. 
Reigerpark ..... . 
Rus-Ter-Vaal ... . 
N'itwatersrand .. . 
r otal .......... . 
:;rand Total: 
Unop 
377 2052 
Unop 
377 2052 
2553 '527 
1613 2623 
1210 2135 
1165 2418 
2090 2011 
2331 1102 
10962 10826 -
2164 
644 
1943 
2235 
1583 
2732 
11301 
136845 90055 30241 23260 
75.7 
349 70 
74 
875 67.3 
81 
78.5 
66 
1224 
3216 11407 
A Jacobs 
W Plaaitjies 
PT Sanders 
L du Preez 
HJ Coverdale 
WJ Louw 
JA Rabie 
E Domingo 
WJ Swartz 
(L.P. = Labour Party; F . P. = Federal Party; R.P. =Republican; N.P. = Natio1 
People's; C.P. =Conservative; Indep. = Independent) 
APPENDIX II: Constitution of the Labour Party 
·The Labour Party of South Africa 
CONSTITUTION 
As amended at the 6th Annual Conference of the Party held from 6th 
to 8th April 1972 at East London. 
Preamble to Constitution 
Whereas the Labour Party of South Africa is a political party in the 
Republic of South Africa, unaffiliated to any other political party, 
and whereas the Labour Party is dedicated: 
(i) To pr{)moting and advancing the dignity, rights, socio-
economic and cultural well-being of all South Africans, 
through responsible negotiation with the Government of the 
day. 
(ii) To furthering the economic, social, cultufal advancement of all 
South Africans, and to assist wherever possible in -stimulating 
and developing their capacities in the widest manner possible. 
(iii) To vigorously opposing Communism in all its forms, believing 
that the fundamental method of defeating Communistic 
influence is the positive maintenance of a free democracy and 
totally rejecting all forms of political totalitarianism as immoral 
in theory, predoomed in practice. 
(iv) To opposing all forms of racial discrimination which under-
mine the civi_l liberty and social jus~ice of the individual. 
(v) To the belief that the right of the individual is paramount and 
the State exists to serve the individual. 
(vi) To support the rule of just law. 
(vii) To opposing forced labour and the exploitation of cheap 
labour. 
(viii) To working tirelessly towards a national economy based on the 
full production, full employment and equal opportunity for all 
people in the Republic. 
(ix) To seeking the introduction, maintenance and extension of 1 
social security for all, with special provision for the aged and 
infirm, regardless of income status. 
(x) To advocate a free national educational system devised to 
enable all able students of all races equal opportunity of 
receiving the highest specialised training. 
Now therefore, the Labour Party of South Africa, adopts as its 
Constitution the following:-
1. Name qf Party 
The name of the party shall be the LABOUR PARTY OF SOUTH 
AFRICA. 
2. Objects oft he Party 
(a) To organise and maintain a political party in South Africa, 
(b) To raise the status_ of all workers in the country by working for 
the provision of: 
(i) minimum basic wages at a civilised level; 
(ii) working conditions at accepted civilised standards; 
(iii) equal pensions, sick benefits, etc.; 
(iv) equal and compulsory education for all according to age 
aptitude and ability; 
(v) housing at economic standards with home ownership; 
(vi) equal opportunity for all people in all spheres of life in 
accordance with their ability. 
(c) To strive for the effective participation of all people in the 
government- of the country, by participation in the councils of 
the nation, in particular by ensuring that all persons attaining 
prescribed qualifications shall vote for, and be eligible for 
membership of Parliament, Provincial Councils, Municipal 
Councils and the instruments of Central and Local 
Government. 
(d) To work for the elimination of the Colour Bar in legislation as 
well as the practical application thereof. 
(e) To develop a political arrangement in the country, such, that all 
sections of the population are treated fairly and justly, so that 
the rights of all groups are protected; and in particular to ensure 
that all those qualifying for membership of the Party shall not 
be disqualified from full citizenship or from politics as in (c) 
above by reason of race, colour or religion. 
(f) Generally, to promote the political, social and economic 
emancipation of the people and more particularly of those who 
depend directly upon their own exertions by hand or by brain 
for their means of life. 
(g) To promote the above aims by such methods as the Party shall 
from time to time decide, provided that only such methods may 
be employed as are Constitutional and legal by South African 
Law. 
3. Languages 
The official languages of the Party shall be English and Afrikaans. 
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4. Colours, Symbols and Motto 
(a) The Colours of the Party shall be Gold, White and Brown. 
(b) The symbol of the Party shall be: a gold colour anchor imposed 
on a white and brown shaped diamond, the colours running 
diagonally. 
(c) The motto of the Party shall be: 'Steadfast/ Standvastig.' 
5. Head Office 
The Head Office pf the Party shall be situated in Cape Town. 
6. M ernbership 
(a) It is the intention of the Party in the first instance to consolidate 
the position of all oppressed South Africans. It shall, however, 
due to legal restrictions, confine its membership to the group 
allowed by law, provided that nothing shall prevent this latter 
restriction being reviewed as conditions in the country change. 
(b) Subject to Section (a) of this Clause, membership shall be open 
to persons, male and female, who have attained the age of 18 
years, and who are prepared to accept the Constitution of the 
Party. 
(c) Party membership shall be individual only. 
(d) No one shall be admitted to the membership ofthe Party who is 
a member of any other political party. . 
(e) Applicants for membership snall complete an official 
application form which shall be submitted to the National 
Secretary, and shall be accompanied in ·each case by 60% (15c) 
of the entrance fee prescribed in Section ll(d) of this 
Constitution. 
(f) .:;) Every member shall be provided with a membership card on 
payment of entrance fee. 
(g) The National Executive Committee reserves the right at all 
times to grant or refuse application for membership and expel 
any member from the Party. Reason for such expulsion shall be 
furnished on request by Regions or Branches concerned. 
(h) Regions or Branches shall submit to the National Executive 
Committee recommendations in writing, the reason for recom-
mending such expulsion. The right to appeal is vested in the 
member so affected; such appeal shall be considered by the 
National Executive Committee. 
(i) Any member who has resigned or been expelled from the Party 
and who seeks re-admission shall make application through the 
Region where he/ she resides to the National Executive Com-
mittee. Should such person· be accepted by the National. 
Executive Committee he/ she shall not hold any official 
posit~on in the Party organisation for at least twelve (12) 
months after re-admission. 
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7. Finance (Head Office) 
(a) Branches shall pay to Head Office each month 25% of monies 
received from members of the Branch or a minimum of R4,00 
per month whichever is the greater for Head Office expenses. 
(b) The Party may raise and maintain funds to invest or distribute 
same as the occasion may arise for the purpose of furthering or 
benefitting the work, aims and objects of the Labour Party of 
South Africa, an9 generally to do all things necessary towards 
that end. 
(c) All ·monies collected by the Treasurer on behalf of the Party 
shall be deposited in the Bank, decided upon by the Officers of 
the Party, within seven (7) days of receipt thereof. An audited 
Balance Sheet and Statement of Income and Expenditure shall 
be prepared at the end of each Financial Year and shall be made 
available to members of the National Executive Committee. 
(d) The National Executive shall have the power to frame 
regulations prescribing the procedure to be adopted by any or 
all formations of the Party in regard to finance. 
(e) The National Treasurer shall present a Financial Report at 
every meeting of the National Executive Committee and at 
Annual Conference. 
(f) Branches and Regions shall forward to Head Office copies of 
their Balance Sheets a month before the Annual Conference of 
the Party. · 
8. National Executive Committee 
When Conference is not in session, the supreme governing body of 
the Party shall be the National Executive Committee, comprising of:-
( a) The Leader of the Party. 
The Deputy Leader of the Party. 
National Chairman. 
National Vice-Chairman. 
National Secretary. 
National Assistant Secretary. 
National Treasurer. 
National Trustee. 
Four (4) members representing each Region. 
Two (2) members elected by the Labour Youth Organisation. 
Conveners of National Committees appointed by the National· 
Executive Committee. 
CPRC Par!\' Members 
(b) The Leader of the Party - Deputy Leader of the Party -
National Chairman - National Vice-Chairman - National 
Assistant Secretary - National Treasurer and the National 
Trustee shall be elected by the Annual Conference. 
114 
(c) The National Executive Committee shall not have powers to 
co-opt. It may appoint any other officials and staff, whether 
paid or honorary. It may create committees as it deems 
desirable. 
(d) The National Executive Committee shall meet at least four 
times a year at a place to be decided by the National Chairman. 
(e) The quorum for such meetings shall be one-third of the 
National Executive Committee members. 
(f) The Leader of the Party and the Deputy Leader shall be 
charged with the duty of guiding Party policy and defending it 
in terms of the decision of Party Conference. They make public 
statements on Party policy, provided that, where no relevant 
Conference exists, such statements be referred back to the 
Party Conference for consideration at its first meeting there-
after. 
The Leader of the Party shall also be leader of the Party in the 
C.P.R. C. 
(g) The National Chairman shall preside at Conference and at all 
meetings of the National Executive Committee. He shall be ex-
officio on all committees which may be established by the 
National Executive Committee. 
(h) All officials of the Party shall ... have the right to attend all 
Regional and Branch meetings. 
(i) The National Executive Committee shall have the right to 
depute one or more of its members to investigate the affairs of 
any Region and/ or Branch at any time without assigning a 
reason therefore, and such member or members shall have 
access to all records of the Region and / or Branch and have 
power to take these into custody and te·rminate their banking 
account Is. 
9. Party Conference 
(a) The Party Conference shall be supreme authority and 
policy-making body of the Party. 
(b) The Leader of the Party in consultation with the National 
Executive Committee may convene a special session of Party 
Conference. 
(c) The Party Conference shall have power to take decisions by 
a majority vote and all such decisions shall be binding on the 
Party. 
(d) Party members of the C.P.R.C. shall attend Conference in 
their personal capacities. 
{e) Members of Branches in ·each area, voting by ballot, shall 
elect delegates to the Annual Conference of the Party. · 
Branches with less than 20 bona-fide members - one delegate. 
Branches with 21 to 49 bona-fide members - two delegates. 
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Branches with more than 50 bona-fide members - four delegates. 
Branches may include observers with their delegates but they shall 
not vote nor be rrc~ent when Conference is 'in Committee'. 
(f) Branches shall be responsible for accommodation and 
travelling expenses of their delegates and a subsistence 
allowance of not more than R2,00 per day. 
(g) All branches shall be given at least three months notice of the 
date and venue ·of the Party Conference. 
(h) Resolutions and any proposed alterations, amendments or 
additions to the Party Constitution shall be forwarded to 
Head Office at least sixty (60) days before Annual 
Conference. 
(i) Branches and C. P. R.C. Party members who have not ful-
filled their financial obligations to the Party shall not be 
entitled to vote at Conference. 
I 0. Regional Organ isar ion 
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(a) The Regional Divisions of the Party shall comprise of the 
following: 
(i) Cape Peninsula: 
Constituencies of -
Bonteheuwel, Kasselsvlei, Liesbeek, Rietvlei, Elsies 
River, Heideveld, South Cape, Strandfontein and 
Tafel berg. 
(ii) Weslet;n Cape: 
Branches in the Magisterial District of -
Vredenburg, Piketberg, Tulbagh, Malmesbury. Hope-
field, Wellington, Caledon, Paarl, Stellenbosch. Ceres. 
Somerset West, Montagu, Bredasdorp. Swellendam. 
Robertson, Worcester. Laingsburg, Sutherland. 
(iii) Karoo , 
Branches in the Magisterial District of -
Williston. Carnarvon, Richmond. Fraserburg. 
Victoria West, Aberdeen, Murraysburg. George. 
Beaufort West, Prince Albert, Ladysmith. Heidelberg. 
Riversdale, Mossel Bay. Calitzburg and Outdtshoorn. 
(iv) Griqualand West and 0. F.S. 
Branches in the Magistrial D-istricts of -· 
Taung, Warrenton. Prieska, Barkley West. De Aar. 
Hay, Kimberley, Herbert, Hopetown, Britstown and 
H artswater. 
(v) Gordonia: 
Branches in the Magisterial Districts of -
Kenhartdt, Upington. Gordonia, Postmasburg, Kuru-
man. Yryburg and Mafeking. 
(vi) Namaqualand: 
Branches in the Magisterial Districts of -
Springbok, Calvinia, Vanrhynsdorp, Yredendal and 
Clan william. 
(vii) Eastern Province: 
Branches in the Magisterial Districts of -
Hanover, Graaff-Reinet, Willowmore, Knysna, 
U ni,ondale, H umansdorp, Hankey, Ui tenhage, Port 
Elizabeth, Steytlerville, Jansenville, Albany, 
Alexandria, Bathurst, Adelaide, Maraisburg, 
Cradock, Steynburg, Vcnterstad, Colesberg, Nou-
poort. 
(viii) Border 
All Branches in the Magisterial Districts of -
Albert, Molteno, Tarkastad, Elliot, Lady Grey, Port 
Beaufort, Herschel, Barkley East, Indwe, Wodehouse, 
Glen Grey, Sterkstroom, Queenstown, Cathcart, 
Komga, Peddie, Stutterheim, East London, King-
williamstown, Middeldrif, Maclear, Victoria West, 
Keiskammahoek, M t. Fletcher and the Transkei area. 
(ix) Transvaal. 
(x) Natal. 
(b) The Regional Annual Conference shall be convened 
annually and shall comprise of: 
(i) Members of the National Executive Committee; 
(ii) All Party members of the C.P.R.C. whose Con-
stituency falls within the Region concerned; 
(iii) All members of the Party in the Region concerned. 
(c) (i) Each Region shall determine its own Constitution 
which shall not be in conflict with the N a tiona! Con-
stitution. 
(ii) Such Constitutions and amendments and/ or alter-
ations thereto to be approved by the National 
Executive Committee. 
-(d) Regional Conference shall have power to take decisions by a 
majority vote in all matters regarding Party organisation, 
finance and discipline in the Region concerned, such matters 
binding on all Party members in that Region. 
I I. Branches 
(a) A Branch may be established in any area provided that there 
are not less than 10 (ten) persons aged 18 years present. 
(b) At the inaugural branch meeting the following officials shall 
be elected: 
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Trustee 
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and at least three (3) members to the branch executive. 
(i) The branch secretary shall immediately after the in-
augural meeting advise both the National Secretary of 
the date the branch has been established, including the 
names and addresses of officials elected and the total 
number of members. This shall be accompanied by an 
amount of no less than R4,00 to Head Office. 
(c) Branch officials may only be elected at an Annual General 
Meeting. Should any vacancy occur before that time they 
may only elect an official in ari acting capacity. 
(d) An entrance fee of 25c shall be paid on acceptance of mem-
bership and thereafter a minimum monthly fee of JOe or 
R I ,00 per annum, payable on the first month after en-
rolment. They (the members) shall be encouraged to make 
donations towards their branch or Head Office of the Party. 
(e) Branches shall submit a quarterly report to their Region, 
who in turn shall submit a quarterly report to Head Office. 
(f) Branch Executive Committee meetings shall be held at least 
once every month and Branch General meetings at least once 
every three months. 
(g) All bona-fide members shall be in possession of an official 
membership card. 
(h) Constituencies Comm ittees: 
These shall consist ,9f representatives from all branches 
within a particular Constituency as delimited for the 
particular election concerned. They shall be especially con-
cerned with these elections, the registration of voters and the 
actual conduct of the elections. They shall have an important 
voice in the selection of the candidates. 
(i) Branches may establish committees who could deal with 
fund-raising, propaganda, etc. 
U) Branches may do anything that is in the interest of the Party, 
provided that all their actions are Constitutional and legal by 
South African Law. 
(k) Should branch finances be R l 0,00 and over, this money shall 
be deposited in a registered savings bank under the name of 
the Labour Party of South Africa, and stating the name of 
the Party Branch. All monies to be deposited in the bank 
within seven (7) days of receipt thereof. 
(1) Copies of minutes of the Annual General Meeting shall be 
submitted to both the National Secretary and Regional 
Secretary wherein that branch is si tuated. 
12. Pany Caucus 
11 8 
(a) All Party C. P. R .C. members shall be members of the Party 
Caucus. 
' PENDIX III: Constitution of the Federal Co.loured People' a Party 
Federal Coloured People's Party: Constitution 
SECTION 1: PRINCIPLES, POLICY, MEMBERSHIP, ETC. 
I. The name of the Party is, THE FEDERAL COLOURED 
PEOPLE'S PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA and its motto is: 
For the Coloured People, from the Coloured People. 
PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES 
2. The Party is founded on the following principles:-
(a) On Divine Principles - The Coloured People as a God 
fearing people accept .the Almighty God as the supreme 
authority in all their activities. 
(b) On the principles of positive equal development. 
(c) It undertakes to promote the welfare of the Coloured 
People of South Africa and to improve and protect their 
political rights. For this reason it wishes to promote pride 
of identity .and independence amongst the Coloured 
People, with due regard to the loyalty and devotion they 
owe to South Africa and its interests. 
3. The Party strives to achieve the above-mentioned principles by: 
(a) Promoting the interests of the Coloured People in the 
Spiritual, Social, Educational, Cultural and Economic 
fields. 
(b) By leading them into a new era of mature and full fledged 
citizenship, and in their evolution, to forge a new 
foundation of vertical equal development in our national 
community. 
(c) By cultivating and stimulating responsible leadership and 
inspiring o.ur youth to a sense of purity and good. 
4. The Party wishes to develop and promote a spirit of co-
operati_on with any other recognised race group based on 
similar principles on condition that they too -recognise and 
accept the aims of the Party. 
5. The policy of the Party is to promote the official languages of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
LABOUR POLICY 
6. (a) The Party envisages in general, with regard to the worker 
• 
and employer and aiso that of the worker and the state, to 
Renamed the 'Freedom Party' at the National Congress of the Party. 6 .January 
197!\. 
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watch that a sound and balanced good relationship is 
maintained. In order to uplift the status of the worker and 
to promote a satisfied and happy labour force the Party 
will strive to secure a proper standard of living for the 
worker. 
(b) The Party will also strive to: 
(i) Instill in the worker a sense of belonging and promote 
mutual understanding and co-operation between the 
worker and his employer. 
(ii) Equalize wages and salaries and working conditions 
and afford every Coloured person the opportunity of 
being satisfactorily and happily and securely 
employed. 
(iii) Retain the traditional employment avenues of the 
Coloured. People and protect them in proclaimed 
Coloured areas against being crowded out by other 
racial groups. 
7. GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
The Party envisages the protection of the Coloured People 
against infiltration by other races in their business areas and 
that business licences and other opportunities in every aspect be 
their exclusive right. That thorough investigations be made in 
Coloured at"eas to prevent the acquisition by proxy or otherwise 
licences and fixed property by other racial groups. 
8. GENERAL 
The Party considers it the duty of the Government to provide 
education based on sound principles for every Coloured child 
with due regard to aptitude and ability. The Party subscribes to 
this policy and will do everything in its power to promote 
education. · 
9. The Party envisages the pt"omotion of a broad and purposeful 
welfare policy for the Coloured People. 
10. The Party accepts the principles that our Coloured Corps 
should also protect the boundaries of the R.S.A. 
MEMBERSHIP 
ll. (a) Aii Coioured men and women can become members of the 
Party subject to the following conditions. On joining the 
Party all prospective members will be regarded as having 
made the following declaratiO'n: 
2RO 
(i) l hereby do solemnly and truthfully declare that I 
accept the supreme authority a·nd guidance of God in 
the destinies of countries and their people. That I will 
loyally uphold and carry out the said principles of the 
Federal Coloured People's Party to the best of my 
ability. That I further of my own free will wish to bind 
myself to undivided loyalty to the Party and the 
fulfilment of my obligations as a member of the Party 
in terms of the constitution. 
(ii) That I submit myself to the authority and discipline of 
the Federal Coloured People's Party in terms of the 
constitution and that I am not a member of any other 
political party. or organisation with a political basis. 
(b) Prospective members must have reached the age of 
eighteen ( 18) and must make written application for 
membership. 
After payment of membership fees, a membership card 
must be issued. 
(c) Application for membership is only admissible if done on 
the prescribed membership application form of the Branch 
Executive. A Branch Executive may without giving reason 
refuse membership to any person. Should this occur such a 
prospective member may lodge an appeal to the Provincial 
Executive. 
(d) No person may become a member of any Branch, other 
than the one within whose boundaries he lives though 
permission to do so may be given by the Provincial 
Executive in exceptional cases. 
TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP 
12. A member ceases to be a member of the Federal Coloured 
People's Party when: 
(a) He/ she submits his resignation in writing. 
(b) Is suspended from the Party. 
(c) A member may be suspended by the Branch Executive 
which has jurisdiction over him without disclosure of 
reasons; pending an appeal to the Provincial Executive. 
Such an appeal must be lodged with the Provincial 
Executive within 14 days. 
(i) A member who in absentia has been sus.pended must 
immediately be informed thereof. 
(ii) Until his appeal is heard he remains a suspended 
member. 
RE-Ilv'STATEldENT OF ft1ElvfBERSH!P 
13. Should a suspended member wish to be re-instated he may do 
su by applying to the Branch Executive who in turn, after 
consultation may recommend the re-instatement of such a 
member to the Provincial Executive. The final decision rests 
with the latter. 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
14. (a) Any proposed amendments to the constitution must reach 
the secretary 21 days before the National Congress where 
they are to be discussed. 
{b) Amendments to the constitution may be presented only by 
the Provincial Councils. 
DISSOLUTION 
15. Should the need arise to dissolve the Party it can only be done 
by the National Supreme Council. Any funds which the Party 
may then possess will then be used at the discretion of the 
National Executive. 
SECTION 2: PARTY STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Terminology: Officers and Bodies. 
I. National Leader 
2. National Supreme Council 
3. Nationa-l Executive 
4. Provincial Leaders 
5. Provincial Councils 
6. Provincial Executives 
7. Constituency Councils 
8. Constituency Executives 
9. Branches with their Executives 
1 A. National Congress 
2A. National Caucus (Advisory) 
3A. Administrative Head Office 
4A. Provincial Congresses 
SA. Provincial Caucus (Advisory) 
6A. Provincial Adm. offic-es 
l. NATIONAL LEADER 
.(a) The National Leader is elected annually during the session 
of the Congress by a Voting College composed of: The 
members of the National Supreme Council, the members 
of. the Caucus and all the chairmen of the Constituencies 
who are present at the Congress. 
(b) The Leader is chairman of the National Congress, the 
National Supreme Council and the National Executive. 
lA. NATIONAL CONGRESS 
(a) The National Congress \V ill be composed oftwoaccrcditcd 
2~2 
members from every registered branch and will meet once a 
year. 
(b) The National Congress revises or amends the Federal 
Party Constitution. 
(c) Receives progress and financial reports tendered by the 
National Executive and Provincial Leaders. 
(d) Forwards matters concerning legislation or resolutions, to 
be placed before the Coloured People's Representative 
Council, to the National Caucus via the National Supreme 
Council. 
(e) Receives the investment and disbursement reports of Party 
funds as reported by the National Executive. 
2. NATIONAL SUPREME COUNCIL 
(a) To consist of23 members: 9 Cape; 6 Transvaal; 4 Natal and 
4 Free State. The Na tiona! Leader of the Party serves as 
chairman of the Supreme Council. Each province to elect 
its members from its Provincial Executive. A secretary and 
a treasurer are elected from its own ranks. 
(b) The Supreme Council is the highest policy-making and 
administrative body of the Party. It will maintain 
collaboration with the Party Caucus. (2A) as the main 
. ~ 
advisory body. 
(c) The Supreme Council will elect its own National Executive 
consisting of 7 members, which will operate on behalf of 
the Supreme Council. 
(d) The Supreme Council will meet at least once a year. 
(e) A quorum is one more than half of its members. 
3. THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
(a) To consist of 7 members as elected by the Supreme Council 
with the right to co-opt two more members. The offic-e-
bearers of theN ational Supreme Council will be the office-
bearers of the National Executive. 
(b) The control of the finances of the Party is vested in this 
body. The Administrative Head Office (3A) will be under 
the supervision of the National Executive. 
(c) The National Executive will plan and direct all national 
activities of the Party. Planning and programming will be 
some of its main functions. 
(d) Serve as the highest finance administrating body of the 
Party and will allocate funds for organisation to all 
provmces. 
(e) Plan election strategy. 
(f) Initiate Republic-wide fund-raising campaigns. 
(g) Make all arrangements for the National Congress. 
(h) Appoint a chartered accountant to audit Party books and 
present an audited financial statement to the National 
Congress. 
(i) A quorum is one more than half of its members. 
4. PROVINCIAL l .EADERS 
(a) The Provincial Leaders are elected annually by the 
Provincial Councils. 
(b) A Provincial Leader is chairman of the Provincial 
Congress, Provincial Council and Provincial Executive. In 
his absence an acting chairman is elected for that meeting. 
4A. THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS 
(a) The Provincial Congress will be composed of two 
accredited members from every Branch in the Province and 
will meet once a year. 
(b) It receives reports on the progress and financial standing of 
the Party in the Province. 
(c) It prepares and submits resolutions to be tabled at National 
Congress. 
5. THE PROVJNC!AL COUNCIL 
(a) COMPOSITION: 
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(i) CAPE PROVINCE: One representative from each 
Constituency Executive. 
(ii) OTHER PROVINCES: Three representatives from 
each Constituency Executive viz chairmen, vice-
chairmen and secretaries (or their elected secundi). 
(iii) A quorum is one more than half of the members. 
(b) The Provincial Council elects its own Provincial Executive 
cons1stmg of the Leader, Provincial Secretary, 
Administrative Secretary-Treasurer and not more than 
seven of its own members. 
(c) Has the right of suspension of any member in any position 
in the Party in the province by a two-third majority of the 
members present provided a quorum is present and written 
advice of the meeting had been given at least two weeks in 
advance. 
(d) In cases of suspension, resignation or death of a member of 
the Provincial Council, the vacancy is filled by the 
concerned Constituency Executive. 
(e) The powers of the Provincial Council are vested in its 
Provincial executive who has to . deal with all matters 
affecting the Party in the Province. 
(f) Considers and approves aspirant candidates for the C.R .C. 
as submitted by the Constituency Councils. 
(g) The Provincial Council will meet at least twice a year. 
(h) A Provincial Council or Executive member who without 
previous leave or condonation for absence, absents himself 
for two successive meetings, is subject to suspension. 
(i) The Provincial Caucus (SA) is the highest provincial 
advisory body. 
(j) Determines membership fees for the province and submits 
half to the Admin. Head Office. 
6. THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE 
(a) The office-bearers of the Provincial Council will be the 
office-bearers of the Provincial Executive. 
(b) The Provincial Executive will direct all the activities of the 
Party in the province but will report fully to the Provincial 
Council. 
(c) It will supervise and direct the administration and 
administrative offices of the Party in the province. 
(d) Appoint on its own responsibility full-time or temporary 
staff where and when necessary in the province. 
(e) It will meet at least four times a year. 
(f) Apply itself to the necessary raising of funds, execute 
decisions taken by Congress and the National Executive 
make press statements, plan the annual Provincial 
Congress and do everything to promote· and improve the 
organisation in close collaboration with the Constituency 
Councils. 
(g) Two additional members may be co-opted to the Executive 
from the ranks of the Provincial Council if neccessary, in 
provinces where the constituencies are large or the number 
very few. 
(h) The Provincial Executive draws up an annual budget and 
submits it to the National Executive. 
(i) It will administer funds allocated to the province by the 
National Executive. 
(j) It will operate a current account for all income and 
expenditure of the province. 
(k) It will prepare an annual financial statement to be 
presented to Provincial and National Congress. 
7. CONSTITUENCY COUNCILS 
(a) A Constituency Council is composed of the chairmen, vice-
chairmen and secretaries of all registered branches in a 
constituency. It elects its own Constituency Executive out 
of its own members which consists of a chairman, vice-
chairman, secretary and no fewer than five or no more than 
nine addition a! mem bcrs. 
(b) This body of which there shall be only one in a constituency 
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co-ordinates the activities of the Party in a constituency. 
(c) One of its main functions is to see that branches are formed 
all over the area under its control. 
(d) Draws up its own programs which must collaborate with 
the programmes of the higher bodies. 
(e) Work in close contact with the Provincial Secretary and 
administrative offices and furnish all information to the 
office for record purposes and for action. 
(f) Recommends aspirant candidates for the constituency to 
the Provincial Council. The final decision rests with the 
latter body. 
8. CONSTITUENCY EXECUTIVES 
(a) This executive, formed as stipulated in paragraph 7, has the 
important task of activating politics in the constituency. 
(b) Elected or appointed members of the C.P.R.C. must be co-
opted if they are not elected by the Constituency Council. 
9. BRANCHES 
(a) A branch may not consist of fewer than 10 members. It 
elects its own chairman, vice-chairman and secretary who 
also handles finances. 
(b) All new members and newspaper subscribers must be 
registered at the Administrative Head Office and 
Provincial Administrative Office and fees sent where 
applicable. 
(c) Branch members must meet at least once a month. Once a 
yea r an annual general meeting must be held and the 
branch executive elected or the old executive re-elected. 
(d) All minutes of meetings and financial books must be 
properly kept and the membership register kept up to date. 
(e) Regular branch reports and financial statements must be 
sent to Head Office and copies to the Provincial Secretary. 
(f) Delegates to a Provincial or National Congress must 
possess and present credentials signed by the branch 
chainna n and secretary. 
(g) All branches of the Party must have current banking 
accounts at a local bank. 
(h) A receipt is issued for all income and all expenditures are 
paid by cheque signed by two members of -the branch 
executive. 
(i) All newspaper subscriptions must be sent directly to Head 
Office. 
U) Branches will hold rallies and functions and exploit other 
channels to raise funds regularly. 
Wet No. 49 
van 1964. 
WET 
Om 'o Vcrtccnwoordigcnde Kleurlingrand van die Rcpublick van Suid·Afrib iJ 
te stel en sy bcvocgdhcdc, wcrksanmhcdc en pligte tc bcpaal en vir daarmtt ir 
verband staande aangelccntltcde voorsicning te maak. 
lnstelling vao 
Verteeo woor-
digende 
Kleurlingraad. 
Benoemde lede 
van Raad. 
(Engelse leks deur die Staatspresident geteken.) 
(Goedgekeur op 26 Mei 1964.) 
DAAR \YORD BEPAAL deur die Staatspresident, die Senu: 
en d1e Volksraad van d ie Republiek van Suid-Afril:.l. 
soos volg:-
1 •. (I) Daar word met ingang van 'n datum wat die S!aa:J-
presldent by proklamasie in die S taatskoerant bepaal, 'n ru.~ 
•~gestel bc~cnd as die. Vcrte.enwo~rdigcnde Kleurlingraad \!: 
die Repubhek_ van SUJd-Afnka (h1eronder die Raad geoocr::\. 
wat bestaa n Ult-
(a) dcrtig lede wat op die hieronder bepaalde wyse verlY.-1 
word; eo 
(b) .sestien lede wat deur die Staatspresident beooem wor{ 
(2) N1ernaod ~odcrs as 'n Kleurling kao tot lid van die Ra.!! 
beooern of verldes word nie. 
~· Twce van die in paragraaf (b) van sub-artikel (I) \"!: 
arttkel een be.doelde lcde van die Raad moet personc wces 11. 1: 
behoort tot d1e ras of klas bekend as Maleiers en twec sodan:.-: 
lede "?oet persone wecs wat behoort tot die ras of klas belc;~ 
a~ Gnekwas~ terwyl die orige sodanige lede benoem word C':: 
die onderske1e provinsies te verteenwoordig te wete-
(a) agt I7de in die geval van die pro~insie die Kaap 6 : 
Goe1e Hoop; . 
·' ·.. . . .. . ·. . .~ . .. ·.· .... ... ·: 
Act No. 49 
of 1964. 
.ACT 
T 0 establish a Coloured Persons Representative Council of the Rcp.ublic or South 
· Africa, to determine its powers, functions and duties and to prov1de for matters 
incidental thereto. 
(English text signed by the State President.) 
(Assented to 26th May, 1964.) 
llE IT ENACTED by the State President, the Senate and the House of Assembly of the Republic of South Africa, as 
follows:-
1. (I) There shall be established with effect fr?m ~ date 
C!lermined by the State President by ProclamatiOn m the 
Ga:etre, a council to be known as _the Coloured ~ersons ~e­~rmntative Council of the Republic of South Afnca (herem· 
;ner referred to as the Council), which shall consist of-. 
(a) thirty members elected in the manner heremafter 
provided; a nd . (b) sixteen members nominated by the State Pres1den!. 
(2' No person other than a Co loured person shall be noml· 
:!lied or elected as a member of the Council. 
2. Two of the members of the Council referred to in para-
2raph (b) of sub-section (I) o f section one shall be persons 
i:<longing to the race or class known as Malays and two such 
members shall be persons belonging to the race or class ~nown 
l S Griquas, whilst the rest of such members shall be nornmated 
to represent the respective provinces, namely-: 
(a) eight members in the case of the provmce of the Cape 
of Good Hope; 
Establishment 
of Coloured 
Persons 
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Registrasie 
van kiesers. 
(b) twce lcde in die geval van die provinsie Transraal: c-: 
(c) een lid elk in die geval van die provinsies Natal en~·: 
Oranje-Vrystaat. 
3. (l) So spoedig doenlik na die inwerkingtreding vao hier~ ·: 
Wet en daarna met tussenpose van hoogstens vyf jaar , ;:l; 
daar 'n algemene registrasie van kiesers plaas, en wei vanaf ·: 
datum wat die Staatspresident in elke geval by proklama;n 
in di-! Staatskoerant bepaal. 
(2) (a) By so ' n algemene rcgistrasie stel elke verkiesing;-
bcampte vir elke afdeling in die gebied ''a~:­
voor hy aangestel is 'n Iys, bekend as die Kleur!:::c-
kieserslys, op van persone wat geregtig is om te st~~ 
(b) So 'n lys moet die name bevat van aile persone n : 
gedurende 'n tydperk van negentig dae wat cind:! 
om vieruur in die namiddag na die gepaste datum !-: 
die toepaslike proklamasie ingevolge sub-artikcl ( ll 
bepaal, volgens voorskrif van artikel ses om registra;:: 
as kiesers in die betrokke afdeling aansoek gcd~:: 
het en geregtig is om aldus geregistreer te word. 
(3) Die lyste wat na 'n algemene registrasie opgestel is. t r~ 
in werking vanaf 'n datum wat die Staatspresident by prokl!· 
masie in die Staatskoerant bepaal, en wat nie later as hondcr~­
en-tagtig dae na die toepaslike ingevolge sub-artikcl (I) l'>:· 
paald~ datum is nic, en bly tesame met enige supplemeN~:: 
lyste daarna ingevolge hierdie artikel opgestel, van krag tot~;: 
nuwe lyste ingevolge 'n daaropvolgende algemene registra•:: 
npgestel, in werking tree. 
(4) In elke jaar vind daar op die eerste dag van Ma:!::. 
Julie en November ondcrskeidelik supplementere registra' : ~; 
plans van kicsers wie se aansoeke om registrasie voor vieru·;: 
in die namiddag op die Iaaste dag van die toepaslike onmiddel!:l: 
voorafgaande maand volgens voorskrif van artikel ses in~~­
dien word: Met dien verstande dat geen s upplementcre regi~ l rl · 
sic plaasvind nic waar die hierby daarvoor voorgeskrewe dall::-
val na die datum van die onmiddellik voorafgaaude algcmc::~ 
registrasie en voor die datum waarop die kieserslys by daarb 
algcmene rcgistrasie opgestel, in werking tree. 
(5) Supplementere lyste ingevolge sub-artikel ( 4) opge~tel 
tree in werking op die cersvolgende eerste dag van onderskeidd:l 
Mei, September of Januarie: Met dien verstande dat 113~ · 
'n stemming na die datum waarop so 'n lys aldus in weeki :.~ 
tree, gehou moet word ingevolge 'n proklamasie voor daarc:: 
datum kragtens artikel ryf-en-dertig of agt-en-tagtig van d:: 
Kieswet uitgevaardig, daardie lys geldig is vir aile doeleinb 
in verband met die verkiesing waarop die proklamasie ~­
trekking het. 
(6) Waar 'n kiesafdeling nie geheel en al binne die gcbi~~ 
van een ingevolgc die Kicswet aangestelde verkiesingsbeamr:= 
val nie, wys die Minister van Binnelandse Sake 'n aldus aang!· 
stelde verkiesingsbeampte aan o m met betrekking tot daarb 
kiesafdeling die pligte uit te voer wat by hicrdic artikel aan ·~ 
verkicsingsbellmpte opged ra word. en ci::~nrnn wnrti <n •,. I· ·· · 
I 
I 
! 
I 
l 
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(h) two members in the case of the province of the Trans-
vaal; and 
(c) one member each in the case of the provinces of Natal 
and the Orange Free State. 
3. (I) As soon as possible after the commencement of this Act 
1::d thereafter at interYa\s of not more than fh"e years a general 
r:gistration of voters shall take place with effect from a date 
C!tcrmined in each case by the State President by proclamation 
in the Gazette. 
(2} (a) At any such general registration every electoral 
officer shall prepare for each division in the area for 
which he has been appointed a list, to be known as 
the Coloured voters' list, of persons entitled to vote. 
(b) Anv such list shall contain the names of all persons 
wlio during a period of ninety days ending at four 
o'clock in the afternoon after the appropriate date 
fixed in the relevant proclamation under sub-section 
(1), have in accordance with the provisions of section 
six applied for registration as voters in the division 
in question and are entitled to be so registered. 
(3) The lists prepared after a general registration shall come 
into operation as from a date fixed by the State President by 
rroclamation in the Gazette, not being later than one hundred 
~nd eighty days after the revelant date determined under s~b­
>~tion (1), and shall, together with any supplementary ltsts 
thereafter prepared under this section, remain in operation 
•Jntil new lists prepared in pursuance of a subsequent general 
registration come into operation. 
{-t) On the first day of March, July and November, respectively, 
in each year supplementary registrations shall take place of 
1oters whose applications for registration are submitted in 
:l~cordance with the provisions of section six before four o'clock 
i:1 the afternoon on the last day of the appropriate immediately 
rrcceding month: Provided that no supplementary registration 
;h:!II take place where the date hereby prescribed in respect 
thereof falls after the date of the immediately preceding general 
r~s:istration and before the date on which the voters' list pre-
r.,~ed at such general registration comes into operation. 
(5) Supplementary lists prepared under sub-section (4) shall 
Cl'lllC into operation on the next succeeding first day of May, 
September or January, respectively: Provided that where after 
the da te on which any such list so comes into operation a poll 
!s 10 he held in terms of a proclamation issued before that date 
under section tlrirty-ftve o r eighty-eight of the Electoral Act, 
Slich list shall be valid for all purposes in connection with the 
elect ion to which the proclamation relates. 
!6) Where any electoral division does not fall wholly within 
the area of any one electoral officer appointed under the 
Electoral Act, the Minister of the Tnterior shall designate an 
dcctoral officer so appointed to perform the duties assigned 
to :~n electoral officer under this section in relation t o the said 
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afdeli11g by die toepassing van bcdoclde Wet gcag binnc die 
gebied van die aldus aangewese verkiesingsbeampte te val. 
4. (I) Behoudens die bepalings van hierdie Wet het elke 
Kleurling wat 'n Suid-Afrikaanse burger en bo die ouderdom 
van een-cn-twintig jaar is, en wat nie aan enige van die onbe-
voegdhede genoem in artikel vyf onderhewig is nie, die reg 
om as 'n kieser op die Kleurlingkieserslys geregistrcer te word. 
(2) Die persone wie se name op die Kleurlingk.ieserslys vir 
'n kiesafdeling verskyn, is geregtig om 'n lid van die Raad te 
kies om die kiesafdeling te verteenwoordig, maar so 'n persoon 
kan by so 'n verkiesing nie meer as een stem uitbring nie. 
5. (1) Niemand is geregtig om geregistreer te word of te bly 
of te stem nie-
(a) indien hy in die Republiek of in die gebied Suidwes-
Afrika skuldig bevind is-
(i) aan hoogverraad; of 
(ii) a an moord; of 
(iii) aan enige ander misdryf waarvoor by gevonnis 
is tot 'n tydperk van gevangenisstraf (behalwe 
aanhouding tot die verdaging van die hof) sonder 
die keuse van 'n boete of beveel is om kragtens 
die Wet op Toevlugte en Rehabilitasiesentrums, 
1963 (Wet No. 86 van 1963), aangehou te word, 
en genoemde tydperk nie verstryk het nie, of 
bedoelde bevel nie finaal buite werk.ing getree 
het nie, minstens drie jaar voor die datum van vo!-
tooiing van sy aansoek om geregistreer te word 
of die datum waarop besluit word of sy naam uit 
die kieserslys verwyder moet word a! dan nie of 
stemdag, na gelang van die geval; of 
(b) indien hy skuldig bevind is aan 'n korrupte of on-
wettige bedrywigheid ingevolge hicrdie Wet of die 
Kieswet, en oobevoeg verklaar is om gedurende enige 
tydperk geregistreer te word of by 'n verkiesiog te 
stem, en bedoelde tydperk nie verstryk het nie; of 
(c) iodien hy onderhcwig is aan 'n hofbev~l waarby hy 
kranksinnig of geestelik gekrenk of gebrekkig ver-
klaar is of wettiglik kragtens die ,Wet op Geestesge-
breken, 1916" (Wet No. 38 van 1916), as geestelik 
gekrenkte of gebrekkige aangehou word. 
(2) By die toepassiog van paragraaf (a) van sub-artikel (l}-
(a) word 'n persoon wat teo volle begenadig is, geag nie 
aan die betrokke rnisdryf skuldig bevind te gewees 
het nie; 
(b) beteken 'n tydperk van gcvangenisstraf die bele termyn 
van 'n vonnis tot gevangenisstraf, al is die vonnis in 
die geheel of gedeeltelik opgeskort of kwytgeskeld; en 
(c) word 'n vonnis tot gevaogenisstraf wat opgeskort is 
en daarna in werking gestel word, geag opgele te 
gewces bet op die datumLwaarop dit aldus in werkiog 
,,.~ IPI W <'rrl 
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for the purposes of the said Act be deemed to fall within the 
area of the electoral officer so designated. 
4. (l) Subject to the provisions of this Act every Coloured 
person who is a South African citizen and is over the age of 
twenty-one years, and who is not subject to any of the dis-
qualifications mentioned in section five, shall have the right to 
be registered as a voter on the Coloured voters' list. 
(2) The persons whose names appear on the Coloured voters' 
list for any electoral division, shall be entitled to elect a member 
of the Council to represent that electoral division, but no such 
perso_n shall cast more than one vote at any such election. 
5. (I) No person shall be entitled to be or to remain registered 
or to vote-
(a) if he has been convicted in the Republic or in the 
territory of South-West Africa- • 
(i) of treason; or 
(ii) of murder; or 
(iii) of any other offence in respect of which he has 
been sentenced to a period of imprisonment 
(other than detention until the rising of the court) 
without the option of a fine or ordered to be 
detained under the Retreats and Rehabilitation 
Centres Act, 1963 (Act No. 86 of 1963), and the 
said period has not expired, or the said order 
has not finally ceased to be operative, at least 
three years before the date of completion of his 
application to be registered or the date on which 
it is decided whether or not his name is to be 
removed from the voters' list or polling day, as 
the case may be; or 
(b) if he has been convicted of any corrupt or illegal 
practice under this Act or the Electoral Act, and 
has been declared incapable of being registered 
or of voting at an election during any period and the 
said period has not expired; or 
(c) if he is subject to an order of court declaring him to 
be of unsound mind or mentally disordered or defective 
or is lawfully detained as mentally disordered or 
· defective under the Mental Disorders Act, 1916 
(Act No. 38 of 1916). 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of sub-section (1)-
(a) a person who has been granted a free pardon shall be 
deemed not to have been convicted of the offence in 
question; 
(b) a period of imprisonment means the full term of any 
sentence of imprisonment notwithstanding any sus-
pension or remission of the whole or any portion of 
the sentence; and 
(c) a sentence of imprisonment which has been suspended 
and is thereafter put into operation shall be deemed 
to have be~n imposed 0 11 the date on which it is s 0 
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(3) Nicmand wat hom by 'n vcrkiesing aan 'n korrupt: c( 
onwettige bedrywigheid skuldig gemaak het, mag by d1ub 
verkiesing stem nie. 
6. (1) Elkc KJeurling wat ingevolge die bcpalings van sut>-
artikel (1) van artikel vier geregtig is om as 'n kieser op di: 
Kleurlingkieserslys geregistreer te word, kan 'n aansoek 0::1 
registrasie volgens voorskrif van sub-artikel (2) pos of afle"'er 
aan-(a) 'n vcrkicsingsbeampte aangestel kragtcns paragr.2: 
· (b). van artikel sewe van die K.ieswct; 
(b) 'n strcekkantoor van die Departement van Kleurling· 
sake; 
(c) 'n kantoor van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie; of 
(d) 'n landdroskantoor. 
(2) So 'n aansoek moet in die voorgeskrewe vorm wec;. 
moet in een van die amptelike tale van die Republiek volt0<.'i 
word en wei op so 'n wyse dat al die voorgeskrewe besondcr· 
hede aangegee word wat nodig is om die aansoeker se identite!t 
vas te stel en sy reg om te stem en die afdeling waarin hy as 
kieser geregistreer moet word, te bepaal, moet, behoudens d:: 
bepalings van artike1 sewe, deur die aansoeker eiehandig saar:. 
met en in teenwoordigheid van 'n bevoegde getuie onderteke:J 
wees, en moet 'n deur bedoelde getuie ondertekende verklaring 
bevat dat hy 'n bevoegde getuie is en dat die aansoeker die 
aansoek eiehandig in sy teenwoordigheid onderteken het. 
Omstandighede 7. (1) Indien iemand as gevolg van liggaamlike swakhcic 
waaronder aansoek ofliggaamlike gebrek nie in staat is om 'n aansoek om registra~i~ 
deur iemand . as kieser te onderteken nie, kan die aansoek, met inagncming 
anders namens 
'n aansoeker van die bepalings van sub-artikel (2), deur 'n ander bevoegde 
voltooi en vo1wassc persoon ten behoewe van hom onderteken word. 
onderteken (2) So 'n aansoek moet voltooi en onderteken word in die 
kan word. teenwoordigheid van die aansoeker en van 'n landdros, vcr· 
kiesingsbeampte, vrederegter of kommissaris van ede. en 
daarop moet geendosseer wees-
(a) 'n verk1aring deur die persoon wat dit ten behoe11e 
van die aansoeker onderteken waarin hy die aard 
van die onderhawige liggaamlike swakheid of gebrck 
aangee, en vermeld dat die aansoeker hom gemagtig 
het om die aansoek ten behoewe van horn te onder· 
teken; en 
Metode van 
verdeling van 
provinsies in 
k:iesafdelings. 
(b) 'n verklaring deur die landdros, verkiesingsbeampte. 
vredercgtcr of kommissaris van ede dat die aansoek 
in sy teenwoordigheid en in die van die aansoeker 
ten behoewe van die aansoeker voltooi en onderteken 
is. 
8. (1) Vir die verkiesing van lede van die Raad stel die 
Staatspresident so spoedig doenlik na die inwerkingtrcding 
van hierdie Wet, en daarna met tussenpose van minstens \·~f 
en hoogstens tien jaar gereken vanaf die jongste vorige \'erdc· 
ling, 'n kommissie aan wat bestaan uit 'n regter of afgctrcde 
rcgter van die Hoog)!eregshof van Suid-Afrika , vir die vr.rdrl i 11~ 
(3) . No person w~w has been guilly of any corrupt or illegal 
rracttce at an electiOn shall vote at that election. 
6. (1) E~ery Coloured_ person wh? is under the provisions 
C'f sub-sectiOn (l) of sectwn four entitled to be registered as a 
'C'ter on the Coloured voters' list may post or deliver an 
!rplication for registration in accordance with the provisions 
cf sub-section (2) to-
( a) an e~ectoral officer appointed under paragraph (b) of 
sectwn seven of the Electoral Act· 
(b) a regional office of the Department 'of Coloured Affairs· 
(c) an office of the South African Police· or ' 
(d) a magistrate's office. ' 
(2) Such an application shall be in the prescribed form shall ~ completed in one of the official languages of the Republic 
;o as to show all. t~e prescribed particulars required for the 
purpose of es~a?l.Isbi?g th~ app~cant's identity, his right to 
\'Ole and the diVISIOn m which he IS to be registered as a voter 
shan, subject to the provisions of section seven, be signed by th~ 
!pplicant pe~sonally together with and in the presence of a 
:ompe~ent Witness, _and shall conta!n a declaration signed by 
such wttness _that he IS a co~pet~nt ~Itness and that the applicant 
personally Signed the apphcatwn m his presence. 
7 .. (1) I~ an.Y. person is by_ reason of physical infirmity or 
rhysJcal d1sabthty unable to sign an application for registration 
lS a voter, the application may, subject to the provisions of 
sub-section (2), be signed on his behalf by any other competent 
adult person. 
(2) Any such application shall be completed and signed in 
the presence of the applicant and of a magistrate an electoral 
cflicer, a justice of the peace or a commissioner ~f oaths, and 
!ball have endorsed thereon-
(a) a statement by the person signing it on behalf of the 
~pplic~nt set~ing. ~ort_h the ?ature of the physical 
mfirr:mty or disability 10 questiOn and stating that the 
applicant has authorized him to sign the application 
on his behalf; and 
(b) a statement by the magistrate, electoral officer, justice 
of the peace or commissioner of oaths that the applica-
tion :vas completed and signed on behalf of the appli-
cant 10 the presence of the applicant and himself. 
8. (I) For the purpose of the election of members of the 
Council the State President shall as soon as practicable after 
:.~e commencement of this Act, and thereafter at intervals of 
:~t less than fi~e an~ ':l~t more th.an ten years commencing on 
: .. e last precedmg dtvlston, appomt a commission consistin" 
cf a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court of South 
~frica. for the division of the proYinr c-s intn Pl~>,. tr-r ., f ,-1;. :,. : .. , . , 
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(a) in die geval van die provinsie die Kaap die Goc;e 
Hoop, in agtien kiesafdelings; 
(b) in die geval van die provinsie Transvaal, in ses ki~­
afdelings; 
(c) in die gcval van die provinsie Oranje-Vrystaat, in 
drie kiesafdelings ; en 
(d) in die geval van die provinsie Natal, in drie kiesafde-
lings. 
(2) (a) Vir die doeleindes van so 'n verdeling word d!e 
kwota van 'n provinsie verkry deur die totale getJJ 
kiesers in die provinsie soos vasgestel uit 'n ondersock 
van die geldendc kieserslyste, te dee! deur die getll 
kiesafdelings waarin daardie provinsie verdeel moct 
word. 
(b) Elke provinsie word op so 'n wyse in kicsafdclingt 
verdeel dat die getal op die Kleurlingkicserslys geregi· 
streerdc persone wat in elke kiesafdeling woon so ru 
as moontlik met die kwota vir die provinsie gelykstaao: 
Met dien verstande dat die kommissie, met inagne-
ming van gemeenskaplikheid of verskeidenheid ra:J 
belange, verkeersmiddele, natuurlike keomerke e:J 
huidige of toekomstige dunheid of digthcid ra:1 
bevolking waaromtrent inligting beskikbaar is, in 
enige geval van die kwota kan afwyk, maar in g~:J 
geval in grater mate as vyftien persent bo of vyftico 
persent .benede die kwota nie. 
(3) Die bepalings van die Kommissiewet, 1947 (Wet No. ~ 
van 1947), behalwe artikel een daarvan, is mutatis mutandis I J:J 
toepassing met betrekking tot die kommissie, en by die toer~ 
sing van bedoelde bepalings word 'n verwysing daarin na die 
sekretaris van 'n daarin bedoelde kommissie uitgele as 'n 
verwysing na die persoon wat die kommissie uitmaak of iemaod 
deur hom aangewys. 
(4) Die kommissie Ie aan die Staatspresident voor-
(a) 'n lys van die .kiesafdelings waario elke provios:: 
aldus verdeel is, tesame met die naam toegeken a2.::1 
en 'n beskrywing van die grense van elke kiesafdeliog: 
(b) 'n kaart van die betrokke provinsie wat bcdocl~: 
grense aantoon; en 
(c) die ander besonderhede wat die kommissie nodig ag. 
(5) Die Staatspresident kan enige aangeleentheid wat op ~~ 
'n lys van kiesafdelings betrekking het of uit die bevoegdhede ~~ 
pligte van die kommissie ontstaan, na die kommissie verwys. 
(6) Die Staatspresident maak by proklamasie in die Staats· 
koerant die name en grense van die kiesafdelings bekend scx1 
hulle finaal vasgestel en gesertifiseer is, en daarna is die kiesaf~~­
lings soos aldus genoem en beskryf, die kiesafdclings in d.>: 
betrokke provinsie vir die doeleindes van hlerdie Wet totdat ·a 
herverdeling plaasvind. 
(7) In geval van 'n verskil tussen die beskrywing van 6: 
r ' .r: .. ~" ,n rliP vn()rrnr>Jd, 1<":~:1rt of kaarte. gee die b~skl')· 
\,.\JLII U I{l:IJ l t· l"lJN . I 
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(a) eighteen electoral divisions i 
?f the Cape of Good Ho e · n the case of the province 
(b) SIX electoral divisions in th ' 
Transvaal· e case of the province of the 
(c) three elect~ral divisions in th 
the Orange Free State; nnd e case of the province of 
(d) ~~:t~l~lectoral divisions in the case of the province of 
(2) (a) For the purpose of an s h ... 
province shall be obt~in~~ g1v151?~ t.he quota of a 
number of voters in that . y dlvldmg .the total 
an examination of th provmce as ascertamed from 
e current vot • 1· ~umber of electoral divis' . ~rs 1sts, by the 
IS to be divided. JOns Jnto which that province 
(b) ~very province shall be divided . . . 
m such a manner that the numb~ntof electoral d lyJsions 
on the Coloured voters' I' . r .o P.ersons registered 
division will be as nearly 1St resJ~ng m each electoral 
?f the province: Pr;vide~s ;:Y le equal t~ tl.lC quota 
Ill a~y case, wi th due re ard t • t t Je cor:nmiSSI~n may 
of mterests, means ~f c 0 comn:unt.ty or diversity 
features and existing or fut omrnunt~atton , physical 
population in respect of whic~r~ ~parslt.y o~ den~ity of 
depart from the quota but . m ormatiOn IS avnilable, 
extent than fifteen per' cent In no case to any greater 
less than the quota. more or fifteen per cent 
(J) The provisions of th c · . 
8 of I 947), except section ~ne o;rnlJSsJOns Act, 194 7 (Act No. 
apply with reference to the comml.er~of, shnll mutatis 1!/fltandis 
the application of the said . l.ssJOn, and for the purpose of 
the secretary of a commis J?rOvtslons any reference therein to 
c~os.trued as a reference ~~~~~e co;ternplatcd. thc_rein shall be 
miSSion or a person designated b p hr_son constttutmg the com-
(4) The commission shall sub Y. lm. 
(a) a list of the electoral d' .n~tt to. the State President-
h !VISIOnS Jnlo wh' h J • as been sC! djvided, together with ~c eac 1 P~OVfllce 
and a descnptJOn of the b . t e name given lo (b) a map of tlJe pr . oundanes of each division. 
ovmce concern d · d · · ' boundaries; and e 111 tca11ng the said 
(c) such other particulars as the c . . 
necessary. ommtsston may consider 
(5) Tile State President may reti 
matter relating to any such list of er:c to the. ~o.rnmission any 
(lUI of the powers or duties ftl to~al.diVIslOns or arising 
6 O le COI111111SSIOn ( ) The State President shall bv ' . · . 
::JJkc known the names and b d P_roclamatlon tn tlJC Gazelte !~ _fr,na lly settled and certifi~~n :~~s ~fthe electoral divisions 
dinstons as so named and d ' 'b d hereafte~ the elcctorn l 
IJkes place, be the electoral d ' e~~n c. shalL unttl a re-division 
for the purposes of this Act. !VISions m the provinces concerned 
·~ (7) ln the ev~~t .of a discrepancy bctw , . . 
... e elcctornl d1v1s1ons nnd the .1r, (' .ecn the descnpt1011 of 
• or . ~flld m:-t n ()r "' ' '""' 11 ... 
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9. (1) Dehalwe vir sover hierdie Wet anders bepaal, is c:! 
bepalings van die Kieswet (behalwe artikels t1ree tot en ~!~ 
ses, en agt tot en met elf, sub-artikel (2) van artikel recrti£':. 
paragraaf (c) van sub-artikel (2) van artikel vyftien, sub-art i!.:~ 
(4) van artikel sewentien, sub-artikel (3) van artikcl t•ree-m-
twiiztig en artikels agt-en-twintig en honderd twee-en-se•renti() 
en di·~ daarkragtens uitgevaardigde regulasies, vir sover cit 
op. die registrasie van kiesers en die opstel van kieserslyste e:1 
eruge aangeleentheid rakende die verkiesing van lede vao c:! 
Volksraad betrekkiog het, mutatis mutandis van toepassin£ 
met betrekking tot die registrasie van kiesers, die opstcl \ :!; 
kieserslyste en enige aangcleentheid rakende die verkiesine H:'l 
lede van die Raad, en by die toepassing van bedoelde bepalings 
word 'n verwysing daarin-
(a) na 'n kiesafdeling as 'n verwysing na 'n kiesafdeling 
ingevolge hierdie Wet uitgelc; 
(b) na 'n kieserslys as 'n verwysing na die Kleurliog-
kieserslys uitgele; 
(c) na 'n verkiesing as 'n verwysing na 'n verk.iesing no 
lede van die Raad uitgele; 
(d) na 'n bevoegde of onbevoegde persoon of iemand ~ 
bevoegdheid of onbevoegdheid as 'n verwysing na ·n 
Kleurling wat vir die ooreenstemmende doclcincc~ 
van die registrasie van Kleurlingkiesers of hul opnarr.: 
in die Kleurlingkieserslys ingevolge hierdie Wet bcvl'tg 
of onbevoeg is of na sy reg om by 'n vcrkiesing in ~:!­
volge hierdie Wet te stem of na sy bevoegdhcid of on~~­
voegdheid ri1et betrekking tot so 'n aangelccnth~i~ 
uitgele; 
(e) na die registrasie van 'n kieser as 'n verwysing r.; 
die registrnsie van 'n Kleurlingkieser ingcH''F= 
hierdie Wet en die woorde "register" en '.'registreer·· 
dienooreenkomstig uitgele; 
(f) na 'n kieser as 'n verwysing na 'n Kleurlingkie~~r 
uitgele; 
(g) na 'n ontbinding van die Volksraad as 'n verwysir.g 
na 'n ontbinding van die Raad uitgele; 
(!z) na 'n blanke as 'n verwysing na 'n Kleurling uitgriE: 
(i) na artikel agt van die Kieswet as ' n verwysing nl 
artikel drie van hierdie Wet uitgele; 
U) na 'n bevoegde getuie, tot tyd en wyl die eerste Klcur-
lingkieserslys opgestel is, uitgele as 'n verwysing r.l 
iemand wat ingevolge artikel vier geregtig is om :~s 
kieser geregistreer te word, en daarna as 'n ver,nsir.;:: 
na iemand wie se naam op 'n geldige Kleurlingkiesm: 
lys voorkom. 
(2) By die toepassing van sub-artikel (1) word ondersta:~r.~e 
bepalings van die Kieswet uitgele asof die wysigings ten ops:g:e 
daarvan aangedui daarin aangebring is, te wete-
(a) in die geval van artikel sestien, deur die \·crwn!:J t:! 
in sub-artikel (2) na artikels lien eo elfvan die Kie~·.,~: 
deur verwysings na artikels ses en sewe onderskcic~!: k 
van hierclie Wet te vervanl!: 
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9. (I) Save as is otherwise provided in this Act, the pro-
·.i;ions of the Electoral Act (except sections two to six, inclusive, 
:1::d eight to elel'en, inclusive, sub-section (2) of section fourteen 
r .. mgraph (c) of sub-section (2) of section fifteen , sub-sectio~ 
l~) of section seventeen, sub-section (3) of section twenty-two 
a.nd sections t1venty-eight and one hundred and seventy-two) and 
the regulations made thereunder, in so far as they relate to the 
:!gistration of voters and the preparation of voters' lists and 
!:lY matter affecting the election of members of the House of 
.\sscmbly, shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to the 
r~gimation ?f voters, t~e preparation of voters' lists and any 
f:'!Jtter affectmg the electiOn of members of the Council, and in 
the application of the said provisions any reference thercin-
(a) to an electoral division shall be construed as a reference 
to an electoral division under this Act; 
(b) to a voters' list shall be construed as a reference to the 
Coloured voters' Jist; 
(c) to an election sha ll be construed'as a reference to an 
election of members of the Council; 
(d) to a qualified or disqualified person or any person's 
qualification or disqualification shall be construed as 
a reference to a Coloured person who is qualified or 
disqualified for the corresponding purposes of the 
registration of Coloured voters or their inclusion in 
the Coloured voters' list under this Act or to his righ t 
to vote at an election under this Act or to his qualifica-
tion or disqualification with reference to any such 
matter; 
(e) to the registration of a voter shall be construed as a 
reference to the registration of a Coloured voter 
under this Act, and the word "register" shn 11 be 
construed accordingly ; 
(f) to a voter shall be construed as a reference to a 
Coloured voter; 
(g) to a dissolution of the House of Assembly shall be 
construed as a reference to a dissolution of the Council; 
(h) to a white person shall be construed as a reference to a 
Coloured person; 
(i) to section eight of the Electoral Act shall be construed 
as a reference to section three of this Act; 
(j) to a competent witness shall be construed, until such 
time as the first Coloured voters' list has been prepared, 
as a reference to a person who is entitled to be regis-
tered as a voter under scctionfour, and thereafter as a 
reference to a person whose name appears on a valid 
voters' Jist. 
(2) For the purposes o f sub-section (I) the following pro-
·.i;ions of the Electoral Act shall be construed as if the amend-
:::~nts indicated in respect thereof had been effected thereto, 
::.!melv-
(a') in the case of section sixteen, by the substitution for 
the references in sub-section (2) to sections ren and 
eleren of the Electoral Act of rcferel!ces to sec1ions 
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(b) in die gcval van artikcl twin!(~, deur na die IICC' :~ 
,grocp" waar dit die ccrste maal voorkom, die 110cr.!: 
,waaraan slegs Klcurlingc kan bchoort en waarl'an ~: 
die ampsdraers Kleurlingc is" in te voeg; 
(c) in d ie .gcval va~1 a rtikcl se11•e-en-twinti~, dcur c:: 
verwy~mg n~ art1k~ls een-en-1•certig en twee-en-reerrir 
van dte ,Zwd-1\fnka Wet, 1909", dcur 'n verwvsinz 
na artikcl agt van hicrdie Wet te vervang; · -
(d) in ?ie geval . van artikel vyj:en-dertig, dcur in su~ 
arttkel (l) dte verwysing na die ontbinding van d:= 
Volksraad kragtens 'n bepaling van die ,Zuid-Afrib 
Wet, 1909", dcur 'n verwysing na die ontbinding 1·:!:: 
die. Raad inJ?evolge hierdie Wet te vervang, en in~ ~u~ 
arttkel ~5) dte woorde ,ooreenkomstig sub-artikcl ~ = · 
van a rttkel sewe-en-dertig van die ,Zuid-Afrika We~. 
1909"' te skrap; 
(e) in die geval van artikcl ses-cn-dertig, deur in rarc.-
graa~ \a) v~n ~ub-artikel (6) die verwysing na ':: 
verktesmg vtr dte Volksraad deur 'n verwysing na ·:: 
verkiesing vir die Raad en die verwysing na artik=~· 
vier-en-veertig, tJt•ee-en-v;ftig en drie-en-vyftig van u;= 
,Zuid-Afrika Wet, 1909", dcur 'n verwysing na an ike' 
lien van hierdie Wet te vervang; 
(f) in die geval van artikel scwe-en-derti~, deur die ~~:· 
wysing na 'n bedrag van tweehonderd rand de:.:: 
'n verwysing na 'n bedrag van sestig rand te ver~·an:: 
(g) in die geval van artikel t Jt·ee-en-veertig, deur in p r; . 
graaf (b) die woordc ,,buite daardie afdeling sal 11e~; 
en" te skrap en die vcrwysing na ticn myl tlcur ·~ 
verwysing na vyf myl te vervang; 
(h) in die geval van artikel nege-en-tagtig, deur die 1·r=· 
wysings na die Speaker van die Volksraad deur IC:-
wysings na die Minister van Kleurlingsake te ven:1n11: 
(i) in die geval van artikel honderd-en-elf, deur in rar;-
graaf (a) ~ie verwysing na die ontbinding van d:: 
Volksraad mgevolge 'n bepaling van die ,Zuid-Afrib 
~et, 1909':, deur 'n ve~wysing _na die ontbinding 1 ;;~ 
dte Raad mgcvolge d1e bepahngs van hierdie Wet. 
en in paragraaf (b) die verwysing na die Sekreta~:~ 
van die Volksraad deur 'n verwysing na die Sekretar'~ 
van die Raad te vervang; 
(j) in .die geval. van a~tik~l honderd sell'e-en-sewentig, de::: 
dte verwysmg na n hd van die Volksraad wie se s~:=' 
ooreenkomstig die bepalings van artikel ricr-c-:. 
l'Jftig van die ,Zuid-Afrika Wet, 1909", l'akant r:· 
\~Ord het, te. vervang deur 'n verwysing na 'n lid \-.1~ 
dtc Raad w1e se setel o~Jreenkomstig die bepalin~ 
van paragraaf (b) van arttkel dertien van hicrdie Wet 
vakant geword het; 
(k) bchoudcns die hcpalings van paragraaf (h), d~:: · 
ve r.'~·ysing.s na d_ic .~reaker of die Sekrrtaris "~•n ~· = 
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(h) in the case of section 11\'enty by the insertion after the 
word "group" where i t occurs the first time of the 
words "to which only Coloured persons may belong 
and of which all the office-bearers are Coloured 
persons"; 
(c) in the case of section twenty-seven, by the substitution 
for the reference to sections forty-one and forty-two 
of the South Africa Act, 1909, of a reference to section 
ei!{ht of this Act; 
(d) in the case of section thirty-five, by the substitution 
in sub-section (l) for the reference to the dissolution 
of the I louse of Assembly under any provision of the 
South Africa Act, 1909, of a reference to the dissolution 
of the Council under this Act, and the substitution in 
sub-section (5) for the words "In accordance with 
sub-section (2) of section thirty-se1•en of the South 
Africa /\ct. 1909, all" of the word "All"· 
(e) in the case of section thirty-six, by the substitution in 
paragraph (a) of sub-section (6) for the reference to 
an election for the H ouse of Assembly of a reference 
to an election for the Council, and for the reference to 
sections forty-four, .fifty-tll'o and fifty-three of the 
South Africa Act, 1909, of a reference to section ten 
of this Act; 
(/) in the case of section thirty-se1'e11, by the substitution 
for the reference to an amount of two hundred rand 
of a reference to an amount of sixty rand; 
(g) in the case of section forty-two, by the substitution in 
paragraph (b) for the words "be outside that division, 
and not" of the words "not be" and the substitution 
in that paragraph for the reference to ten miles of a 
reference to five miles ; 
(h) in the cnse of section eighty-nine, by the substitution for 
the references to the Speaker of the House of Assembly 
of references to the Minister of Coloured Affairs; 
(i) in the case of section one hundred and elel'en, by the 
substitution in paragraph (a) for the reference to the 
dissolution of the House of Assembly under any 
provision of the South Africa Act, 1909, of a reference 
to the dissolution of the Council under the provisions 
of this Act, and in paragraph (b) for the rc(erence to 
the Secretary to the House of Assembly of a reference 
to the Secretary of the Council; 
(j) in the case of section one hundred and se1•enty-seven 
by the substitution for the reference to a member of 
the House of Assembly whose seat has become 
vacant under the provisions of section fifty-four of 
the South Africa Act, 1909, of a reference to a member 
of the Council whose seat has become vacant under 
the provisions of paragraph (b) of section thirteen of 
this Act; 
(k) subjec.t t? the provisions of paragraph (h), by the 
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na onderskeidclik die Voorsitter en die Sekrctaris 
van die Raad te vervang. 
(3) Die Minister van Binnelandse Sake kan rcgulasics io 
verband met die registrasie van Kleurlingkiesers, die opstel 
van Kleurlingkicscrslystc en die hou van verkiesings vir di: 
doelcindcs van hierdie Wet uitvaardig, en so ' n regulasie kan 
cnige regulasie ingcvolgc die Kieswct uitgcvaardig, toepas met 
die wysigings of aanpassings wat bedoelde Minister nodig ag. 
10. (I) Niemand word as lid van die Raad benoem nie. 
tensy-
(a) hy ooreenkomstig sub-artikel (l) van arlikel rier 
bcvoeg is om as 'n kiescr geregistreer te word; co 
(b) hy vir 'n tydperk van minstens twee jaar onmiddclli\: 
voor die datum van sy benoeming ononderbroke in 
die provinsie wat hy benoem word om te verteen· 
woordig, gewoon het. 
(2) Niemand behalwe 'n persoon wat op die KJeurling· 
kieserslys geregistrecr is en vir 'n tydperk van minstens t\\Ce 
jaar onmiddellik voor die datum van sy verkiesing ononderbroke 
in d ie provinsie waarin die kiesafdeling gelei! is w~arvoor h~ 
hom verkicsbaar stet, gewoon het, is bevoeg om tot lid van die 
Raad vcrkies te word nie. 
(3) 'n Persoon in sub-arlikc\ (I) van artikel1•yfvan die W-:t op 
die Onderdrukking van Kommunisme, 1950 (Wet No. 44 Y:!n 
1950), bedocl, is nie bcvoeg om tot lid van die Raad verkics of 
b-:nocm tc word of om lid van die Raad te bly nie. 
11. Elke lid van die Raad moet, voordat hy sy sitplek innccm, 
'n ecd in die volgende vorm voor 'n landdros ane en ondertekcn: 
Ek, A.D., sweer hiennee trou aan die Republiek van Suid· 
Afrika en ondcrnecm plegtig om my pligte as lid van di: 
Vcrlecnwoordigcnde Kleurlingraad van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika na die beste van my vcrmoe uit te voer. 
So help my God. 
12. (I) Dehoudens die bepalings van artikel rfertien beklcc ·n 
lid van die Raad sy setel vir 'n tydperk van vyf jaar vanaf di~ 
datum waarop hy verkies of benocm word, en vir die doel word 
'n verkose lid geag verkies te gewees het op die stemdag ten 
opsigte van die belrokkc kiesafdeling vasgestel, hetsy 'n stem· 
ming plaasgevind het al dan nie. 
(2) lndicn die sctel van 'n lid van die Raad vakant word voor 
die datum waarop sy ampstermyn verstryk, word die vakaturc 
gcvul--
(a) in die geval van 'n benoemde lid, deur 'n persoon wat di~ 
Staatspresident volgens voorskrif van hierdie Wet 
benoem; en 
(h) in die geval van 'n verkose lid, deur 'n persoon \IJ! 
volgens voorskrif van hierdie Wet verkics word, 
en 'n aldus bcnoemde of vcrkose persoon bekiee sy amp vir di~ 
. . . 
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occur of references to the Chairman and the Secretary, 
respectively, of the Council. 
(3) The Minister of the Interior may make regulations in 
connection with the registration of Coloured voters, the pre-
~aration of Colomed voters' lists and the holding of elections 
for the purposes or this Act, and any such regulation may apply 
any regulation made under the Electoral Act with such amend-
ments or modifications as the said Minister may consider 
necessary. 
10. (1) No person shall be nominated as a member of the 
Council, unless-
(a) he is qualified as provided in sub-section (1) of section 
four to be registered as a voter; and 
(b) he has for a continuous period of not less than two 
years immediately preceding the date of his nomina-
tion resided in the province ·he is nominated to 
represent. 
(2) No person other than a person registered on the Coloured 
v(Jters' Jist who has for a continuous period of not less than two 
'cars immediately preceding the date of his election resided in 
ihe province in which is situated the electoral division in which 
he is a candidate for election, shall be qualified to be elected as 
a member of the Council. 
(3) No person referred to in sub-section (I) of section .fir!! 
c.f the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 
1950), shall be qualified to be elected or nominated as or to 
remain a member of the Council. 
11. Every member of the Council shall before taking his 
scat make and subscribe an oath before a magistrate in the 
foll<:>wing form: 
I, A.B., do hereby swear to be faithful to the Republic _of 
South Africa and solemnly undertake to perform my duttes 
as a. member of the Coloured Representa tive Council of 
the Republic of South Africa to the best of my ability. 
So help me God. 
12. (1) A member of the Council shall, subject to the pro-
visions of section thirteen, hold office for a period of five years 
from the date on which he is elected or nominated, and for that 
purpose an elected member shall be deemed to have been 
~lccted on the polling day fixed in respect of the electoral 
di1·i~ion concerned, whether or not a ballot has taken place. 
(2) lf the scat of a member of the Council becomes vacant 
before the date o f termination of his period of office, the 
vacancv shall be filled-
(a) in the case of a nominated member, by a person 
nominated by the State President in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act; and 
(b) in the case of an elected member, by a person elected 
in accordance with the pro visions of this A ct. 
. . . 
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13. 'n Lid van die Rand onlruim sy amp-
(a) indicn hy ophou om vir bcnoeming of verkicsing a~ li.l 
van d ic Raad bcvoeg tc wces; of 
(b) indicn hy 'n hcle gewone scssie afwesig bly somkr 
sresialc vcrlof van die Rand, tensy sy afwesigheid te 
wytc is aan sy dicns, terwyl die Republiek in oorlcg 
hctrokke is, in die Suid-Afrikaansc Wcermag of ·n 
:IIHkr 111ag of' diciiS ingcstcl dcur of kr:1gtens di~ 
Yerdedigingswet, 1957 (Wet No. 44 van 1957). 
14. ( l) Die Raad kics 'n voorsilter uit sy !cdc, en wannccr Lli~ 
voorsittcr om die een of antler rede nie sy rligte kan uitvocr nie. 
kies die Raad 'n ander lid om as waarnemende voorsitter or tc 
tree. 
(2) By 'n verkiesing van 'n voorsitter of waarncmcnde \'CO r-
sitter tree die Sekretaris van Klcurlingsake of sy gemagt igdc np 
as voorsitter van die Rand. 
(3) Die persoon wat by 'n vergadering van die Raad voorsit. 
het benewens sy beraadslage11de stem ook 'n beslisscndc stem: 
Met dicn vcr~tandc dat by 'n staking van stemme by die \Cr-
kiesino va n 'n vomsit tcr of waarnernende voorsillcr van die Raad,~ie wedywcrendc kandidalc loot om sodanige aanstclling. 
en di<: wenncr van so 'n loting word geag as voorsitter t'f 
w;wrnemendc voorsittcr, na gclang van die geval, verkie5le \ICC~ . 
15. Die setel van die Rand word deur die Rnacl met gocd-
kcuring van die Minister bepaal. 
16. (I) Die Rnad bn van tyd tot tyd vnstc reglemcnt c 1:1n 
ordc aannccm wal nic mel hicrdic \Vel onbcstaanbaar i-; ni .. · 
vir die reeling en bcstuur van sy verrigtings en die afhandclin~ 
van sy werksaa m hcde. 
(2) Ikltnudcns die b~palings van hicrdic Wet en t eg11la'i~' 
daarkragtcns ui tgcvaardig en cnigc vastc reglcmcnt va n ortk i• 
dnar \'fyhcid van spraak en dehat in die Raad. 
(3) Gcen lid van die uitvoercnde komitee of van die R;~atl i' 
blootgcstcl aan cnigc regsgcding uit hoofde van 'n aangeleenthciJ 
of o nderwcrp wat hy hy petisie, konsepwetgc\ving, besluit. \·oor· 
stel or andcrsins ann die Raad voorgelc het of uit hoofde 1:111 
wat hv in die Raad of'n vcrgadering van die uitvoercnde komitc~ 
of 'n ~.o mitce deur die Raad aangestel, gesc het ofuit hoofde 1:1n 
die wysc waaror hy in die Raad gestem bet nie: Met dien \C f-
standc dat die bcpalings van hierdie sub-artikel 'n lid van tl i~ 
Raad nic onlhef van aansprccklikhcid ten opsigtc van enigict' 
deur hom gesc of gedoen met betrekking tot die Senaal. di~ 
Yolksrnad, 'n provinsiale raad , 'n gercgshof of 'n statut~rt: 
Jiggaam of 'n lid daarvan of ' n bcampte in die Staatsdicns. ten 
opsigtc waarvan hy by ontstentenis van bedoelde bcpaling; 
aansprccklik sou gcwccs het nic. 
17. (J) (a) Daar is 'n uitvoerende komitee van die Rnad 1q' 
best nan uit vyf raadsledc, van wie cen cleur die Sta:1!<· 
nrc~ idcnt a~ voorsit icr van die komiice a:~nf2C1\"/S ll•'r •~ 
l<JLUUIU:O I'UlSOi':S l<.I:I ' IU·Sl::--.! 1.\ ll \1. t OUN( II. t \l'l 
13. A member of the Council shall vacate his officc-
(a) if he ceases to be qualified for nominat ion or elect ion 
as a member of the Council; or 
(b) if he fails for a whole ordinary session to attend without 
the special leave of the Council unless his absence is 
clue to his serving, while the Republic is at war, with 
the South African Defence Force or any ~>Lhcr force 
<'r service established by or Uiltkr the DcJ'cncc Act, 
1957 (Act No. 44 of 1957). 
1~. ( l) The Council shall elect a chairma n from amongst its 
members, and whenever the chairman is for anv reason unable 
to perform his duties, the Council shall elect another member to 
scn·e as acting chairman. 
(2) At at,y election of a chairman o r acting chairman the 
SCCJetary for Coloured Affairs or his nominee shall act as 
chairman of the Council. 
(3) The person presiding at a meeting of the Council shall in 
addition to his deliberative vote also have a casting vote : 
Provided that in the case of an equali ty of votes for the election 
of a chairman o r acting chairman of th:: Council the contesting 
cand idates shall draw lots for such appointment and the winner 
of such draw shall be deemed to be elected chairman o r act ing 
chairman as the case may be. 
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tS. The seal of the Council shall be determined by the Scot of Council. 
Council with the approval of the Minister. 
16. (I) The Council may from time to t.imc adopL standing 
rules and orders not inconsistent with this Act, for the regulation 
and conduct of its proceedings and the dispa tch of business. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any regulations 
made thereunder, and of any standing rules and orders, there 
shall be freedom of speech and debate in the Council. 
(3) No member of the executive committee or of the Council 
shall be liable to any legal proceedings by vir tue of :iny matter 
or subject which he may have brought by peti tion, draft law, 
resolution, motion or otherwise, or by vi rtue of anything he may 
ha\'e said before the Council or a t any meeting of the executive 
committee or a committee appointed by the Council , or by 
reason of his vote in the Council: Provided that the provisions 
of this sub-section shall not relieve a member of the Council 
C1f liabil ity in respect of anything said or done by him in rega rd 
to the Senate, the House of Assembly, a provincial council, a 
court of law or a statutory body or a member thereof or an 
0mcer of the public service, in respect of which he would, hu t 
for the said provisions, have been liable. 
17. (I) (a) There shall be an executive committee of the 
Council consisting of five members of the Council of 
whom one shall be designated bv the State President 
n~ clwirmnn of the cnnm1i!lee and four sh3 li be clec1ed 
r rcl''"'lll of 
speech in Council. 
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· t k 1 nic ook die voor-(b) Die nidus anngcwcsc voors!t cr ar 
sitter van die Raad wees me. d' I . I 
• . [' 1 • rdic Wet bcklcc JC cue (2) Uehoudcns d•c bcpa .lllgs van a: vir die duur van hut 
van die uit vocrende kom~~c~~~ud: M~t dien verstande d~t die 
ampstermy!l as led? va\d' I'd van die komitce by beslu•t van 
Raad tc emge.r tybd n gedosc.t• twcc-derdes van al sy lede van 
'n mcerderhc1d cstaan c Ul 
sy amp kan onthcf. . d I d ur 
(3) •11 V~knturc in ~ie _uitvoere~d~n~o~;1 \~~e ;~~r di;e;~ad eop 
die annwysmg of ~crkdr.csmg vrn an die lid wie se setel vakanl dieselfdc wyse as m re gcva v. 
geword hct. . · d komitec om 
(4) Wann~c~ die vo?rsitter van dlelt~~v~f{~~ v~cr nic, of die 
enigc rcdc n•c Ill staat IS ?m~y a~~~i~stcr 'n ander lid van die 
voorsitter se amp vakant IS, an de voorsitter te dien totdat die 
Rand aanwys om as. warne~cn at of die vakature gevul word. 
voorsitter sy ampsphgte a~ er':'' de komitee maak 'n 
(5) (a) Dric led\ van .~~~es~I!~i~~evnan 'n meerderhei~ va.n 
kworum Ul en , d 'ng van die kom1tee IS ?~eb~~{~ite!~g~ ~r~~~£i~;\~~~;:0Ee1e~~~n v~cr~~~~~tl~~~ bes~lllt va; a le stemme die voorsitter benewens sy 
by n sta mg van k 'n beslissende stem het. be.raadslage~de .sted~ ~~tvoerende komitee is vertroulik 
(b) ~~~g~s~~~~~';tg ~~ig~ inli~tin~ 1i~e~~r~f:~i~~\e~ov~~ 
stemmmg openbaardmaakk, k,d,aarna tot tyd en wyl 'n 
mp onthef wor en an ' , d k 
sy a d , 1 algemene verkiesing tot stan orn, n~we raa s l~lda v•an die komitee gekies of benoem word me weer a 
nie. l akatures in die uitvoerende (c) Wanneer daar ~ovee v, nie verkry kan word nie, komit~e is dat. 11 kd\~O~~~itec se pligte uit totdat die voer die voorsJtter !e 
vakatures gevul kan word. . . k 
, ie uitvoerende komitec verng ~le . wer -
(6) (a) D d. R d behalwe vir sover d1t d1e maak 
saamhcde van Je aa i die 'Raad nie in sitting is nie, ~~nb~e~:~i:~t~r·d~:r~~gende a~ngeleenthede vir sover 
dit Kleurlinge betref, te wete,-
(i) finans!es; . 
(ii) plaashke bestuur, 
(iii) onderwys; . . 
. ) kapswelsyn en pensroene, en . 
(Iv lgc~~~~se ebiede en nedersettin.gs vir Kleur.lmg~. 
(v) an . d' g val van die voorsJttcr, aan WJe die (b) Behalwe m le ge ~ 1 · b ectra word wys b~har.tiging v3n ~naits~~s te:~e~~i~l~g van elk va'u die dl~ Ultvocr~~e~thede in paragraaf (a) vermcld cen van 
onge kaan1e de nan orn namcns hom en onder sy opdrag s~ gc osc ~I d' uit te ocfen en die wcrksaamhe~le <;n 
d !C bevoeg le. e t m~"f dnnrdie an ngcleentheld JO pfinff' f r- Vf"rrlf' \\'fl 1 ' 
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(b) The chairman so designated shall not also be the 
chainnan of the Council. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act the members of the 
executive committee shall hold office for the duration of their 
period of office as members of the Council: Provided that the 
Council may at any time by resolution of a majority consisting 
of two-thirds of all its members remove any elected member of 
the committee from office. 
(3) Any vac:1ncy in the executive committee shall be filled by 
the designation or election of another member of the Council in 
the same manner as in the case of t.he member whose scat has become vacant. 
(4) Whenever the chairman of the executive comm it tee is for 
any reason unable to perform the duties of his omcc, or the 
office ofchainnan is vacant, the Minister may designate another 
member of the Council to serve as ac.ting chainnan until tl1e 
chainnan is able to resume his office o r the vacancy is filled. 
(5) (a) Three members of the executive committee shall be a 
quorum and the decision of a majority of the members 
present at a mccling of the committee shall be a 
decision of the committee and shall be deemed to be a 
joint decision of all the members : Provided that in 
the event of an equality of votes 1 he chairman shall 
have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote. 
(b) Any voting in the executive commitrcc shall be confi-
dential and a member who discloses any information 
in connection with any such voting, may be removed 
from his office by the Minis ter, and shall not thereafter 
until such time as a new Council comes into existence 
after a ccneral election, be capable of being elected or 
designated a member of the committee. 
(c) Whenever there are so many vacancies in the executive 
comm ittee that a quorum cannot be obtained, the 
chairman shall perform the duties of the committee 
until the vacancies can be filled . 
(6) (a) The executive committee sha ll carry out the functions 
of the Council, except in so far as the making of laws 
is concerned, while the Council is not in session, and 
shaU a lso deal with the following matters in so fa r 
as they affect Coloured persons, namely-
(i) fin a nee ; 
(ii) local government; 
(iii) education; 
(iv) community welfare dnd pensions; and 
(v) rural areas and settlements for Coloureds. 
(b) Except in the case of the chairman, to who m the 
management of finance is hereby assigned, the execu-
tive com mittee shall in respect of each of the remaining 
matters mentioned in paragra rh (n) designate one or 
its elected members to exercise and pcrf'orm r>n it5 t t . tr . , 
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(c) Ond,anks an~lc;sluidcndc wetsbepalings kan die l'vlini5t~r 
of n Atln~JOJstrntcur by kcnnisgewing in die Sraat_t-
~oerant cntg? ~cvocgdhcid wnt by wet nan hom Ycrlccn 
1s en wa~ op n lll paragraaf(a) vcrmclde aangclccnthcid 
bctrckkmg hct, dclcgcer aan die lid van die komitec 
wat nnngewys of nan wie dit opgedra is om die wcrk-
saamh~de verb~nd? aan bedoelde aangeleentheid tc 
bchnrt1g, en ~o r: l1d oefcn bedoelde bevoegdhedc uit 
ooreenkomst1g d1e opdrag van die komitee. 
(7) Wanneer 'n gekose lid van die uitvoerenclc komi tee om die 
e:n of an~cr red~ nie in stunt is om sy wcrksaamhcde te verri2 
me, wys dJC komJtee ' 11 ander gckose Jid van die komitee aan om 
eersbedoclde lid se pligte uit te voer totdat hy sy werksaamhcdc 
kan hervat. 
18. Elk~ lid van die uitvocrende komitee moet voordat hr 
sy ampsphgte nanvnar 'n eed in die volgende vorm voor ·n 
landdros aile en onderteken: 
~k, A: B., sweer hiermee trou aan die Republick \·an 
SUJd-Afnka en onderneem voor God om hicrdie trou 
gestand te doen; om my amp as lid van die uitvocrcndc 
k?mitce va_n die Ver~eenw<?ordigende Kleurlingraad Yan 
'he Repu~l1ek van SUJd-Afnka met eer en waardigheid tc 
bckl~e;_ d1e Grondwet en die reg van die Republiek te 
eerb1ed1g en te handhaaf; 'n opregte en getroue raadsman 
tc wces ; gecn sake wat voor die uitvoerende komi tee dien e!' 
wat aan my vir geheimhouding toevertrou word rcl!-
st~ceks of onrcgstreek~ te ope~baar nie; en om my ~rnp~­
phgte met nougesethetd na d1e beste van my vermoc na 
te kom. 
So help my God. 
19. (J) Die lede van die Rnad ontvang die toelacs wat die 
Staatsprcsident bepaal. 
(2) Die Staatspresident kan in die gcval van lede van die Raad 
wat o_ok lede_ van die uitvocrende komitee is, toelaes bepaal wat 
verskll van d1e toelaes vir ander Raadslede bepaal, of bepaal dat 
aan Raadslede wat ook lede van die uitvoerende komitec is 
addisionele toelaes benewens hul toelaes as Raadslede betaai 
~oet word, en kan op dieselfde wyse tussen die voorsitter \·an 
d~e Raad en and~r randslede en tusscn die voorsitter van die 
mtvoerende komttee en andcr komiteelede onderskeid maak. 
20. (I) Die Raad is bevocg-
(n) om op versoek die Regering te adviseer in verband met 
aile sake r~kende die ekonomiese, maatskaplikc. 
OJWOc~kundige . en staatkundige belange van die 
Kleurh~gbevol~mg van die Republiek; en 
(b) om by d1e Regenng aanbevelings te doen in verband met 
aile ~angcleenthedc rnkende die ekonomie~c. maat-
~k.arllke, _opvo~dkundige en politieke belanpc van die 
\...lii .. Ul.JH. Lt.l JJ .. h.,)\1 . ,,} h l.t" L ,,i,\ 1/\t l '•· '- '),,, . , , .... , • . _ , 
(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained 
in any law, the Minister or an Administrator may 
by notice in the Gazette delegate any power conferred 
upon him by any law which relates to any matter 
referred to in paragraph (a), to the member of the 
committee designated to perform the functions inci-
dental to that matter or to whom that matter has been 
assigned, and any such member shall exercise such 
powers in accordance with the directions of the 
committee. 
(7) Whenever an elected member of the executive committee 
is for any reason unable to perform his functions, the com-
mittee may designate any other elected member of the committee 
to perform the duties of such first-mentioned member until he 
is able to resume his functions. 
18. Every member of the executive committee shall before 
assuming his official duties make antl subscribe before a 
magistrate an oath in the following form: 
I, A.B., do hereby swear to be faithful to the Republic 
of South Africa, and undertake before God to abide by 
this allegiance; to hold my oflice as a member of the 
executive committee of the Coloured Representative 
Council of the Republic of South Africa with honour and 
dignity; to respect and uphold the Constitution and the 
law of the Republic; to be a true and faithful adviser; 
not to divulge directly or indirectly any matters brought 
before the executive committee and entrusted to me to 
keep secret; and to perform the duties of my omce 
conscientiously and to the best of my abil ity. 
So help me God. 
19. (I) The members of the Council shall receive such allow-
ances as the State President may determine. 
(2) The State President may in the case of members of the 
Council who are also mcmbe'rs of the executive committee 
determine allowances which differ from the allowances deter-
mined for other members of the Council, or determine that 
members of the Council who are also members of the executive 
committee be paid additional allowances arart from their 
allowances as members of the Council, and may in like manner 
differentiate between the chairman of the Council and other 
members of the Council and between the chairman of the 
executive committee and other members of the committee. 
20. (I) The Council shall have power-
(a) on request to advise the Government in regard to all 
matters affecting the economic, social, educational 
and political interests of the Coloured population of 
the Republic; 
(b) to make recommendations to the Government in 
regard to all matters affecting the economic, social, 
educational and ~olitic_a .l. iolcres!s of the Coloured 
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Verleoiog van 
wetgewende 
bevocgdhcid 
aan Raad. 
Rcgcring aanbevclings te doen in verbnnd met cnigc 
bcplanning wat na die mening van die Rand berekcn i<. 
om die beste belange van genoemde bevolking te b~· 
vordcr; 
(r) om in die algerncen te d ien as 'n skakel en 'n middel Yir 
kontak en beraadslaging tussen die Regering en 
genocmde bevolking. 
(2) Vir die tloelcindes van sub-artikel (1) word die Regering 
deur die Minister vcrteenwoordig. 
(3) Deur bemiddeling van die M inister het lede van die 
uitvoercnde komitcc regstrecksc tocgang tot enigc Minister in 
verband met enigc aangclccntheid rakende die Kleurling-
bevolking van die Republ:ek. 
(4) Die Minister en die Sckretaris van Kleurlingsake kan 
enige vergadcring van die Raad of die uitvoerende komitce 
bywoon en aan die verrigtings aldaar deelneem, maar kan nie 
by so 'n vergaclcring stem nie. 
(5) (a) Die Raad kan met gocdkcuring deur die 
Minister na oorlcgplcging met die Minister van Finan-
sics verlccn, eicndom vcrkry en daaroor beskik. 
dicnaars annstel en cnigiets antlers doen wat hy by die 
uitoefening van sy bevoegdhede of die verrigting van sy 
werksaamhede nodig ag. 
(b) Die Raad kan 'n pensiocnskema instcl vir die dienaars 
of cnigc klas dicnaars deur hom aangestcl. 
(6) Die Minister kan met inagneming van die wetsbepalings 
op die Staatsdiens beamptes in die Staatsdiens beskikbaar $tel 
om die Raad by d ie verrigting van sy werksaamhede by tc staan. 
(7) So ' n bcampte bly in a ile opsigte o nderworpe aan die 
wetsbepalings op die Staatsdiens. 
(8) D ie salaris en toclacs aan so 'n beampte betaalbaar en 
enige bydraes wat in verband met so 'n beampte deur die 
Regering aan cnige pcnsiocn- of voorsorgsfonds betaalbaar is, 
word, terwyl hy by die Raad dicns docn, deur die Raad bctaal 
uit die gelde ingcvolge sub-artikcl (2) van artikel twee-en-twintig 
aan die Raad oorbetaal. 
21. ( I) Die Staatspresident kan by proklamasie in die Staats-
koerant aan die Raad die bevoegdheid vcrleen om wette te maak 
ten opsigtc van enige vcrmelde onderwerp wat binne 'n in 
paragraaf (a) van sub-artikel (6) van artikel sewentien genoemde 
aangclt:enthcid val, en daarop het die Raad, behoudens die 
bepalings van hierdie Wet, d iesclfde bevoegdheid o m oor so 'n 
onderwcrp wctte te maak as wat by die Parlement berus. 
(2) Geen voorgestelde wet word in die Raad ingedien nie, 
bcha ]we met gocdkeuring deur die Minister na oorlegpleging met 
die Minister van Finansics en die Administrateurs verlcen. 
(3) Die Minister laat 'n cksemplaar van elke proklamasie 
wat kragtens sub-artikel (I) uitgcvaardig is, in die Senaat en in 
die Volksraad ter Tafel lc binne vecrticn dac na die publikasie 
daarvan as die Parlcmcn t in gewone scssie is, o f, as die Parlemcnt 
nie in gewone scssie is nic, binnc vcer!icn dac na die aanYang 
. ' . 
tions to the Government in regard to any planning 
calculated, in the opinion of the Council , to promote 
the best interests of the said population; 
(c) generally to serve as a link and means of contact and 
consultation between the Government and the said 
population. 
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1) the Government shall 
be represented by the Minister. 
(3) Dy mediation of the Minister members of the executive 
committee shall have direct access to any Minister in connection 
with any matter affecting the Coloured population of the 
Republic. 
(4) The Minister and the Secretary for Coloured Affairs may 
attend any meeting of the Council or the executive committee 
and take part in the proceedings thereat, but shall not have the 
right to vote at any such meeting. 
(5) (a) The Council may with the aRproval of the Minister, 
granted after consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, acquire and dispose of p roperty, appoint 
servants and do any other thing which it considers 
necessary in the exercise of its powers or t he perform-
ance o f its functions. 
(b) T he Council may establish a pension scheme for the 
servants or any class of servantc; appointed by it. 
(6) The Minister may subject to the laws governing the public 
service make available officers in the public service to assist the 
Council in the performance of its functions. 
(7) Any such officer shall in all respects remain subject to the 
laws governing the public service. 
(8) The salary and allowances payable to any such officer, 
and any contributions payable by the Government to any 
pension or provident fund in connection wi th any such officer, 
shall so long as he serves with the Council be p aid by the 
Council out of the moneys paid over to the Council in terms of 
sub-section (2) of sectio n twenty-two. 
21. (I) The State President may by proclamation in the 
Ga:.ctte confer upon the Council the power to make laws in 
respect of any specified subject falling within any matter 
referred to in paragraph (a) of sub-section (6) of section seven-
/een, and thereupon the Council shall, subject to the provisions 
of this Act, have the same power to make laws in regard to such 
subject as is vested in Parliament. 
(2) No proposed law shall be introduced in the Council 
except with the approval of the Minister granted after consulta-
tion with the Minister of Finance and the Administrators. 
(3) The Minister shall cause a copy of every proclamation 
issued under sub-section (I) to be laid upon the Tables of the 
Senate and the House of Assembly within fourteen days after 
publication thereof if Parliament is in ordinary session or if 
Parliament is not in ordinr.ry session within fourteen days 
r . . ... . ' . . . . : . ,... . ... ~: .. ... - · . ,... .~ r •. : • • ~ .. 
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22. (I) Die geldc wat vir die uitocfcning van die bevucutlk~~ 
en die vcrrigting van die werksaamhcde en pligtc van di; R:!.!~ 
nodig is, word jaarliks bcskikbaar gestel uit gelde wat c: ~ 
Parlement vir die doc! hewillig het. 
(2) Die Rand moet van tyd tot tyd ramings van sy uitl!:l\\~ ' 
vir goedkeuring aan dieM inister voorle, en die Minister Ia at, ~ :: 
tyd tot tyd uit die ingevolgc sub-artikel (I) bewilligdc geldc :!.! :: 
die Raad die bcdrac oorbctaal wat nodig is om die uitgawes t! 
dek wat die Minister goedgekeur het. 
(3) Enige bedrag ingevolge sub-artikel (2) aan die Raad oor· 
betaal, mocl deur die Raad gestor! word in 'n rekening by·:: 
bank wal die Minister, na oorlcgpleging mel die Minister \ ':!:: 
Finansics, gocdgekeur het en waaruit aile uitgawes dcur di~ 
Raad aangcgaan, bctaal moet word. 
(4) Die Raad beloop gcen uitgawes wat die deur die Minister 
goedgekeurde uitgawes oorskry nie. 
(5) Die Raad moet behoorlike rekenings van al sy tramabi~! 
laat hou en bedoeldc rckcnings moct deur die Kontroleur en 
Ouditeur-gcncraal geouditeer word. 
(6) 'n Afskrif van enige versing dcur die Kontroleur e:: 
Ouditeur-generaal ann die Minister van Finansies gestuur in 
vcrband met enigc ouditering deur hom uitgevoer, moet aan di! 
Minister van Kleurlingsake gestuur word. 
23. (I) Elke wetsontwcrp deur die Raad a-:mgeneem. m·~~ : 
onvcrwyld nadat dit aangcneem is, tesame met die verduidcli~­
ende opmcrkings wat nodig is om die omvang, uitwerking e:1 
rcdes vir die aanname daarvan aan te dui, deur die Sckretar.; 
van die Raad in sowel die Afrikaanse as die Engelse taal aan tl:: 
Sekretaris van Kleurlingsake besorg word, wat dit ann d i~ 
Minister stuur om nan die Staatsprcsidcnt vir sy toesternminc 
voorgclc te word. -
(2) (a) Die Staatspresidcnt kan, wannccr 'n welsont wcrp ~~:: 
hom voorgclc word, verklaar dat hy daarin toestcm 0f 
dat hy sylocstemming wecrhou of dat hy die wctSC'!l'.· 
werp na d ie Raad terugvcrwys vir verdere oorweging in 
die Jig van sodanige inligting en advies as wat gcg~~ 
word. 
(b) Waar die Staatspresident sy toestemming tot 'n wet;. 
ontwcrp verleen, word een eksemplaar van die wct'-
ontwerp deur hom onderteken. 
(3) 'n Opgawe wat aandui dat 'n wetsontwcrp vir \·erd~r~ 
oorweging terugverwys is, of dat die Staatsprcsidcnt sc l <'~ · 
stemming daartoe wcerhou is, word binne 'n tydperk \·an SC\\~ 
dac na ontvangs daarvan deur die Sekretaris van die Ra:!c. 
indien die Raad dan in sessie is, of, indien die Raad dan nie i:1 
sessie is nie, binne 'n tydperk van sewe dae na die aanvang \':!1 
die eersvolgendc scssie van die Raad, in dit: Raad tcr t::f-:! 
gelc saam m et sodanigc advies en inligting :;:; wat die St3:n· 
president gegee hct. 
24. (I) Die Sekretaris van Kleurlingsake laat elke wet ten 
opsig!e wanrvan toestemming dcur die Staatsprcsident verlccn 
. . ,. , , ,.. ,. 
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22. ( 1) The moneys required for the exercise of the power.s 
~nJ the performance of the functions and duties of the ~ounc1l 
~~~ll be made available annually out of moneys appropnated by 
P1rliament for the purpose. 
Funds Clf 
Council. 
I~) The Council shall from time to time submit estim~t~s of 
::; c.'(pcnditure to t.he Minister for al?proval, and the Mt~tster 
! ~:111 from time to t1me cause to be patd over to the. Cou nell out 
c-~ the moneys appropriated in terms of sub-se.cuon ( I) such 
~-nounts as may be necessary to cover the expenditure whtch the 
\linistcr has approved. . . 
(3) Any amount paid over to th~ ~ounctl under s~b-sectwn 
(~)shall be deposited by the Councli m a~ acco~nt w1th a. ~ank 
1ppro\'cd by the Mi~ister, after c~nsult_atwn wtth the Mm1ste.r 
" f Finance, from wh1ch all expendtture mcurred by the Council 
>h311 be paid. 
(~) The Council shall not incur a~~ expenditure in excess of 
the expenditure approved by the M1mster. . 
(5) The Council shall cause proper accounts of a~ltls trans-
!:tions to be kept and such accounts shall be aud1ted by the 
C0ntrollcr and Auditor-General. 
(6} A copy of any report _tr~osmitted ~Y the <;ontroller ~nd 
.\uditor-General to the Mtmster of Fmance 111 .connectiOn 
?.ith any audit carried ou~ by him, shall be transm1tted to the 
\linister of Coloured Affa1rs. 
2J. ( I) Every bill passed by the Co~mcil shall, forthwith 
!~tcr having been passed, together. wt.th such explanatory 
,'~'cn·ations as may be necessary to mdtcat~ the scope, effect 
:1nJ reasons for the passing thereof, be submttted by the .secre-
t:lr\· of the Council in both the English and ~he Afnkaans 
h n.guage to the ~e~retary for Colo~tred Alfatrs wl,10 .shall 
tr.1n::mit it to the Mtmster for presentation to the State I restdent 
fN his assent. 
(2) (a) The State President may on the presentation to hi~ of 
a bill declare that he assents thereto or that he wtth-
holds' his assent or that he refers the bill back to the 
Council for further consideration in the light of such 
information and advice as may be given. 
· (h) Where a bill is assented ~o by the ~tate President one 
copy of the bill shall be stgned by lu m. 
()) A return indicating that a bill has been ref~rred ,back for 
further consideration, or that the State Pres1dent s assent 
t~t::rcto has been withheld, shall withjn a perio? ?f seven daY:s 
.!ft::r it is received by the Secretary of the Counc1l, tf t~e Cou_nctl 
:5 then in session, or, if the Council is not then m sessiOn, 
·.,ithin a period of seven days afte.r the c~mmencement of tl!e 
~rst ensuing session of the Counc1l, be latd upon t~e table m 
the Council together with such information and adv1c0 as may 
h:t'e been given by the State President. 
2-t. (I) The Secretary for Coloured Aflair~ shall cause every 
! 1,,. in respect of which assent has hecn g1ven by tl1e State 
Consent to law~. 
Promulgation and 
date o f 
e<>M!llcn~ment 
YJX 
Wet No. 49 
van 1964. 
Woordbcpaling. 
Kort titel 
en inwerking-
treding. 
Wet No. 50 
van 1964. 
W YSI(i IN< ;s \Vi; I' Ill' I 'Nt;liMOKON IOSEVUt(;OI 'DI NU 
'n tyuperk van hoog~tcns cen jaar op 'n kecr, maar so ·n ~~:· 
Jcnging vcrval op die datum waarop die eerstc Raad ingc,·ol~: 
hicrdic Wet saamgcstcl word. 
30. Tcnsy uit d ie sarnchang anders blyk, beteken in hicr~ : ~ 
Wet-
(i) , Administratcur' ' 'n Admin.istrateur wat in oorl:;: 
mel en met tocstemming van die uitvocrende komi:~ 
van die bet rokke provinsic handel ; (i) 
(ii) ,Kieswct" die Wet tot Konsolidasie van die Kics11c!:~. 
I 946 (Wet No. 46 van 1946), soos by artikcl ncF 
toegepas ; (iv) 
(iii) , Kleurli ng" icmand wat kragtens die Bcvolkingmg:. 
strasiewet, 1950 (Wet No. 30 van 1950), geklnssifi~w 
is as ' n lid van die Kaapse K leurling-, Malcicr- cf 
Griekwagroep of die groep Ander Gekleurde~; (ii) 
(iv) .,Kicurlingkiescrslys" die in sub-a rtikel (2) van arti~d 
drie bcdoclde kiescrslys; (iii) 
(v) ,Minister" d ie Minister van Klcurlingsake; (\') 
(vi) ,Sckrctaris van die Raad" 'n beamplc of wcrkn::rr.~: 
aangestel om die sekretaricle werksaamhede \'an d:~ 
Raad te behartig. (vi) 
31. Hicrdie Wet heet die Wet op die Verteenwoordigcr.~~ 
Kleurlingrnad, 1964, en tree in wcrking op ' n datum wat ~i~ 
Staatsprcsident by proklamasie in die Staatskoerant bcpu:!l. 
WET 
Tot wysiging nm die PncurnokonioscYergoedingswct, 1962. 
Wysiging van 
artikel I van 
Wet 64 van 1962. 
Wysiging van 
artikel 27 van 
Wet 64 van 1962. 
(Afrilwanse teks deur die Staatspreside11t geteken.) 
(Goedgekeur op 27 Mei 1964.) 
DAAR WORD Bf:PAAL dcur die Staatspresident, die S;:n1~: 
en d ie Volksraad van die Republick van Suid-Mrib. 
soos volg :-
1. A rtikcl een van die Pneumokonioscvcrgoedingswcr. 1 9~: 
(hkrondcr die Hoofwet genoem), word hierby gewysig dcur ::: 
die omskrywing van ,voordeel" in suh-an:kcl (I) na die 110<':~ 
, kleurlingn rbcidcr" wnar dit ook al voorkom die woonJ.: .. r ~ 
kleurlingvrou" in tc vocg. 
2. Art ikcl se1re-en-twintig van die Hoofwct won] hicr~~ 
gewysig-
(a) dcur die woordc ,.Gecn scrtiflkaat van geskiktl· ·:id •' 
P Nt· U~IocoNtosls Cm1PENSATtON ;\~11: ;--: tnlt:NT ,\<"T 
fc>r a period not exceeding one year at a. time, but any sue~ 
c\tcnsion sha ll lapse on the date on whtch the first Counctl 
"Jnllcr this Act is consti tuted . 
)')'I 
Act No. 49 
of 1964. 
30. In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates- Definition~. 
(i) "Administrator" means an Administrator acting. in 
consultation with and with the consent of tlw cxccutii"C 
committee of the province concerned; (i) 
(ii) "Coloured person" means any person who is classified 
under the Population Registration Act, 1950 (Act 
No. 30 of 1950), as a member of the Cape Coloured, 
Malay or Griqua group or the O ther Coloured 
group; (iii) 
(iii) "Coloured voters' list" means the voters' list referred 
to in sub-section (2) of section three; (iv) 
(iv) "Electoral Act" means the Ell!ctoral Consol idation 
Act, 1946 (Act No. 46 of 1946), as applied by section 
11i11e; (ii) 
(v) "Minister" means the Minister of Coloured AO"airs; (v) 
(\·i) "Secretary of the Council" means an o~cer or _em-
ployee appointed to perform the secrctanal functiOnS 
of the Council. (vi) 
31. This Act shall be called the Coloured Persons_ Rcpre-
~c ntativc Council Act, 1964, and shall come into oper~t1o~ on a 
date to be fixed by the State President by proclamatiOn 111 the 
Ga::clte. 
.\ct ~o. 50 
of 1964. 
Short title :1nd 
commencement. 
To amend the Pneumoconiosis Compensation Act , 1962. 
(Afrikaans text signed by the State President.) 
(Assented to 27th May, 1964.) 
IJE IT ENACTED by the State President, the Senate and the House of Assembly of the Republic of South Africa, as 
follows:-
!. Section one of the Pneumoconiosis Compensation Act, 
1962 (hereinafter referr~d t~ as the pri~c.ipal Ac~~· is he.~e~y 
amended by the insert1on m the dcllmt10n of ~~encllt m 
,uh-scction (I) a fter the words "coloured labourer wherever 
lhcy occur of the words "or coloured female". 
Amendment of 
section I of 
Act 64 of 1962 
20 Section tll'enty-seven of the princi1'al Act is hcrcbv Amendment of 
· · section 27 of 
amended- of Act 64 of 1962 
(a) bv the <;ub~titu t ion fnr the words "No certifica te 
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Appendix 5 
AMENDMENT OF C.P.R.C. ACT - March 1975 
Insertion of 
section 22A in Act 
49 of 1964 
Short Title 
2. The following section is hereby 
inserted in the Coloured Person's 
Representative Council Act, 1964, 
after section 22 : 
Power 
0 f 
the 
Minis 
ter 
22A. "If the Minister is 
satisfied that the chairman 
of the executive, the 
executive of the Council 
fails, for whatever reason, 
to exercise or perform, in 
terms of this Act, any power, 
function or duty conferred or 
imposed by this Act, the 
Minister may exercise or 
perform such power, function 
or duty, or authorise any 
other person to exercise or 
perform such power, function 
or duty. 
( 2) Any such power, function 
or duty so exercised or 
performed, shall for the 
purpose of this Act be deemed 
to have been exercised or 
performed by the chairman of 
the executive or the 
executive of the Council, as 
the case may be, in terms of 
this Act". 
This Act shall be called the 
Coloured Persons 
Representative Council 
Amendment Act, 1975 
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Appendix 6 
A who's who for the period 1964-1980 
ADAMS A. ('Lofty'): Always prominent in the debates and a 
controversial personality, Adams entered the 
C.P.R.C. in 1969 as a nominated representative 
for the Malay community and a member of Tom 
Swartz's pro-Separate Development Federal 
Party. Soon disillusioned with Federal policy, 
he became an independent in September 1972 and 
jointed the Labour Party at the end of the 
final session of the first C.P.R.C. in 1974. 
He defeated the new leader of the Federal 
Party, W J Bergins, in the 1975 elections and 
. he became one of the most capable of the Labour 
members in the C.P.R.C. A rift grew between 
him and party hierarchy over the question of 
rapprochement with the government and he was 
expelled from Labour towards the end of 1979. 
Adams went on a self-styled "peace crusade" 
thereafter, giving lectures nationwide and 
bitterly attacking Labour in a newspaper called 
Reach out, which he personally financed. He 
was appointed to the President's Council in 
1980 and died in 1984. 
AFRICA W S: A nominated Federal Party member of the Council 
after 1969 and 1975, Africa was distinguished 
by his anti-black sentiments which he voiced 
openly in the C.P.R.C. debates. He took over 
the leadership of the Freedom (previously 
Federal) Party after the resignation of Bergins 
in 1979 for a short period before accepting an 
appointment to the President's Council in 1980. 
He stood against a Labour candidate in 1984 and 
was defeated. 
ARENDSE M D: Arendse was already a veteran in Coloured 
politics by 1969, having won his reputation as 
a staunch opponent of government policies on 
the Union Council for Coloured Affairs. A 
blunt and irascible politician, he led the 
Labour Party to victory in the 1969 elections 
before being ousted as party leader for 
allegedly becoming over-friendly with the 
Government. Becoming an independent, largely 
out of pique, he rejoined the party just before 
the 1975 elections. This was not enough to win 
him a nomination as a candidate and he was 
heavily defeated after standing as an 
independent. Arendse made an ignominious 
BERGINS Dr W J: 
CURRY D M G: 
DU PREEZ L V: 
ESSOP S.: 
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comeback in the 1984 election to the House of 
Representatives, winning by 3 votes in a 2,2% 
poll. Shortly afterwards he was convicted of 
bribing voters and unseated. 
An educationalist, Berg ins was nominated to the 
Council in 1969, and was subsequently elected 
to the executive with the portfolio of 
Education. He was elected leader of the 
Federal Party in 1975 after Torn Swartz's 
retirement and was again nominated to the 
C.P.R.C. after failing to win election that 
year. He led the Federal Party delegation at 
the meeting of Vorster' s Cabinet Council in 
1976, but resigned from the party and politics 
in 1979 after clashing with other members of 
the party hierarchy. 
curry was a fiery and outspoken stalwart of 
the Labour Party. Unloved by his opponents and 
by many within his own party, he was often 
accused of "radicalism" and of seeking to win 
control of the party himself, as well as of 
victirnising the more moderate members. He was 
elected to the C.P.R.C. Executive after 1975 
and later to Hendrickse's Cabinet in the House 
of Representatives. 
du Preez was elected to the Council as a Labour 
representative in 1969, resigning in 1973 and 
standing successfully for election again in 
1975. He was the Chairman of the Council in 
its sessions after then and also chaired a 
committee of Labour Councillors investigating 
viable constitutional options for South Africa. 
He was unhappy that the party had decided that 
the report of the committee not be submitted 
as evidence before the Schlebusch Commission 
and, having resigned from Labour, submitted it 
as an independent. He was elected to the 
President's Council in 1980 and h e avily 
defeated in the 1984 election. 
Essop was the only independent candidate to be 
elected, in both C.P.R.C. elections, although 
he briefly joined the Federal Party after 
winning in 1969. He carne around to voting 
predominantly for Labour in key issues after 
1972, but only formally j oined the party after 
the abolishing of the C.P.R.C. in 1980. He 
died soon after winning election to the House 
of Representatives in 1984. 
FORTUIN G J: 
LEON L S "Sonny": 
MIDDLETON N S: 
MULLER J A: 
PLAAITJIES W D: 
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Having been elected to the C.P.R.C. Executive 
after the 1975 elections, the more moderate 
Fortuin soon clashed with the hardliners in the 
Labour Party. He was unhappy about resigning 
his position with the rest of the executive 
after Leon's dismissal as Chairman of the 
Executive and piqued at not being re-elected 
to his former position the following year. 
After resigning from Labour, he became one of 
its bitterest foes and worked actively to 
undermine its influence. 
Possibly the most influential Coloured 
politician since Dr Abdurahman, Leon took over 
the leadership of the Labour Party in 1970. 
After the 197 5 elections, however, he came into 
increasing conflict with the more 
uncompromising elements in the party hierarchy 
due to a perceptible moderation of his stance . 
The estrangement led to his resigning as party 
leader in 1978 and from the party itself in 
1980, after which he was appointed to the 
President's Council. 
An executive member of the Labour Party between 
1970 and 1982, Middleton was known as one of 
the hard-liners in the party, being a staunch 
advocate of Black Consciousness and of building 
a united front of non-white leaders, 
particularly with Chief Buthelezi. He resigned 
from Labour, largely out of sympathy for the 
latter, after the party decided to take part 
in the tricameral parliament. 
Like Adams, Muller was a nominated, Federal 
Party member of the Council who quickly became 
disenchanted with the nature and aims of 
swartz 's party. After switching to Labour, 
Muller became a dedicated party worker and 
stood successfully for election in 1975. 
Afterwards he came to oppose the Labour Party' s 
boycottist tactics and went independent. He 
died .in 1979. 
An elected Federal member from the conservative 
Free State, Plaaitj ies abruptly switched to 
Labour qt a crucial stage of the July 1974 No-
Confidence debate, precipitating the collapse 
of the Federals. His switch to Labour was a 
temporary one, his essential conservatism 
RABIE J A: 
ROOKS E G: 
SWARTZ R R: 
SWARTZ W J: 
VAN DER ROSS R E: 
JANSEN A A: 
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seeing him leave the party in opposition to 
their boycottist tactics. 
A colourful, ambitious figure whose long career 
in participation politics seems set to continue 
into the 1990's. Rabie's reputation as a 
Coloured nationalist was not undeserved, 
particularly in the light of his advocating a 
possible Coloured homeland being established 
in Malmesbury. After failing to win the 
leadership of the Federal Party after Swartz's 
retirement, Rabie became an independent. In 
1979 he joined the Labour Party. Rabie was 
also the only C.P.R.C. member to serve on the 
Theron Commission. 
Rooks, a founder member of the Labour Party, 
broke with it in 1971 after publically 
criticising its leadership for fostering closer 
ties with .Buthelezi. The following year he 
formed the Social Democratic Party which fared 
disastrously in the 1975 elections. 
Although probably well-intentioned, Tom Swartz 
was also a megalomaniac who put the favour of 
his white masters before that of the Coloured 
electorate. His willingness to be used as a 
tool to implement a hated social policy, first 
through the chairmanship of the Union Council 
for Coloured Affairs and then as the nominated 
chairman of the C.P.R.C. Executive eventually 
made him an object of derision, not least for 
those whom he served so loyally, if 
misguidedly. 
The only successful National Coloured People's 
Party candidate in the 1969 election, Swartz 
continued to support separate development even 
after the Federal Party rejected it. He was 
nominated to serve a second term in 1975 by a 
grateful Government. 
The founder of the Labour Party and its first 
chairman, van der Ross left politics in 1968. 
His activities since then included serving as 
a member of the Theron Commission and becoming 
the first Coloured rector of U.W.C. 
Nominated to the C.P.R.C. after 1975, Alathea 
Jansen was used, in her capacity as Government-
appointed Chair of the Executive, as a willing 
rubber stamp to execute the Council's functions 
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after Leon's refusal to sign the budget. Good-
natured and well-intentioned, she was also, as 
her exasperated opponents discovered, thick-
skinned and extremely stubborn. 
APPENDIX 7 
POLITICAL PARTIES 1964-1980 
Federal Party: Founded predominantly by members of the Union 
Council for Coloured Affairs in 1964, this party won 
the favour of the Government through its whole-
hearted support for Separate Development and 
poli t;ical quietism. It opposed communism, 
liberalism and racial intermixture, and sought to 
uplift the Coloured people as a distinct, separate 
national group within a multi-racial South Africa. 
Superior organisation, abundant funds and careful 
planning saw the party run a slick campaign in the 
1969 elections, but nevertheless it fared 
disappointingly, winning only 11 of the 40 seats 
contested. All twenty members nominated by the 
central Government, however, were Federal members, 
enabling the party to control the C.P.R.C. until 
July 1974 when a number of defections saw them lose 
a no-confidence motion. Even before that, there had 
been a shift to the left in policy, Separate 
Development coming to be rejected altogether. 
Nonetheless, the party lost further ground in the 
1975 elections, even though the other conservative 
parties had been virtually wiped out. Anxious to 
be rid of its "stooge11 image its name was changed 
to Freedom Party at the beginning of 1978, but it 
was clear by this stage that with the collapse of 
Separate Development had the effect of rendering it 
redundant. Party splits in 1979 and 1984 as well 
as the defection of many of its leaders to the 
dominant Labour Party resulted in the Freedom Party 
being almost completely crushed in the 1984 
elections, though its shadow lingers on. 
Labour Party: The formation of the Federal and other pro-
Government Coloured political parties after 1964 led 
to the Labour Party being formed in 1966 to ensure 
that these were not seen to be representative of 
Coloured opinion. It opposed apartheid, 
discrimination and attempts by the Government to 
foist on the Coloured people a separate ethnic 
identity and forthrightly called for equal rights 
for all South Africans. It also resolved to destroy 
the C. P.R.C . and fight for representation in the 
central Parliament, and won 26 of the 37 seats it 
contested in 1969. This triumph was repeated on an 
even greater scale in 1975, despite the fact that 
the party was hampered by a number of resignations 
in the early 1970s. After resisting a number of 
attempts by the Government to co-opt it into its 
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power-sharing schemes, it was eventually decided, 
in January 1983, to participate in the tricameral 
Parliament, and Labour won nearly all the seats in 
the 1984 elections. However, the unpopularity of 
their decision to participate and a low percentage 
poll greatly undermined the party's credibility. 
MINOR PARTIES: The National Coloured People's Party 
The lj.C.P . P. was slightly to the right of the 
Federal Party, more forthright in its advocacy of 
an exclusively Coloured nationalism and making use 
of racist slogans in the 1969 elections. It polled 
reasonably well in the Transvaal and won one seat. 
In 1972 it merged with the Federal Party . 
Republican Party: Uncommitted on the apartheid issue, the R.P. 
sought to capture the Cape rural vote and 
particularly that of the Griqua community. The 
personality of its leader, Tom Le Fleur, who 
advocated an independent homeland for the Griqua 
people, played an important role. The party gained 
the third-highest number of votes in 1969, despite 
winning only one seat, and survived to fight the 
1975 elections with embarrassing results. 
Conservative Party: A · minority group aiming at maintaining 
existing Coloured rights and protection from African 
competition. It made little impact in the 1969 
elections and threw in its lot with the Federal 
Party soon afterwards. 
Social Democratic Party: A break-away group of disaffected Labour 
members who tried unsuccessfully to set up a middle-
of-the-road party in the Council while opposing 
apartheid. The S.D.P. failed completely in the 1975 
elections and disbanded shortly afterwards. 
Liberal Independent Party: A small, maverick group called 'the 
biggest joke of 1974' by Sonny Leon. It advocated 
the establishment of a Coloured Homeland. Fielded 
no candidates in 1975 and petered out soon after. 
147 
APPENDIX 8 
Extracts from the C.P.R.C. Debates 
The following verbatim extracts are not included solely for 
interest value (though some are entertaining for their own sake) 
but also to illustrate the often undisciplined and petty nature of 
many of the exchanges. Noteworthy remarks concern the low esteem 
nominated members were held in by the elected Labour 
representatives: 
i) M.D. Arendse: 
ii) Hon. Members: 
iii) Chairman: 
iv) w.s. Africa: 
v) N. Middleton : 
Do not order me to sit down. I am not a 
bloody nominated member! (Vol. 23 1973 
9 Aug. p. 153) 
Nominated! 
J.D. Pieterse: Mr Chairman, I feel very 
embarrassed about this call of "nominated! 
nominated! every time I ... (INTERJECTIONS) 
(Vol. 27 July 1974 p.78) 
Order, the Honourable Mrs Potts. Please 
do not get so excited! (Vol. 27 .July 1974 
p. 205) 
Labour kan seker kaffirtaal praat (Vol. 
27 25 July 1974 p 178) 
A n d M r c 1 o e t e 
said ... (INTERJECTIONS) ... Just shut up man! 
(Vol 27 25 July 1974 p. 109) 
vi) Lofty Adams, who had left the Federal Party and openly 
supported Labour, had recently been on trial for murder and 
subsequently acquitted. Tom Swartz, in the bitterness of 
defeat, asked this breathtaking question: 
"Who saved you from the gallows? Tell us" (Vol. 27 1974 26 
July p 302) 
vii) P. Swartz: 
N. Potts: 
J. Rabie: 
Chairman: 
vii) The Chairman: 
Some of the political parties favour political 
integration, others a coloured homeland. 
Rabie! Rabie! 
Los vir my uit! 
Sal die agbare Mev. Potts asseblief stilbly? 
(Vol . 25 19 Sept. 1973 p. 751) 
The Honourable Mr Solomon, I am going to ask 
you to withdraw that. I cannot allow anybody 
to threaten anybody in this chamber! (Vol. 
40, 8 Sept. 1978 p. 40) 
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